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In the face of such complex, urgent threats of fires, floods, and increasingly 
powerful storms, many scholars warn that climate change puts us on the path to a 
technocratic, “rule of experts” for the sake of survival.  Others warn that climate change 
will actually undermine the authority of governments, as they become increasingly 
unable to meet the basic needs of their citizens.  In this dissertation, I draw from 
interviews, archival research, and ethnographic observations in the US and Oman to 
examine how power and historical context shape the way that these societies politicize 
natural disasters.  These two countries have fundamental differences in terms of their 
state-society relations.  Yet responses to recent tropical cyclones demonstrate that each 
country manifests similar contention in the face of disaster.  Contemporary Americans 
and Omanis treat large-scale natural disasters as unplanned spectacles of 
interdependence, attention-grabbing symbols of their nation’s fate in an 
emergency.  Officials and dissidents alike are seizing upon the public’s attention to these 
symbols, competing to anchor them to their own agendas.  For example, disasters are 
treated as “revelations” about the legitimacy of government authorities, or “lessons” 
about public values other than safety from disaster, such as social justice and religious 
piety.  Such disaster-contention in the US and Oman is a relatively new phenomena.  It 
emerged in the early- and mid-twentieth century by virtue of the spread of new 
communication technologies that made it possible to conceive of “national emergencies,” 
and by an expanded vision for government and civic responsibility, making such 
emergencies problems for the government to solve.  I argue that this record of contention 
shows that disasters are not partisan to technocratic order, nor are they conveyor belts to 
chaos.  As the most attention-grabbing manifestations of climate change are treated as 
spectacles of interdependence, they provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs of 
many stripes, including nationalist and democratic movements that deride the rule of 
experts.  The political consequences of climate change are therefore contingent upon the 
historically constructed nature of interpretive frameworks, like “citizenship” and 
“national emergency,” and how officials and dissidents utilize them to give political 
meaning to calamity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Drought, famine, storms, fires, food and water shortages—climate scientists warn 
of a roster of dangers that will become increasingly frequent and more destructive in the 
years to come.  Many social and political theorists are similarly dire in their own 
forecasts.  In the face of such complex, urgent threats, they worry about the kinds of 
citizenship, political authority, and social relations that might follow.  Can the dream of 
having political communities governed by a system of consultation, deliberation, and 
power-sharing among equals survive in an environment of constant emergency, wherein 
it appears necessary to take quick, decisive action for survival?  What ideals and practices 
of citizenship are being made possible by calamities today, and what might this mean for 
democracy’s future? 
The political stakes of how we respond to disasters raises the following questions 
that I address in this dissertation.  When large-scale disasters destroy life and property, 
how is this suffering and damage framed in public discourse as a problem for the political 
community to solve?  How have such understandings and debates changed over time, 
such that, for example, it is only recently that ecological disasters became political 
spectacles through which the officials and dissidents fight over the proper role of 
government?  What accounts for such changes?  And what is at stake in the attempts by 
governments and dissidents to shape the public debate around disasters?  What kinds of 
authority, values, and civic action do these actors seek to empower or undermine in the 
face of calamity?   
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In this dissertation, I contribute to this line of inquiry by providing empirically 
grounded analysis that investigates how political power and historical context shape the 
way that societies respond to calamity.  My point of entry is to examine responses to 
calamities, especially “tropical cyclones”— a meteorological term that refers to the 
storms more commonly called hurricanes, cyclones, and typhoons, depending on the 
location of the storm.  I study these responses through a paired comparison of Oman and 
the United States.  These two countries have fundamental differences in terms of their 
state-society relations that would lead observers to expect little overlap in terms of 
political outcomes.  Yet recent cyclones demonstrate that they nevertheless manifest 
similar contention around citizenship, particularly the capacity and value of state power 
in providing for the welfare and security of the national community.   
This similarity between the US and Oman is puzzling because neither of the 
defining features of each regime-type’s legitimacy—popular sovereignty in the US, and 
traditional patronage in Oman—explain how authority is being held to account in these 
crises.  Moreover, we cannot attribute this similarity to the disasters themselves, as if they 
momentarily blow away the political idiosyncrasies of each place.  A historical analysis 
reveals that natural disasters did not trigger such state-centered contention in either 
country until the early- or mid-twentieth century.  In this dissertation, I examine why 
these seemingly different countries came to look so similar in the aftermath of tropical 
cyclones, and argue that the answer to this question helps to highlight the political risks 
and opportunities that climate-related natural disasters make possible today.   
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Natural Disasters as Emergencies in Contention  
A group of scholars of contentious politics provide a helpful way into thinking 
about the kinds of unofficial political values, authority, and identity that are being 
mobilized in response to natural disasters.  These works attempt to explain and later 
predict the capacity of natural disasters to generate political contention, instability, and 
hurt or bolster the popularity of political leaders.  But as I describe below, there are 
problems and limits within their analysis.  
The work of Drury and Olson has set the research agenda for much of this 
scholarship, which I will refer to as the “Maslowian approach.”1  They argue that 
disasters can produce “Maslowian Shocks,” a phrase based on A.H. Maslow’s 
psychological model of the “hierarchy of human needs.”2  According to the Maslowian 
model, natural disasters quickly generate a group of people with basic needs that are 
unmet, needs of which the state’s “primordial function” is to protect and provide relief 
when protection fails.   
That is not to say that the Maslowians only see psychological needs driving 
politics.  They also take into account the context of disasters and how governments 
respond.  For example, they argue that media coverage of the disaster draws broader 
public attention to the destruction and the government’s capacity to provide for the 
 
1 For examples, this includes Sarah Poggione, Vincent Gawronski, Gabriela Hoberman, and Richard Stuart 
Olson, “Public Response to Disaster Response: Applying the “5C+A” Framework to El Salvador 2001 
and Peru 2007,” International Studies Perspectives, 13 (2012): 195-210; Richard Stuart Olson and 
Vincent Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis: a “5C+A” Framework for Analysis,” 
International Studies Perspectives, 11 (2010): 205-221; A. Cooper Drury and Richard Stuart Olson, 
“Disasters and Political Unrest: An empirical Investigation,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 6, no. 3 (1998): 153-161; Clair Apodaca, State Repression in Post-Disaster Societies, 
(New York: Routledge, 2017). 
2 Olson and Gawronski, “From Disaster Event to Political Crisis,” 205-221. 
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victims.  They also posit mediating variables derived from the political context of the 
disaster.  Two of them make post-disaster unrest more likely: prior political unrest, 
because the preexisting grievances can be exasperated by the disaster, and high income 
inequality, because victims might be less confident that their needs will be met by the 
government on account of previous experiences with neglect.  Other factors make unrest 
less likely, such as government repression and the availability of aid from the government 
or foreign agencies.3    
Thus the Maslowians see disasters generating contestation through the 
intersection of these psychological needs and the intervening variables that allow or 
prevent the government from meeting those needs.  A “well-resourced and managed 
response” to a Maslowian Shock can generate popularity for the government, while the 
opposite can generate criticism, or even a political crisis.  Hence, in their model, the 
bigger the disaster, the more likely it is to generate political unrest because of the power 
of unmet psychological needs.4 
The Maslowian approach is helpful because it posits hypotheses for why disasters 
pose potential problems for state leaders.  The lack of basic needs, such as food and 
shelter, as well as how media brings broader public expectations to bear on the state’s 
response to a disaster, are all important to consider. But their account has some internal 
tensions.  On one hand, they take the problems to which people are responding and how 
 
3 Moreover, in an apparent tautology, Drury and Olson also hold that “stable” democracies are the least 
likely to experience major unrest after a natural disaster. Drury and Olson, “Disasters and Political 
Unrest,” 159. 
4 Ibid.,153-161.  
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they are understood as a matter of fact.  On the other hand, they emphasize the role of 
cultural differences and how people interpret their circumstances.   
When Olson and Gawronski speak of social facts, they argue that the disaster lays 
bare to a public audience, “the actual values, qualities, and operational codes of the 
responding political leadership.” And that moment of truth can hurt or help the popularity 
of leaders, depending upon the quality of their performance.  They also speak of “good 
management” and overall quality of leadership as social facts that disasters reveal.  
Moreover, their use of Maslow’s psychological categories for explaining how people 
hold the government accountable depicts a kind of universal, automatic process of human 
apprehension.  The Maslowians thus appeal to a universal set of human needs and 
expectations of authority figures to explain the politicization of disasters across different 
kinds (e.g. floods and earthquakes), in different parts of the world (e.g. Nicaragua and 
China), and in different historical eras (e.g. the modern era and first-century BC).5 
This appeal to the “bare facts” of the cases, and the presumably universal 
psychological needs of the disaster victims is in tension with the authors’ simultaneous 
attention to the importance of interpretative frameworks for explaining the politicization 
of disasters.  For example, they note that public expectations of extraordinarily good 
conduct of public figures in times of crisis can be pivotal to a politician’s post-disaster 
report card.  Moreover, when the authors applied their model in subsequent studies of 
earthquakes in El Salvador (2001) and Peru (2007), they found a lack of public concern 
 
5 Apodaca’s recent work on the how disasters generate contention shows similar reasoning, but situated 
within the language of social contracts.  In her version, everyone expects governments to protect people 
from natural disasters and to distribute recovery resources fairly.  Hence, disasters generate contention by 
straining the ability of the standing authorities to fulfill this role.  Apodaca, State Repression in Post-
Disaster Societies, 2-4, 25-26. 
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over the extent to which the governments anticipated the earthquakes.  In other words, 
one of the six dimensions that Olson and Gawronski had hypothesized to be universal 
features of public concern after a disaster was entirely absent.  To their credit, they 
rightfully speculate that perhaps the “political culture” of El Salvador and Peru might 
have foreclosed this concern.6 
For these reasons, the Maslowian approach is a helpful starting point because it 
utilizes the tools of comparative politics to generate several hypotheses about how 
political contention is generated out of natural disasters in different contexts.  But in 
trying to explain why some disasters and not others generate a politicized response, their 
models point in two different directions.  One direction resembles the errors of an earlier 
age of social science in which protest, rebellion, and other forms of contentious politics 
were explained as the automatic outcomes of psychological states, like mass rage, or of 
objectively measurable states of oppression or deprivation.7  In this vision, a warming 
globe might indirectly generate political mobilization, as its disasters make more 
common the instance of government failure to provide enough food, medicine, and 
shelter to its citizens.  Accordingly, the recalcitrance of human deprivation could lead to 
new political crises.   
 
6 Poggione, Gawronski, Hoberman, and Olson, “Public Response to Disaster Response,” 207. 
7 Rod Aya, “Popular Intervention in Revolutionary Situations,” in Statemaking and Social Movements: 
Essays in History and Theory, ed. Charles Bright and Susan Harding (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1984), 318-343, as cited in James C. Scott, “Resistance without Protest and without 
Organization: Peasant Opposition to the Islamic Zakat and the Christian Tithe,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 29, no. 3 (1987), 418.  For a critique of this model of social movement formation, 
see Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency: 1930-1970 (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1982), 5-19; and Douglas McAdam, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. 
Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 464-481. 
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The other, more productive direction in which their findings point is to examine 
the production of public meaning in the aftermath of disasters.  Even if there are universal 
psychological forces at work, they nevertheless appear to be mediated by an interpretive 
process that is not universal.  This variation includes, for example, understandings of 
what governments are capable of doing, and therefore what they are responsible for in a 
disaster’s aftermath.  One does not have to look beyond the US for cases wherein these 
understandings vary significantly.  Consider President Truman.  He had himself filmed 
for newsreels flying over the floods that devastated Texas in 1951, showcasing his 
concern and his working with “experts” who were managing the disaster.8  A year later, 
the same President mocked a reporter who asked him what he would do about a drought 
threatening the Mid-West: “What can I do? I can’t make it rain.”  Rather than respond 
with outrage at his lack of compassion or plan of action, the press core laughed and 
moved on to other topics.9  Juxtaposing the levity of that exchange to seriousness of 
Truman’s PR campaign during the Texas floods a year earlier indicates that in this 
context, there was no clear expectation of the state’s so-called “primordial function” in 
the face of disaster.  Other scholars of the history of disasters and the American 
presidency have similarly described a high degree of variability in expectations of state 
responses to disaster.10   
 
8 British Pathe, “Truman sees US Flood (1951),” YouTube Video, 1:19, April 13, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z41ILqvQKK8, 6/12/2018. 
9 Harry S. Truman, “The President's News Conference Online,” ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/230951. 
10 Gareth Davies, “Introduction: The American Politics of Disaster from the Civil War to the Present,” 
Journal of Policy History, 26, no. 3 (2014), 299-304; and Gareth Davies, “The Changing Presidential 
Politics of Disaster: From Coolidge to Nixon,” in New Historical Approaches to the American 
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Such variety in understanding disasters and authority demands an account of how 
the interpretive process of meaning-making mediates the politics of ecological 
emergencies.  This process should be the starting point for grasping the kinds of political 
and social ties impelled by climate change.  Rather than appealing to a model of 
contention based upon universal psychological drives, the political consequences of 
climate change are best explored in processes of public meaning making, and the 
historical and political forces that shape it.   
 
 
An Interpretivist Approach to the Politics of Natural Disasters  
I take an interpretivist approach to the study of the politics of natural disasters.  
Interpretivism is an alternative epistemology for social inquiry which holds that people's 
experience of the social world is constituted by the symbols and concepts through which 
they think, perceive, and communicate.  Rather than appealing to innate psychological 
drives and social facts, this approach examines how actors make their world intelligible 
by assigning meaning, and how power shapes this process in different contexts.  For 
example, the criteria people use to judge their leaders change over time.  Moreover, what 
counts as compassion, attentiveness, generosity, or competence, to cite some criteria that 
the Maslowians presume, is produced by historical configurations of power, and can vary 
widely across cases and time.  Crucially, meaning can also vary within cases, wherein 
 
Presidency, ed. Brian Balogh and Bruce Schulman (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 233-
249. 
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there are battles to define the concepts or principles to which people appeal.11  The work 
of an interpretivist is to document these processes of meaning-making and to show their 
effects, such as the kinds of debates or institutions that they make possible. 
Other scholars who have created a kind of theoretical infrastructure upon which I 
am building my interpretive approach to the study of natural disasters.  A group of 
scholars I will refer to as “moral economists,” many of whom inspired the later 
interpretivist turn in social science, help explain how ecological calamities have 
contributed to political contestation.  They focus on famine, or “subsistence crises,” in 
pre-modern Agrarian societies.12  That is, prior to modern states and capitalism, during a 
time when most of the world’s population lived as subsistence farmers, drought, flooding, 
pestilence, and other hazards could lead to anger, resistance, or out-right rebellion against 
authorities.  But not always.  The fundamental insight of the moral economists is that 
having a bunch of hungry or starving people was not enough to cause collective 
contestation.  Sometimes people starved quietly, or fled the area.  Other times, 
contestation could escalate, “bread riots” or revolutions being extreme examples of a 
larger field of resistance and contestation.   
 
11 On the study of everyday language in politics, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On 
the Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought, (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993); and Frederic Charles Schaffer, Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An 
Interpretivist Guide, (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2016).  For interpretivism more broadly, see Dvora 
Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, eds., Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and 
the Interpretive Turn, (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2014). 
12 This includes works such as Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944). E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the 
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present, 50 (1971): 76-136; and James Scott, The 
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1976).   
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Scott convincingly shows that the politicization of these famines occurred when 
there was a shared perception of exploitation under conditions of famine, and what counts 
as exploitation was context-specific.13  Contention emerged when groups of people 
thought that they were suffering unnecessarily because elites took too much of their crop 
yield.  What counted as necessary and unnecessary suffering was built around what moral 
economists call the “subsistence ethic,” a set of expectations commonly held by peasants 
that tax collectors would leave them with enough food to survive.14  Famine-causing 
disasters would not trigger contestation if the authorities adjusted their taxes, taking less 
and leaving peasants with what appeared to be their fair share given the circumstances.  
However, if the collectors took what was seen as too much, it would generate collective 
sentiments of injustice, of exploitation, and contestation would often follow.  It was a 
violation of pre-established expectations of reciprocity in the distribution of resources 
that helped generate contention, not an aggregation of hunger pangs.  In other words, it 
was a “cultural” shock, not a “Maslowian” one.  The moral economy literature shows the 
pay-off of looking and listening, not presuming, in order to document how collective 
meaning-making shapes the politics of disaster.    
But I am also extending the interpretive analysis of natural disasters beyond the 
findings and insights of the moral economy literature to help make sense of something 
new.  Much of the moral economy literature was developed to explain contestation within 
 
13 In Scott’s later work, he examines a broader universe of grievances outside the context of famine.  See 
James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1985); and James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 
14 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 13-34. 
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relatively stagnant social, economic, and political systems that no longer exist.15  As I 
discuss below, the contemporary societies that I examine here are no longer defined by 
agrarian relations and their corresponding insecurities of survival vis-à-vis nature, and a 
minimal agrarian state.  States today no longer act as simply taxers with minimal policing 
of the public order.  State practices are much more varied and intimately involved in the 
daily lives of the people that they rule over, in ways that bear directly on natural disasters.  
Hence, exploitation through over-taxation is but one of many ways in which state 
representatives can draw the ire of their subjects.  As a consequence, the range of 
expectations for authority figures after a disaster is much more diverse and contested 
today.   
A growing number of historians are examining the longitudinal changes of how 
disasters have been interpreted in a variety of countries, including the United States.  
These scholars tend to emphasize a distinction between “pre-modern” and “modern” 
disasters in Western societies and their colonies.  Crucial to the distinction between pre-
modern and modern is whether natural events are perceived as being driven by 
supernatural, often divine forces, or by mechanistic laws of nature.  Different conceptions 
of human-, and later state-, responsibility follow from each interpretation.  For example, 
when Russell R. Dynes argues that the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 was the first “modern 
disaster,” he emphasizes how it was the first major disaster in which a cohort of powerful 
 
15 James Scott’s work departed from this agrarian focus in his later publication of Weapons of the Weak, 
which examined a community transitioning into a mechanizing, capitalist agricultural system.  In this 
work, he abandons the term “moral economy” to refer to this set of shared expectations, and instead 
speaks of a shared “ethos.”  For example, see Scott, Weapons of the Weak, 190-198.  However, he later 
returns to the concept to speak of resistance in non-agrarian contexts.  See Scott, Domination and the 
Arts of Resistance, 58. 
 12   
men insisted that it be treated as the outcome of “natural” causes, implementing a 
reconstruction effort that took these natural laws into consideration.  By conceiving of 
natural disasters as the calculable risks of living on a hazard-filled planet, these men 
sought to mitigate or even control such threats through better knowledge of when and 
where these hazards occur, applying new technology and engineering strategies.16 
Following this modernizing account, other historians have elaborated on how this 
risk-focused interpretation of disasters brought with it new understandings of state-
society relations.  Here is how Davidson describes this change as it occurred in the 
context of the colonial Americas: 
In political terms, this [change] implied a shift of power from the church to the 
state: whereas the church had formerly been charged with assuaging the threat of 
disaster, the government became responsible for calculating and managing the 
risks it posed.17  
 
Davidson is describing a revolutionary shift in politics.  With the new scientific 
understanding of causality came with it a corresponding demand for the state to take up 
the mantle as public guardian, mastering nature for the common good.  Some 
representatives of this modernizing story go so far as to argue that the consequence has 
been that disasters no longer carry with them moral or political meaning, that for all but 
the super-religious, disasters are seen as “random, morally inert phenomena.”18 
 
16 Russell R. Dynes, “The Lisbon Earthquake in 1755: Contested Meanings in the First Modern Disaster,” 
University of Delaware Disaster Research Centre, 1997.   
17 Mark Anderson, Disaster Writing: The Cultural Politics of Catastrophe in Latin America 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 15-16.  Anderson is drawing from the 
historical narratives of the emergence of risk-based governance in Europe, citing Niklas Luhmann, Risk: 
a Sociological Theory, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993). 
18 Ted Steinburg, Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disasters in America, (2nd ed.), (New 
York City: NY, Oxford University Press, 2000), xvii. 
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This literature is helpful in highlighting the importance of a new framework for 
thinking about how humans can better control nature through the use of science, 
technology, and the engineering of nature and humans, which I will expand upon below.  
However, the problem with this modernizing account is that it flattens the plurality of 
interpretations and interventions into disasters, both in the “pre-modern” and “modern” 
era, and therefore does not capture the kinds of political opportunities that disasters 
provide today.  “Pre-modern” Europe and Latin America, for example, were filled with 
astrologists, witches, sorcerers, soothsayers, shaman, and lay priests, all offering different 
interpretations of the causes of calamity and venues for agency: spells, incantations, 
talismans, prayers, and fasting were common ones.19 So it is true that supernatural 
mechanisms for good health or a good afterlife were common in this era.  The precarious 
material conditions made magic, providence, and prophecy attractive avenues through 
which people could find meaning.  However, no one held a monopoly over the narrative 
or the responsibility to provide such security.  It is an exaggeration to say that 
modernization involved the church handing its monopoly over to the state.   
As I show in subsequent chapters, just as there was no single actor perceived to be 
responsible for pre-modern disasters, neither is there one for “modern” disasters today.  
The emergence of secular interpretations of disasters has pointed to several possible 
solutions to these hazards.  People regularly attribute some immediate, material cause to a 
disaster, citing the mechanics of the atmosphere after a hurricane, for example.  But this 
 
19 On Europe, see Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century England, (New York City, NY: Penguin Books, 1971).  On Latin 
America, see Stuart B. Schwartz, Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from 
Columbus to Katrina, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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understanding has not rendered disasters “morally or spiritually inert.”  People regularly 
hold the two visions of disasters at once: they see disasters as problems of nature, like a 
large-scale accident.  But they also are capable of “zooming out” to attribute a broader 
political or even cosmic meaning to these events.  Thus, what we see today is a field of 
contestation to define how much security in the face of natural disasters is possible, to 




My original plan for the dissertation was to write about contentious politics in 
Oman, and use the response to Cyclone Gonu as a case study.  But the more I studied the 
cultural battles being waged in that case, the more I saw similarities between Oman and 
what I had already examined in the United States.  As I will show in subsequent chapters, 
in both countries state leaders and other officials are subject to criticism in the public 
sphere in the aftermath of natural disasters, wherein political entrepreneurs seek to anchor 
the meaning of the destruction to a larger political message that calls into question their 
rule, and the values through which it is justified.  In response to these and anticipated 
attacks, governments similarly use the spectacle of the disaster to justify their own 
ideological punch-lines.  Some of this contention invokes the values of technocratic 
authority, but also appeals to less tangible features of “national character,” such as 
“strength” or “honor” in the face of forces that experts cannot contain.     
 
20 I provide a brief summary of this contestation in the section titled, “Summary of Argument,” while the 
subsequent chapters provide more in-depth case-studies. 
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This overlap between Oman and the US was originally puzzling to me.  
According to the prevailing social science literature, Oman and the United States are 
radically different in terms of their political and cultural institutions.  Oman is a recently 
unified (1950s) and independent (1970s) nation-state.  Scholars normally categorize it as 
having a rentier economy based on hydrocarbon deposits, which the government uses to 
fund development projects and buy loyalty from citizens by paying salaries to a large 
public sector.  The country is ruled by a semi-theocratic Sultan with absolute power.  He 
is not beholden to elections, nor does he have any domestic competitors to appease or 
compete with for popularity.  The regime maintains heavy restrictions on free speech and 
political organizing.  The relationship between the Omani citizens and the state is thus 
commonly defined by a kind of patronage.  The Sultan is praised as a good leader 
because he is purportedly a wise and generous patron to his subjects, using the 
hydrocarbon wealth for the good of all Omanis.21  The government is not, in other words, 
there to facilitate popular sovereignty and maintain a relatively free market economy, as 
it is in the United States.  Indeed, Americans are taught to pursue their livelihood by 
competing for jobs, and to think about their membership within the nation-state as 
democratic citizens, where their political leaders are obligated to represent their will and 
allow for popular and free participation in public debates, elections, even activism.  If 
 
21 These readings of Omani politics are addressed in further detail in other chapters.  They are represented 
in the works of J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies: The Sultanate’s Struggle for Supremacy, (London, 
UK: Saqi, 2007). Marc Valeri, Oman: Politics and Society in the Qaboos State, (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); and Jennifer S. Hunt, “The Late Unpleasantness: The Arab Spring in Oman,” in 
The Silent Revolution: The Arab Spring and the Gulf States, ed. May Seikaly and Khawla Mattar, 
(Berlin, DE: Gerlach Press, 2014). 
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these models of state-society relations are so different, then why have Americans and 
Omanis recently politicized cyclones so similarly?  
I investigate this question by deploying two kinds of comparison.  The 
longitudinal contrasts of disaster politics within each country, i.e. the Galveston 
Hurricane of 1900 vs Hurricane Katrina in 2005, help to denaturalize the kinds of 
conflicts that disasters give rise to today.  Noticing the peculiarity of the present in 
comparison to the past demonstrates a change that is of great political consequence, and it 
gives us clues as to when and where to look for an explanation for this change.  I will 
argue that the emergence of two frameworks for understanding disasters in the twentieth-
century helps explain what we are seeing today in both the US and Oman. Denaturalizing 
the present through longitudinal comparison also helps us notice underlying possibilities 
for the future, as such political formations continue to change.  As these changes are 
subject to human influence, it may even help us see opportunities to shape that future.  In 
short, the historical comparisons help us to see the strangeness of where we are, to 
investigate how we got here, and to think about where we might go next.  
The cross-case comparison, juxtaposing the history of the US with that of Oman, 
helps expand this “we,” demonstrating that these changes are not unique to any one 
country or political system.  So while the longitudinal comparisons help to “de-
naturalize” our world, the cross-case comparison helps to “de-exceptionalize” it.22  The 
overlapping parts of each country’s story help me generate analytical tools for 
understanding the forces at work, elucidating how they operated in different contexts, and 
 
22 For a similar use of both longitudinal and cross-case comparison to draw insights from two very different 
countries, see Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, 
(Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press, 1971). 
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yet produced similar results.  A big part of my story here is that the processes that made 
such politicization possible have traveled to different parts of the world, for example, 
through imperialism.  These findings allow me to generate analytic concepts for thinking 
about what constitutes the similar phenomena under question, and what changes helped 
to put those constitutive elements in place.23 In doing so, it suggests alternative analytic 
categories that correct the more prominent ones in other scholarship, such as the 
universalist, psychological framework of other analyses of disaster contention, and the 
“othering,” regime-type frameworks that obscure what is shared across contemporary 
democratic and authoritarian polities.24  These concepts might provide useful suggestions 
of how to interpret, compare, and explain disaster politics in other cases, if only as a 
starting point.25   
 
23 Thus, a big part of my “causal” argument appeals to what interpretivists call “constitutive causation,” 
which explains phenomena by documenting “how humans conceive of their worlds… which make[s] 
possible or impossible the interactions they pursue.” See Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow, 
Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes, (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2012), 51-53.  
For helpful discussions of other approaches to causality, including positivist and non-positivist 
approaches, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: 
Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics, (New York City, NY: 
Routledge, 2011), 111; Charles Tilly, “Mechanisms in Political Processes,” Annual Review of Political 
Science, 4 (2001): 21-41. 
24 While much of the discussion of the relevance of regime types to disasters focuses on which regimes are 
“better” at providing aid and mitigation, there are some scholars who have argued that regime-type 
significantly shapes the kinds of political contests that attend disasters.  For an example of the former, see 
Alastair Smith and Alejandro Quiroz Flores, “Why Natural Disasters Rock Democracies Less,” Foreign 
Affairs, July 15, 2010, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-07-15/disaster-politics.  For the 
latter, see Christian P. Sorace, Shaken Authority: China’s Communist Party and the 2008 Sichuan 
Earthquake, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 40-41; and Rutherfod H. Platt, Disasters and 
Democracy: the Politics of Extreme Natural Events, (Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1999). 
25 On the distinction between analytic and empirical claims, as well as the different kinds of 
“generalizability” in social science, see Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, 112-
153.  On the use of comparative ethnography to critique established categories of analysis, see Erica S. 
Simmons and Nicholas Rush Smith, “The Case for Comparative Ethnography,” Comparative Politics, 
51, no. 3 (2019): 341-359. 
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It might help to clarify here that I do not conclude from these findings that such 
processes will generate a similar kind of disaster politics everywhere.  As I juxtapose the 
US and Oman, I am not engaging in what is often referred to in political science as a 
positivist, “most-different” comparison.  Such studies seek to compare cases that differ in 
most ways but for the variables under scrutiny, so as to isolate them and test their causal 
relationship—mimicking as much as possible the controls of a scientific lab.26  The 
purpose of my study is not to discover, test, or prove a generalizable theory of causality.  
I agree with a number of scholars who hold that the effects of such changes are 
indeterminate, varying according to context.27  Those interested in understanding other 
cases would have to look, not infer from my study, in order to discover whether a similar 
story could be told elsewhere.   
I approach these comparisons by documenting and analyzing the interpretive 
processes through which disasters are given meaning.  I do so by focusing on the 
discourse of citizenship and natural disasters.  I track the words, images, and narratives 
that are deployed to communicate and debate what natural disasters are, what dangers 
they pose, what can be done about them, and who is responsible for addressing them.  
The sites of this discourse occur in a variety of settings in both countries.  I make use of 
public media, ethnographic observations, online discussion forums, records of volunteer 
 
26 On this strategy of paired comparison, see John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices, 
(New York City, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 139-142; and Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of 
Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political Studies, 43, no. 2 (2010): 230-
259.  For an analysis of the neo-positivist assumptions behind this approach, see Jackson, The Conduct of 
Inquiry in International Relations, 69-71. 
27 Tilly, “Mechanisms in Political Processes,” 25. 
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groups meetings, archived oral history projects, as well as official documents and 
statements from government officials and aid agencies.   
While most of the data I work with are documents, I do occasionally make use of 
interviews that I conducted in both countries with people involved with government 
institutions and non-governmental agencies, as well as everyday people who experienced 
some of the climate-related disasters I will be analyzing.  When possible, I also integrate 
some of my own ethnographic observations of civilian and government responses to 
Hurricane Sandy in New York City (2012), which I documented while attending 
meetings and workshops of an activist and recovery group, “Occupy Sandy.” I also 
integrate my observations of responses to Cyclone Chapala (2015) which grazed Oman 
during my ten-months of field research in the country, most of which was spent in 
Muscat, but included multiple, extended trips to the interior, the south (Salalah), and 
Masirah Island.  
My positionality shaped what original data I was able to document, and how I 
represent that information here.  So some transparency about my role in that process 
might help the reader judge my forthcoming claims.28  There was a lot that I did not get 
to see and hear, and therefore document, because of who I am.  There were archives, 
events, and social spaces from which I was excluded because I am a male, non-Muslim, 
non-Omani.29 But my positionality also opened doors in ways that were generative to 
 
28 On the role of reflexivity in allowing readers to judge the findings of interpretivist research, see Yanow 
and Schwartz-Shea, Interpretive Research Design, 100-104. 
29 For example, I was in the coastal city of Salalah as Cyclone Chapala was approaching in October 2015.  
A contact had brought me to his neighborhood to show me the civilian-run relief effort that was 
organizing evacuations and gathering food, water, and other supplies to distribute after the storm made 
landfall.  After the organizers gave me a friendly, formal welcoming and briefly explained their efforts, 
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data-collection.  My credentials and prestigious scholarship likely helped me gain a 
“permission slip” for conducting research in Oman from the National Center for Statistics 
and Information, which gave me some footing within the bureaucratic hierarchies of the 
Omani government when requesting access to research materials or interviews with 
officials.  My university affiliations also likely helped connect me with Omani officials 
and intellectuals who were excited to talk at length about Omani politics and economics 
in informal settings, and get my feedback on their own research and writing.     
Moreover, my nationality and being open about my own left-wing politics and 
activist background seems to have gained me access to spaces and discussions that other 
researchers might not have enjoyed.  For example, a number of Omani civilians I spoke 
with in private explained to me that as an “outsider,” I was more “open minded” than 
other Omanis, and so they were willing to discuss sensitive social and political issues 
with me that they would not have with their neighbors or family members.  In the US, it 
was quite easy for me to access the meeting spaces of Occupy Sandy, a group that was 
organizing aid projects after Hurricane Sandy (2012) New York City.  This ease of access 
was likely because I knew one of the more prominent activists in the group from my own 
participation in “Occupy” activism the year prior.  Moreover, from my experience I was 
aware of what to do, and what not to do, in their spaces in order to remain welcome.  For 
example, knowing how to participate in a “spokes council” group discussion, and taking 
 
they quickly arranged for someone to drive me home.  I was being quickly ushered away from a scene 
that I wanted to stay and observe.  When I asked to stay for their meeting, they informed me that I was 
not allowed in: It was occurring in their Mosque, and I am not a Muslim.  My subsequent efforts to meet 
or speak with these volunteers were met with polite rebuffs or silence.  This failed attempt at access 
prevented me from spending enough time with the group to understand what they were doing, and for 
that reason, I was unable to include their perspective in my account.   
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initiative to help clean and organize the meeting and eating spaces, were all practices that 
were obvious to me from past experience.  In this way, my positionality allowed me to 
take ethnographic notes, conduct interviews, and eventually, be given access to the 
group’s archive of internal communications.   
The documents and original data that I examine here do not provide a 
comprehensive representation of how individual Americans and Omanis understand 
disasters and their larger significance.  No doubt, such understandings would be infinitely 
varied.  Moreover, there is no all-seeing, objective perspective from which to document 
such things.  Silences are thus an inevitable feature of representing the world in social 
inquiry.30  Rather than an exhaustive account of experiences and voices, I am 
documenting and analyzing processes of public meaning-making, those discourses and 
practices that shape how people and institutions seek to give collective meaning to 
disasters, and at times, mobilize that narrative for larger goals, such as contesting the 
status-quo.  These discourses are constituted by the concepts, images, narratives, and 
institutions used to address disasters in public.31  My task is to identify patterns within 
public communication, points of contestation, the contexts of both, and then compare 
them in the way I have described above. 
 
 
30 Michael Burawoy, “The Extended Case Method,” Sociological Theory, 16, no. 1 (1998): 23. 
31 Here I am borrowing from Berlant’s concept of the rhetoric of citizenship.  See Laura Berlant, The Queen 
of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship, (London, UK: Duke University 
Press, 1997), 10. 
 22   
Summary of Argument 
This dissertation advances three interrelated arguments.  First, it is a mistake to 
interpret the disasters of today as merely material phenomena that destroy or kill, to be 
overcome or managed by volunteerism and statecraft.  Contemporary Americans and 
Omanis treat large-scale natural disasters as symbolic phenomena that teach, reveal, or 
test important features of the political community.  Like public ceremonies, rituals, and 
spectacles, we see citizens and officials making disasters into a theater of power in which 
the value of public figures, institutions, and political values can be enhanced or 
undermined.  But contrary to how scholars have described these other public events, 
disasters-cum-spectacles are not choreographed and scripted ahead of time with the 
purpose of conveying a single idea or feeling.32 As disasters arrive seemingly from 
“outside” at the behest of no one, they are unplanned spectacles to which political 
 
32 Prominent approaches to studying the choreographed and political nature of public rituals, ceremonies, 
and spectacles include those inspired by Clifford Geertz, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and Michel 
Foucault.  Geertzian approaches tend to treat rituals and ceremonies as events with shared meanings, at 
times choreographed to enhance the status of rulers.  Neo-Durkheimian and neo-Marxist approaches 
view these events as mechanisms that uphold the status quo, whether through the production of 
consensus and fellow-feeling, or through manipulative socialization.  In contrast, Foucauldian 
approaches do not presume that the meaning of these events is shared, nor do they presume their effect.  
They instead examine the competing, sometimes ambiguous systems of meaning and their indeterminate 
effects.  Examples of the Geertzian approach include Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in 
Nineteenth-Century Bali, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980); and David Cannadine, “The 
Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the ‘Invention of Tradition’, c 
1820-1977,” in The Invention of Tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York City, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 101-164.  For neo-Durkheimian approaches, see Sidney Verba, 
“The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment,” in The Kennedy Assassination 
and the American Public, ed. E. Parker and B. Greensberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1965), 348-360; and McKim Marriott, “Cultural Policy in the New States,” in Old Societies and New 
States: the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, ed. Clifford Geertz (Glencoe, Il: Free Press, 1963), 
27-56.  For neo-Marxist approaches, see Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-
1914,” in The Invention of Tradition, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York City, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 263-307; and Steven Lukes, “Political Ritual and Social 
Integration,” Sociology, 9, no. 2 (1975): 289-308.  For Foucauldian approaches, see Michel Foucault, 
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (New York City, NY: Random House, 1995), 3-69; and 
Lisa Wedeen, The Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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entrepreneurs compete to give public meaning.  Dissidents seize upon the public’s 
attention to the destruction and suffering in order to put their governments on trial and 
justify alternative, critical understandings of the status-quo in light of the disaster.  As 
officials respond, what follows is a framing contest, wherein actors compete to anchor the 
meaning of the spectacle to some broader political conclusion.33  It is through these 
contests that the most tangible manifestations of global warming are given meaning in 
public discourse. 
Common themes of debate emerge in these contests over the political spectacle.  
Rather than apolitical appeals to expertise, dissidents raise concerns that the destruction 
represents some larger injustice: to whom are the technocrats accountable?  Did they do a 
good enough job?  Did they serve everyone equally?  Moreover, dissidents are not 
exclusively calling for the technocrats to “meet the needs” of disaster victims.  They 
direct the project of recovery to some good beyond returning to the status quo, attempting 
to make the emergency an opportunity for citizens to become, or participate in, 
something greater than oneself.  Ennobled is a mode of citizenship that means one is 
actively participating in making things better, in a way that is not scripted by officials and 
experts.    
In both countries, these challenges to officials and their narratives carry enough 
significance that official actors, including heads of state, are compelled to respond.  
Sometimes they denounce these attacks, other times they attempt to appropriate them, 
 
33 On framing and framing contests, see Robert D. Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and 
Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000): 611-639; 
and Francesca Polletta, “Culture and Movements,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 619, (2008): 78-96.   To clarify, although I am borrowing some analytic concepts from 
this literature, I am not utilizing them to explain the success or failure of social movement mobilization.   
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making images of laypeople responding to calamity as an embodiment of the national 
spirit, or stories of religious piety as complimentary to the national order.  In doing so, 
they appeal to peddle two different framings at once.  The first renders the government as 
a responsive technocratic institution, treating the disaster as the outcome of manageable 
environmental forces.  The second renders the disaster as a surprising, uncontainable 
event during which spontaneous acts of the state and civilians, experts and laymen, come 
together in heroic fashion to address the calamity.   
Thus, contrary to the claims of some scholars, disasters spark contestation that 
goes beyond material concerns of meeting basic needs and playing “hot potato” with who 
or what is to blame.34  My analysis shows that states must attempt to use their symbolic 
power to intervene in the process through which people understand disasters in public 
venues.  Hence, representatives of the American and Omani governments respond to 
natural disasters in the form of a political campaign to recuperate the public image that 
the disaster harmed.  They advertise both the technical capacity of the disaster response 
agencies (FEMA/military), the leadership of the head of state (President/Sultan), and the 
national solidarity and agency of the victims and volunteers.  Similar to how scholars 
have shown that states attempt to use public rituals, ceremonies, and spectacles to 
consolidate power, disasters are being made into theaters of power wherein dissidents and 
officials compete in the production of public meaning.   
Second, I argue that such disaster-contention is not natural, universal, and static, 
but plural and historically constructed by specific arrangements of power that we see 
 
34 For example, see Sheldon Ungar, “Moral Panic Versus the Risk Society: the Implications of the 
Changing Sites of Social Anxiety,” British Journal of Sociology, 52, no. 1 (2001): 273-276. 
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today.  I establish this claim by showing that contemporary disaster-contention in both 
the US and Oman is a relatively new phenomena to which states now have to 
respond.  This variance over time is clear evidence that it is a mistake to appeal to 
universal, unchanging variables such as our innate psychological responses to disaster or 
a pre-determined role of the state as the guardian of our basic needs.  Rather, the 
contention is made possible by historical changes in how people think about human 
suffering, what can be done to address it, and who is responsible for doing so.   
One of these changes is the emergence of “national emergency” as a discursive 
framework.  Understanding disasters as “national emergencies” means that they are 
abrupt deviations from the nation’s normal times that demand urgent intervention.35  In 
contrast to a tragedy, which locates the harm in the past, and therefore finished, 
emergencies emphasize the here-and-now, demanding quick action.  This way of 
understanding disasters is particular to societies that have access to news in real-time.  
The telegraph, newspapers, and radio made it possible for this information to travel 
quickly, allowing national audiences to learn of the emergencies befalling their fellow 
citizens living in different parts of the country.  Such an awareness of collective suffering 
happening “meanwhile” allowed them to contemplate their relationship to these urgent 
problems as they happened, and how they might intervene in them.36  Thus, with this 
 
35 Alternatively, Birkland conceptualizes disasters as potential “focusing events,” whose sudden shocks can 
change the policy agendas of government by drawing attention to, and shift the priority of, different 
policy problems.  I do not adopt his framework because it restricts the level of analysis to official 
policymaking, and does not account for the logic of urgency that characterizes many of the non-state 
mobilizations in the face of disaster.  See Thomas A. Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change after 
Catastrophic Events, (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006). 
36 My conceptualization of national emergencies is indebted to several scholars who have tracked the 
political effects of modern conceptions of time, especially Benedict Anderson and Craig Calhoun. 
Anderson illustrates how the notion of “meanwhile,” made possible in part by print capitalism, helps to 
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technology in place, “national emergencies” became part of the discursive repertoire of 
public discussion, a way for local and national actors to understand disasters.37     
Parallel to this shift in thinking about time was the emergence of a new way of 
thinking about citizenship.  Liberal theorists often use “citizenship” to refer to one’s 
membership status in a political community that is distinct from being the “subject” of a 
political ruler.  Here, being a citizen means one enjoys a specific set of rights as an agent 
within a political community, for example, preserving one’s right to free speech or the 
right to representative government.38  But citizenship is often more than just a legal status 
that shapes what rights and responsibilities members have vis-à-vis each other and their 
government.  It is a set of identities and practices that are subject to change and 
 
constitute nationalist imaginaries.  Calhoun shows how a more specific, urgent understanding of 
“meanwhile” also emerged with new communication technologies; he calls this understanding the 
“emergency imaginary.” But I refer to a “national emergency” in a way that is distinct from his 
“emergency imaginary” in two ways.  First, because he is analyzing the proliferation of international 
humanitarian institutions in Europe in the 1970s, Calhoun is conceiving of emergencies as international, 
distant events.  As such, these interventions are top-down, bureaucratic, and carried out by foreign actors: 
emergency intervention is typically carried out by “the first world,” for “the third world.”  His level of 
analysis is international.  Thus he is not considering how the logic of emergencies play out in other 
contexts.  Indeed, as I show in later chapters, emergencies are often addressed by local and national, not 
international actors, and are therefore shaped by context-specific conceptions of citizenship.  Moreover, 
by jettisoning the assumption that international humanitarian actors are making the intervention, one 
cannot assume that a national emergency contains an explicitly anti-political ideology of short-term 
problem-solving, as Calhoun does.  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (New York City, NY: Verso, 2006); Craig Calhoun, “The Idea of 
Emergency: Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order,” in Contemporary States of Emergency: The 
Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions, ed. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolif, (Brooklyn, 
NY: Zone Books, 2013) 29-58.   
37 For a helpful discussion of how such “discursive repertoires” structure how political entrepreneurs 
engage in framing contests, see Marc W. Steinberg, “Tilting the Frame: Considerations on Collective 
Action Framing from a Discursive Turn,” Theory and Society, 27, no. 6 (1998): 856-862. 
38 This conception of the citizen has its modern origins in the work of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.  See 
Melissa S. Williams, "Citizenship as Agency within Communities of Shared Fate," in Unsettled 
Legitimacy: Political Community, Power, and Authority in a Global Era, ed. Steven Bernstein and 
William D. Coleman, (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 33-52. 
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contestation outside of formal institutions.39  Often times, states or civil society actors 
mobilize to enact or demand new responsibilities or new rights vis-à-vis their fellow 
citizens or their government.  They also mobilize to change the meaning of old rights and 
responsibilities, and how they are implemented in practice.40  As Margaret Sommers puts 
it, “citizenship is a ‘contested truth’—its meaning political and historical constructed.”41 
In other words, both “citizenship,” as distinct from “subject,” and the particular 
constellation of identities and practices that define it, are constructions that are subject to 
change and contestation.   
A central part of my argument is that a similar construction of citizenship gained 
prominence in both the US and Oman in the twentieth century, helping to make disasters 
into political spectacles over which different groups would fight to give meaning.  Both 
bottom-up and top-down forces in these countries mobilized to make political 
membership about the collective pursuit of safety in the face of sudden collective 
suffering.  In part, what it meant to be an American or Omani citizen was increasingly 
understood as being able to enjoy a certain amount of protection from forces outside of 
 
39 Janine Brodie, “The Social in Social Citizenship,” in Recasting the Social in Citizenship, ed. Engin F. 
Isin (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto, 2008), 20-43. 
40 Ibid., 34-39.   
41 For example, the liberal emphasis on agency has its historical roots in the European Enlightenment and 
its focus on emancipation from despotic rulers.  See Margaret Sommers, “Rights, Relationality, and 
Membership: Rethinking the Making and Meaning of Citizenship,” Law & Social Inquiry, 19, no. 2 
(1994): 65.  Others point out that specific patriarchal and racial institutions in early America shaped early 
conceptions of citizenship there.  For example, the dignity afforded to those who could vote and be paid 
for their work was used as a social distinction, putting white men over slaves and women.  See Judith 
Sklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
402-409. 
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one’s control, and to expect aid from one’s fellow citizens and government when disaster 
did strike.   
This development was not specific to natural disasters, but part of broader 
changes to the ideas and practices of citizenship.  The history of the shifting discourse of 
citizenship is too long to address here.  What concerns me is how social movements and 
government institutions increasingly came to associate membership within a political 
community with the capacity to enjoy a certain standard of life, including access to things 
like education, health care, and financial support when necessary.42  This discourse of 
citizenship emerged as a way to think about disasters in the US and Oman through 
processes that were in many ways unique to each country.  In the US, the federal 
government was founded with a constitutional duty to look out for the “general welfare” 
of the nation, occasionally used to justify the provision of aid to disaster victims.  But it 
would not be until the twentieth century that disasters became sites of political spectacle, 
as Progressives and later New Dealers increasingly used the public provision of aid to 
justify their rule.   
Similar discourses of citizenship and their relevance to disasters emerged more 
rapidly in Oman.  Anti-colonial forces were chasing the British out of the Middle East in 
the mid-twentieth century, singing of modernization and independence.  In Oman, this 
 
42 It therefore is closely related to what Thomas. H. Marshall conceptualizes as “social citizenship.”   Here 
is how he put it: “By the social element I mean the whole range, from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a 
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.  The institutions most closely 
connected with it are the educational system and the social services…”  See Thomas H. Marshall, 
Citizenship and Social Class, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1950).  For challenges and 
appraisals of Marshall’s account, see Margaret R. Sommers, “Rights, Relationality, and Membership,” 
63-112; and Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “Civil Citizenship Against Social Citizenship? On the 
Ideology of Contract-Versus-Charity,” in The Condition of Citizenship, ed. Bart van Steenbergen 
(London, UK: Sage Publications, 1994), 90-107.   
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anti-colonialism took the form of the Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1976).  British colonial 
officers responded by implementing state- and nation-building projects in Oman.  These 
projects were premised on the idea that development would win the loyalty of Omanis to 
the British-backed Sultan.  The result of their attempt to put down the rebels is that the 
Omani political system was constructed by the British to emulate the citizenship 
frameworks of Western industrialized countries, but without the other so-called 
“political” or “civil” aspects of citizenship that might give Omanis a say in who rules 
over them, and therefore undermine the power of the British-backed Sultan.   
What these origin stories have in common is that in both cases we see movements 
and initiatives that established the American and Omani state as an entity that 
increasingly intervenes in how people live, with the goal of providing security and 
welfare to the national population.  In both countries, political entrepreneurs seized upon 
this understanding of the state, using it as a sort of campaign promise to support their rise 
to power.  For FDR and his allies, it was “the New Deal;” for Sultan Qaboos and his 
cohort, it was “the renaissance” (al nahda).  The success of these entrepreneurs helped to 
establish a new model of citizenship.  It attached the symbolic capital of political leaders 
to their ability to maintain a buffer between civilians and the economic and ecological 
forces that inflict sudden collective devastation—what Franklin Delano Roosevelt once 
called, “the hazards and vicissitudes of life.”  While later neoliberal movements have 
helped dial back some of the promises of the New Deal or the nahda, protecting citizens 
from calamity remains a politically resonant understanding of what the state is 
responsible for in both countries.  Thus, much like how moral economists point to the 
“subsistence ethic” as shaping whether and how disasters resulted in contestation in 
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agrarian societies, I am highlighting how a new vision of citizenship does so in the US 
and Oman today.  
It is the historical convergence between the new ways of thinking about human 
suffering, through the lens of national emergency and citizenship, that explains why only 
recently we see disasters being made into unplanned political spectacles over which 
dissidents and officials compete to give meaning.  National emergencies put on display in 
dramatic fashion the capacity for these states to fulfill what are only recently perceived to 
be their new duties in the face of disaster.  The spectacle of technocratic failure in the 
face of emergency is a new, symbolically powerful picture of a broken social contract.  
Nothing about this formation in the US and Oman is natural, necessary, or inevitable.  It 
is the peculiar character of our contexts.  
The third argument follows from the previous two. Scholars and activists alike 
should recognize the political potentials and dangers that lie in natural disasters.  History 
tells us not just how we got to a place where such different countries share similar politics 
today, but that our future is open to change.43  De-naturalizing these post-disaster contests 
provides an invitation to consider how these formations will continue to change, and the 
opportunities and dangers that lie therein.  We should read post-disaster contention as a 
series of experiments and struggles to popularize new ways of thinking about who we 
 
43 Here, I am indebted to Foucault’s work on genealogy.  For his comments on the “liberatory” elements of 
genealogy, see Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and interviews, ed. D.F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 
164; and Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, (New York City, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980), 82-84.  For 
helpful assessments of Foucault’s approach and its liberatory goals, see Mark Bevir, “What is 
Genealogy?” Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2, (2008): 272; and Arnold I. Davidson, “Foucault 
and the Analysis of Concepts,” in The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the 
Formation of Concepts,” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) 188-189. 
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are, who or what we can look to in the face of calamity, and the kind of world we want to 
build on top of the debris.  The resonant depictions of national vulnerability in the media 
and in the streets, along with the attempts to address it collectively, instigate contests 
wherein political entrepreneurs find opportunities to frame the emergency toward a larger 
political project, putting pressure on the state to intervene in this framing contest.  
Recognizing this field of contestation allows us to see the humanitarian framing, the drive 
to return things back to “normal,” is one among many competing ways of problematizing 
calamity.  Rather than just holding states accountable to a pre-existing social contract, 
like the duty to provide for basic needs in the face of calamity, these mobilizations are 
spaces for political and social action that is unscripted.  As global warming makes 
disasters more frequent and destructive, and we are confronted with more scenes of 
human suffering and ecological destruction, the political spectacle of disaster is an 
opening for political experimentation and mobilization.   
Global warming has not put us on a conveyor belt to a technocratic rule of 
experts.  As Rozario noted, hopes for social progress do not automatically create a 
uniform citizenry of optimistic citizens willing to give their fate over to experts and 
political authorities.44  Along with proponents of science and technocratic rule, such hopes 
also produce critics, skeptics, and ambivalent people.  This broader universe of critique, 
skepticism, and ambivalence should be taken seriously as a resource of political struggle, 
potential reform, or even out-right alternatives.  While the internal discourse of disaster 
 
44 Rozario focuses his theoretical analysis on the more optimistic Americans who insist that catastrophes 
are opportunities, if not necessities, for progress.  My account builds upon his by giving these ambivalent 
and skeptical ideas more theoretical attention in how they compete to shape the cultural politics of 
natural disasters.  See Kevin Rozario, The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern 
America (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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management might regard itself as being merely technical and apolitical, it is quite 
different in public debates that are constituted by notions of national emergency and new 
visions of citizenship.  Tropical cyclones occurring in these contexts show a tendency to 
force disaster managers and other officials to justify to the public how they use their 
power.  Moreover, these attempts to justify their power are forced to contend with 
discourses outside of scientific knowledge, addressing politically contested terrain of 
modern citizenship.   
While there are historically rooted patterns in the discursive repertoires that shape 
these framing contests, there is no political teleology to emergencies.  Global warming is 
partisan to neither authoritarian nor democratic formations.  In responding to such 
disasters, there are opportunities for mobilizing new values and institutions, and to re-
authorize old ones.  These opportunities exist because the sense of emergency that some 
cyclones help create makes a narrative of the common good easy for the public audience 
to apprehend.  The perception of overwhelmed officials and the need for spontaneous 
volunteerism draws people into public-spirited activity—popular discussion and debate 
over the common good, and extraordinary popular organizing on behalf of the nation.   
I share the hopes of scholars and activists who see the manifestations of climate 
change, like tropical cyclones, as opportunities to mobilize popular debate that calls into 
question managerial orthodoxy.  I also agree that such disasters are opportunities for 
mobilizing new, cosmopolitan identities in the face of our shared destiny in a warming 
globe.45  But in order to understand the feasibility and challenges of such mobilizations, 
 
45 Urlich Beck, “Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk,” American Behavioral 
Scientist, 55, no. 10, (2011): 1346-1361. 
 33   
and the multiple directions in which this politicization is likely to occur, it is first 
necessary to examine how power is shaping public responses to climate-related natural 
disasters, how it shapes the conditions of what a more democratic version of climate 
politics could look like.   
By looking and listening closely to the messiness of public discourse after 
climate-related natural disasters, we can see patterns.  There are multiple, competing 
ways to understand these events as public problems that implicate our social, economic, 
and political institutions.  These are the pre-existing venues for public thinking and 
organizing around the politics of climate-related natural disasters.  As such, they hold 
untapped political potential.   
In times of national emergency, when everyone is paying attention, in the moment 
when activists could use the symbolic power of the disaster to pose alternatives, it is not 
inevitable that public debates around disasters is lured into a political cul-de-sac of the 
politics of managerial success and failure.  The public debate need not focus on blame or 
praise for state officials in whether they address short-term problems, tethering “the 
common good” to the status-quo, or limiting it to those within our national borders.  It is 
a failure of environmentalists, or any radical movement for that matter, to surrender the 
field of politically salient anxieties and hopes that these debates articulate, and allow such 
managerialism to determine the public agenda.  By showing how more than just a 
technocratic imagination is being applied to emergency thinking, I hope to spotlight other 
visions of political authority and collective action that are in play as we respond to global 
warming.  It is not just as a threat to our survival or a reassertion of the status-quo.  It is 
also a political opening.  
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The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter Two examines how 
new frameworks of national emergency and citizenship came to constitute public 
discussion and mobilization after calamity in the United States.  Chapter Three shows 
how this discursive repertoire also emerged in Oman, similarly changing how disasters 
were given meaning in public.  Chapters Four and Five document the processes of public 
meaning-making and political contestation in the US and Oman after recent, extremely 
destructive tropical cyclones.  The concluding chapter mobilizes the empirical material 
documented and analyzed in the preceding chapters to reflect upon the political 
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CHAPTER 2: 
HOW NATURAL DISASTERS BECAME UNPLANNED POLITICAL 
SPECTACLES IN THE US  
 
The storm that would be called the “Great Galveston Hurricane” or “the Great 
Storm of 1900,” hit the island city of Galveston, Texas on September 8th.  At the time, the 
island was only nine feet above sea level, with a population of approximately 38,000.  
The fifteen-foot storm surge meant that there was not a single building on the island that 
went undamaged.  The total inundation allowed waves to lift the houses right off of their 
foundation, leaving over ten thousand homeless.  The number of dead are estimated at 
between six and twelve thousand, and the property damage has been estimated as high as 
$30 million; adjusting for inflation, this figure comes to approximately $932.9 million.1 
Occurring just before a presidential election, the Galveston Hurricane is 
remarkable in retrospect.  Killing over six thousand people, the storm remains the most 
deadly hurricane to have hit the United States. With five-times the casualty-rate as 
Hurricane Katrina, a contemporary observer or scholars of the Maslowian school of 
thought might expect to see a robust attempt by the Federal government to provide aid 
after such an incredible calamity, and a great deal of public scrutiny over its efforts.  But 
neither occurred.    
 
1 The figure of 30 million is from Bellis Bixel and Elizabeth Hayes Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm: 
Catastrophe and Catalyst, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2000). The calculation uses a 
3007.14% inflation rate between 1900 and 2020.  
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Together, this and the subsequent chapter provide a longitudinal explanation for 
how disasters have become occasions for political spectacles in the US and Oman.  I do 
so by arguing that two discursive formations converged in each country to help make 
large-scale natural disasters into political spectacles.  The first discourse is one through 
which people interpreted threats, what I call here a “national emergency.”  The second is 
the growing prominence in political discourse of a new vision of citizenship.  These 
discourses have never become hegemonic.  There remain other ways to interpret both 
large-scale disasters and the extent to which governments are responsible for protecting 
people from them.  Yet these frameworks have become such salient features of the 
discursive repertoire in the twenty-first century that governments now have to justify 
their rule in reference to them.  I argue that in order to understand the kinds of political 
struggles that disasters make possible today, one must attend to how these frameworks 
emerged to give meaning to agency and responsibility in the face of natural disasters in 
the twentieth century.   
In this chapter, I show that the emergence of new discursive frameworks of 
national emergency and citizenship explains why now, and not before, American 
Presidents seek to justify their rule in the aftermath of natural disasters, and why other 
competing political actors are using disasters as occasions to challenge the status-quo—a 
contemporary dynamic I examine in more detail in later chapters.2 A skeptical reader 
might mistake this chapter as merely another account of the perennial debate within 
 
2 My argument compliments that of Davies in that we both see changes in news media and national culture 
as essential to explaining this politicization of natural disasters in American history.  See Gareth Davies, 
“The Emergence of a National Politics of Disaster, 1865-1900,” Journal of Political History, 26, no. 3, 
(2014): 305-326. 
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American politics regarding how much the federal government should intervene in local 
problems.  Certainly that debate is part of the story I tell below.  But paying attention to 
how the new discourses of national emergency and citizenship constitute disaster 
contention also helps us recognize these changes as part of a broader phenomenon that is 
not unique to America’s peculiar federated system, contrary to how the changing political 
history of disasters in America is so often told by scholars.3  The federal-versus-state-
power debate does not capture how the very idea of being a member of a political 
community, a citizen, has shifted from being members of shared system of law 
enforcement and tax collection, to being cared for as part of a larger population that 
occasionally suffers from calamity.  Such a shift means a change in how both state and 
federal power is exercised and advertised, how civil society actors mobilizes to shape the 
lives of disaster victims in the name of national solidarity, and how people attempt to 
hold their government accountable in “emergencies.”  
I begin this chapter by examining the emergence of national emergencies as a 
framework, which was made possible in the nineteenth century by new communications 
technology utilized by philanthropists and journalists to frame disasters as national events 
that demand urgent, nation-wide mobilization.  This advocacy brought them into conflict 
with a class of local boosters who sought to hide such problems from public attention.  
Using the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 as a case study, the third section argues that some 
large-scale natural disasters in the early twentieth century evaded the censorship and spin 
 
3 See ibid.; Patrick S. Roberts, Disasters and the American State: How Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the 
Public Prepare for the Unexpected, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Platt,  
Disasters and Democracy: the Politics of Extreme Natural Events. 
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of boosters, and were commonly understood as national emergencies, leading to nation-
wide mobilization in the name of charity.  What is striking about Galveston in retrospect 
is that despite it being the most deadly hurricane in American history, it had no 
corresponding national political contestation.  The post-disaster framing contests that we 
see today in the national public were absent.  All the political mobilization following the 
Galveston Hurricane remained local.  Disasters, understood as national emergencies, 
were not yet political spectacles in which the standing of government representatives was 
put on trial or in which the values of national membership were debated.  As the 
subsequent two sections demonstrate, this would change as very successful political 
movements appealed to new visions of citizenship to define the goals of government.  In 
this way, Herbert Hoover, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the Progressive and New Deal 
movements that they represented, were pivotal in making national emergencies about 
national political authority.  This idea was expanded upon by Senators and civil rights 
activists in the 1960s, who helped to fully centralize disaster response in the hands of the 
federal government, setting the stage for the kinds of disaster politics we see today.          
 
Disasters as Local and National Events   
Calamities are often occasions for public discourse that gives broader, conflicting 
meanings to the event.  The themes of these discourses often address issues of political 
membership, or what we today call “citizenship.”  The sudden and terrible destruction 
would often prompt people to ask, who are we, what do we owe each other in the face of 
catastrophe, and what kinds of moral, economic, or political actions are necessary in light 
of this event?  But prior to the twentieth century, there were no clear expectations for the 
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American government’s response to disasters.  Thus, unlike today, there were no political 
scandals in the name of government negligence for disaster-caused suffering and 
destruction.  It is only recently that government representatives have had to justify their 
authority after disaster.  That is not to say that Americans were apathetic towards the 
suffering of disaster victims.  Indeed, before there were any scandals, there were mass 
mobilizations around the country to respond to the urgency that large-scale disasters 
presented to Americans.  But such nation-wide activity and discussion did not have any 
corresponding national political goals.  Prior to the early twentieth century, political 
mobilization after calamity remained isolated within the communities directly affected.  
In that sense, the US had “national emergencies” before it had a clear repertoire of who 
was responsible for responding to them, and how they should conduct their intervention.   
 
Calamity, Community, and the Early American State 
In colonial America, disasters were variously interpreted as the natural outcome 
of the environment, or as the result of some supernatural forces.  Especially common was 
the notion that disasters were divine punishments for collective sins, or divine 
blessings—opportunities for salvation because they prompted communities to correct 
themselves to a Godly path.  For these reasons, the authority to interpret calamities for 
the community had great import, as such stories could prompt religious revival, moral 
reform, and acts of charity.4  
 
4 When it came to providing relief to disaster victims, it was often charity the provided the most help, 
though some funds came from the local parish and in the form of tax reduction.  Rozario, The Culture of 
Calamity, 31-65. 
 40   
After the creation of the American federal government, major disasters remained 
wholly local events.  Instead of a formal, national response that would emerge later, 
disasters in early America instigated ad hoc relief efforts by business leaders, local 
politicians, charities, churches, and those same actors in neighboring cities.  In a dramatic 
example of the lack of federal responsibility for such events, picture the scene in the then-
Federal capital of Philadelphia in 1796, when a plague of Yellow Fever hit.  President 
George Washington, along with the rest of the governing officials, fled from the city 
abandoning the problem entirely to the remaining residents.  While residents used 
newspaper editorials to castigate doctors and clergymen who fled the capital, they made 
no mention of the flight of the federal government.5  At the time, little was understood as 
to the causes and proper treatments of the disease, and so the response was often fatalism 
and flight, not management.  The epidemic wiped out approximately 10% of the city’s 
population.  The people and dead bodies of the new nation’s abandoned capital were 
tended to by a spontaneously formed group led by a local banker and philanthropist.6  
Other cases of disaster response in this period are not so starkly anarchic, as local 
politicians often did stick around to govern the aftermath and protect their business 
interests.  But the federal government rarely played a role in these projects.7 
 The federal government involved itself in disaster response intermittently, with 
little effort at showing off its beneficence.  Instances of federal assistance to disaster 
 
5 David Paul Nord, "Readership as Citizenship in Late-Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," in A Melancholy 
Scene of Devastation: The Public Response to the 1793 Philadelphia Yellow Fever Epidemic, ed. J. 
Worth Estes and Billy G. Smith (Philadelphia, PA: Science History Publications, 1997), 19-44. 
6 Davies, “Dealing with Disaster,” 56. 
7 Roberts, Disasters and the American State, 16-40. 
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victims occurred on a case-by-case basis in the first decades after American 
independence.  There was no official policy on the books specifically addressing natural 
disasters, but rather a more general mandate in the constitution for Congress to look after 
the “general welfare” of the nation.  If someone lost their home to flood or fire, for 
example, then they could appeal to this notion of welfare and ask the government for 
assistance.   
But to be successful in getting such aid, individuals would have to do more than 
report their suffering to Congressmen.8  They would have to make their innocence legible 
to the state, wherein their hardship appeared to be occurring through no fault of their 
own.9  When someone would ask for assistance, Congressmen would debate whether they 
were simply unfortunate, and therefore deserving official aid, or if they had taken some 
undue risk which brought the doom upon themselves.  For example, fire victims in 
Alexandria received help without much debate.  However, a merchant who lost his ships 
at sea was denied assistance because Congressmen perceived this loss as an inherent risk 
of the import business, something the government could not be expected to help with.  In 
Dauber’s study of these debates, she finds that for Congress to provide aid, the affliction 
had to appear sudden and through no fault of the victim.  It was not need, “welfare,” but 
undue suffering that Congress sought to redress for its citizens.10    
 
8 This gendered wording is appropriate to the context, as the first woman would not be elected to Congress 
until 1917. 
9 Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare 
State (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 6-7. 
10 Dauber, The Sympathetic State, p. 87. 
 42   
An audience was ready to listen and help because many did see those suffering 
from calamities as innocent.  While some religious leaders were still giving sermons 
describing such events as instances of divine judgement in the manner of Sodom and 
Gomorrah, as some still do today, others, including those in Congress, do not appear to 
have seen God’s hand in such events.  Instead of embracing the suffering as some form of 
sanctified affliction, wherein earthly pain is to be endured for cosmic reasons beyond our 
comprehension, Congressmen had what Susan Sontag called a modern understanding of 
human suffering: it is out of place, an accident that must be fixed.11  Christian theologians 
and laymen, along with secular, scientific peddlers of the Enlightenment, had long-since 
created concepts, theories, and everyday conveniences that distanced the relevance of 
God’s agency from nature.  From their perspective, the meaning of events, including 
cataclysms, was ambiguous enough such that people could put the best face on them.  
They often described disasters as misfortunes in a world where justice is dealt in the 
afterlife and not necessarily in this world.  Hence, nature was commonly viewed as an 
uncaring force that afflicted harm or prosperity without regard to whether people 
deserved it.  In what is on the face of it a strange use of religious rhetoric, Congressmen 
used theological language, “act of God” or “the visitation of providence,” to render 
disasters as random misfortunes, containing no moral significance from on high.  Such 
randomness underscored the innocence of victims of a disaster, as opposed to their guilt 
 
11 On the notion of sanctified affliction, see Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, 78-112.  On the 
modern understanding of suffering, see Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, NY: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 98-99. 
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as would be evidenced by an event of divine justice like Gomorrah.12  This disenchanted 
view of the world made it possible to speak of innocence and victimhood in the context 
of earthquakes, fires, floods, and storms, and the need to help them. 
While these debates in Congress show the early existence of a discourse of 
citizenship that made government responsible for some forms of disaster response, two 
qualifications are necessary for the sake of understanding what would come later.  First, 
this account of an early discourse of government responsibility to its citizens after 
disasters is complicated by notions of giving that go beyond the boundaries of national 
membership and the contractual logic of the state’s duty.  Christian charity, or its 
secularized off-spring, “humanitarianism,” also shaped congressional actions after 
disaster.  The figure of the innocent victim occasionally appeared as a foreigner, 
beckoning aid beyond the boundaries of citizenship, even if such aid violated the law.  
These notions of charity were used in Congress to legitimize international aid to victims 
of disaster as early as the 1812 earthquake in Caracas, and later for famines in Ireland and 
Russia.  When congressional opponents of aid for disaster victims cited constitutional 
limits on Congress’s role in governance, other Congressmen invoked extra-constitutional 
sources of authority to legitimize providing the aid.  They invoked the duties of a 
“Christian nation,” and cited the demands of “humanity.”  The figure of the innocent 
disaster victim monopolized political rhetoric so affectively that when congressmen 
argued against providing aid to people in other countries, they did not invoke some 
 
12 Parallel to this secularizing of the meaning of “act of God” was that of the word “disaster” itself.  
“Disaster” originally referring to an “ill-started” event on account of a star or planet, from a time when 
astrological or supernatural forces, were thought to create misfortune on earth.  Rozario, The Culture of 
Calamity, 11. 
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argument for austerity in the name of isolationism or “America-first.”  Instead, they 
questioned the innocence of the victims.  For example, one congressmen argued, “if 
Russia is in trouble… it grows out of the people’s own fault, and out of their own 
idleness.”13 Rather than simply pointing out that Congress was under no contractual 
obligation to help Russians, these statesmen insisted that a lazy Russian is not an 
innocent victim deserving of aid.  
The second qualification to this account of Federal aid in early America is that 
there were no consequential rules or norms in place that made it so every American 
citizen could expect aid in their times of need.  Just as the protection of liberty was 
enshrined in the constitution, and yet women, African Americans, and others could not 
expect to enjoy it, disaster victims of the nineteenth century could not expect to have their 
own welfare protected as some guarantee of the American social contract.  Rarely in 
session in the nineteenth century, Congress was often not on hand to receive pleas for 
disaster aid.14  When they were in session, they did indeed reject pleas for aid on the 
grounds that those requesting it were not innocent victims, or simply on the grounds that 
it would establish costly precedents for future pleas.15  As will be described in more detail 
later in this chapter, federal responses to disaster were not subject to public scrutiny or 
political scandal during this time.  What I hope to have established here are some of the 
cultural and institutional predecessors of what would become the new framework of 
citizenship in the US. 
 
13 Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 28-29.   
14 Gareth Davies, “The Emergence of a National Politics of Disaster,” 315-316. 
15 Dauber, The Sympathetic State. 
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Localized Disasters and the Framing Wars of Nineteenth-Century Calamities 
The use of telegraph, and later radio, in the nineteenth century made it possible to 
see calamities as national emergencies.  These technologies transmitted information, and 
later images and sounds, from local events to a national public dispersed throughout the 
country.  For the first time, a national audience was capable of witnessing, albeit 
vicariously, the drama of disasters as they unfolded in real-time.  Harkening the audience 
as not just voyeurs, but as potential participants in the drama through the giving of aid, 
national emergencies became events of mass mobilization.  I address that phenomena in 
the subsequent section.   
Here, I show that bringing the national spotlight to these disasters, and making 
them into urgent problems demanding intervention of “the nation,” was not something 
that happened automatically once the media technology was available.  This new medium 
instigated competing advocacy over how much publicity these events received, and how 
they were framed.  Making disasters into national emergencies was therefore an 
accomplishment of philanthropic organizations and for-profit media outlets who sought to 
capture the attention of a national public and direct it toward local suffering.  To do so, 
they had to fight local elites who sought to hide the drama from the national public in 
order to protect their financial interests.   
The historical scholarship on disasters in nineteenth century America shows 
multiple types of actors competing in the disaster-framing contests within the local and 
national media.  One of the most significant actors was a new economic class of urban 
developers, or “boosters,” who maintained a special interest in how local disasters were 
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communicated to a larger national audience.  These local elites sought to defend their 
financial interests in portraying their newly urbanizing and industrializing territory as 
being safe for human settlement and financial investment.16  In these cases, elite 
landowners and capitalists tended to minimize the extent to which this territory was 
deemed too dangerous for their workforce to inhabit, and for outside prospectors to invest 
in.  For example, Florida boosters complained about the national press referring to all 
cyclones as “Florida Hurricanes.”17  
There were two target audiences for the boosters’ “nothing-to-see-here” spin.  
Locally, elites tried to minimize religious interpretations of the storm among workers, 
who tended to view disasters as having theological, instead of natural origins.  
Accordingly, a hurricane or earthquake can be a divine sign of the sinfulness of the city 
and reason to migrate.18  Another popular response to disaster which disrupted the status-
quo of industrializing areas was the holding of religious revivals.  Just as people are less 
likely to stay put and show up to work if they saw their home as fundamentally unsafe, 
the same can be said if they saw their city as a modern-day Gomorrah.  Moreover, local 
 
16 For an analysis of the real-estate boom in Miami after World War I and its relationship to cyclones, see 
Marian Moser Jones, “Tempest in the Forbidden City: Racism, Violence, and Vulnerability in the 1926 
Miami Hurricane,” Journal of Policy History, 26, no. 3 (2014): 384-405. 
17 This practice was eventually replaced when Hurricanes were given female names by the Weather Bureau 
in 1949.  Steinburg, Acts of God, 47-68. 
18 Historically, perhaps the most common response to ecological calamity has been migration to safer areas.  
For this reason, many states have seen disasters as problems for maintaining public order and taxation.  
Thus Ottoman Sultans, notoriously averse to being involved in matters of local governance throughout 
their empire, would respond to local famine, fires, and plague only when they resulted in mass migration 
that threatened the peace and disrupted tax collection.  Sometimes they would do so by providing aid to 
local governors, often tax relief, while also sending military forces to prevent people from fleeing.  On 
Ottoman responses to disaster, see Yaron Ayalon, Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire: Plague, 
Famine, and Other Misfortune, (New York City, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
 47   
elites had an interest in how prospective investors in other parts of the country perceived 
the future of these developing territories.  Like fleeing workers, potential investors were 
unlikely to gamble on a real-estate boom in a place that is proven to be systematically 
unsafe.19  
For these reasons, local politicians, factory owners, real-estate entrepreneurs, and 
the owners of local papers had it in their financial interest to frame disasters as 
manageable, material problems, not spiritual ones.  This group of local elites also had it 
in their interests to minimize the material threat posed by disasters.  They did so by 
deflating reports of their damage, and denying their systemic nature, rendering them as 
fluke accidents, rather than recurring features of the location.  Steinburg’s Acts of God 
documents this propaganda in urbanizing areas on the east coast of the United States, like 
Charleston and Miami, and those on the west coast, like San Francisco.  His accounts 
show many examples in the late ninetieth, early-twentieth century of local elites trying to 
control the public narrative around disasters for both local and national audiences.  
Sermons at elite churches would deny God’s role in the event, and emphasize the 
Christian duty of getting back to work.  Op-eds in the local press would circulate a 
similar message, emphasizing the need for calm and returning to “normal.” 
For these reasons, boosters came into conflict with the scientific community.  
Scientists agreed with the boosters that disasters were material, not spiritual problems, 
but emphasized that they were systemic dangers.  Scientists insisted that the land was 
 
19 Hence, the real-estate boom in 1920s Miami came to a halt after a devastating 1927 hurricane.  Marian 
Moser Jones, “Tempest in the Forbidden City,” 395. 
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simply not safe due to the climatic forces that generated disasters, as these systems were 
beyond the power of human management.20  The California politicians and business 
owners would blame fire, not earthquakes, for destroying their cities.  Unlike 
earthquakes, fire was seen as a hazard that could be managed.  Hence, there was a 
concerted effort to spread the idea that the incredible devastation of San Francisco by the 
1906 earthquake was merely due to the fire started by the tremors: the seismic, and 
therefore persistent occurrence of earthquakes was not the problem.  They sought to 
promote the idea that their city could be made safer through better organization.  By this 
logic, a new water system was needed, but not government regulation of urban 
development above the fault lines.21   
As boosters commodified disaster-prone territory and sought to defend its 
reputation in the eyes of potential investors, this additionally pitted them against two 
other types of actors who sought to use the media to tell a more sensational story to a 
national audience.  The profit-driven national press would often focus on natural 
disasters, reporting on lurid details of suffering in order to sell newspapers.22  Local elites 
 
20 However, there were utopians among the scientific community that hoped to control the climate through 
cloud seeding and even nuclear explosions. This culminated in weather modification research by General 
Electric and the United States military after WWII, in which they examined how they might seed clouds 
to cause rain, and bomb hurricanes out of existence.  But the promise of this effort was scientifically 
suspect with mixed results.  Moreover, it created legal problems for the project’s leaders as they were 
sued by citizens of Savannah, Georgia for allegedly causing a hurricane to change course and destroy 
their parts of their city.  Although the courts found in favor of the hurricane-bombers, the project was 
eventually abandoned due to these pressures.  See Raymond Arsenault, “The public storm: Hurricanes 
and the State in twentieth-century America,” in Paradise lost? The Environmental History of Florida, ed. 
J.E. Davis, & Raymond Arsenault, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005) 276-277.  
21 Members of the scientific community fought back, and their campaign was served well in the 1930s 
when earthquakes killed many people and without starting fires.  See Steinburg, Acts of God, 27. 
22 Gareth Davies, “The Emergence of a National Politics of Disaster,” 316. 
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also fought against the American Red Cross, who publicized the destruction of disasters 
in newspapers and radio in order to raise money around the country for their relief 
efforts.23 For example, Clara Barton, the organization’s founder, was chased out of Texas 
by local boosters after trying to focus national attention on a drought.   
On other occasions the American Red Cross fought back, as was the case after a 
hurricane in Florida in 1926.  One representative of the organization denounced the 
boosters: “the officials of Florida from the Governor down, and the real-estate operators 
have seriously handicapped [our] efforts to provide relief for those who suffered.”24  And 
in what might rightly be understood as a heretofore unrecognized predecessor of the 
contemporary environmental justice movement, African American disaster victims also 
used the national media, the Red Cross, and the NAACP to generate support against the 
racial discrimination they faced at the hands of local relief organizations.25   
Indeed, by the early decades of the twentieth century, the boosters were fighting a 
losing battle.  They could no longer deflect national attention away from the calamities 
that hit their territory.  As the next section demonstrates, large-scale natural disasters 
became “national emergencies” in extreme cases in the late nineteenth century.  And by 
the early decades of the twentieth-century, more and more disasters would become 
 
23 See Jones for an account of this after the Miami hurricane of 1926. “Tempest in the Forbidden City;” 
Jones also documents this as occurring when Clara Barton, in the early years of the American Red Cross, 
was chased out of Texas by local boosters who did not want her publicizing the effects of the drought.  
See Mariana Moser Jones, The American Red Cross from Clara Barton to the New Deal, p. 43. 
24 Steinburg, Acts of God, 57-63. 
25 Examples of the NAACP’s work after hurricanes are documented in Jones, “Tempest in the Forbidden 
City,” and Andrew Morris, “Hurricane Camille and the New Politics of Federal Disaster, 1965-1970,” 
Journal of Policy History, 26 no. 3 (2014): 406-426. 
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objects of national attention an emergency mobilization.  This shift in public 
understandings of disaster is clearest in how philanthropists and media outlets were 
becoming more successful in bringing in donations from, and selling newspapers to, 
Americans far away from the calamity.   
 
National Emergencies with No National Scandals   
Once the interests of boosters shifted away from hiding, minimizing, or re-
framing the disaster in the new medium of national media, we see large-scale disasters 
mobilizing a national public to address the suffering as a national emergency.  The 
Galveston Hurricane of 1900 illustrates this shift.26  With a national media in place and 
the boosters overwhelmed by the destruction, major disasters were treated by a broad 
coalition of responders as “national emergencies.” They organized as an ad hoc 
collection of actors, including civilians, businesses, local and neighboring state 
governments, civil society organizations, as well as federal agencies.  But unlike later 
responses to national emergencies, this national response was not politicized.  The focus 
of these actors was on alleviating suffering, not on whether the government was doing its 
job or whether the disaster pointed to broader problems with the status-quo.   
In the aftermath of the Hurricane, the Mayor of Galveston created a Central Relief 
Committee, composed of several local civic leaders to work with him to coordinate the 
relief effort.  As the hurricane cut the city off from communication to the outside world 
 
26 Unless otherwise specified, for the following account of the Galveston Hurricane, I draw from Patricia 
Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm. 
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and washed away the connecting bridges, they had to take a boat to the mainland to cable 
anyone who could offer aid.  They called local governments in surrounding cities, as well 
as President McKinley.  In contrast to the aforementioned efforts of elite boosters who 
sought to down-play the damage of local disasters, it appears that the complete 
destruction of Galveston convinced the city’s elite to take a different approach and 
publicize their destitution to a national audience, at first pleading for aid, and later, 
advertising the recovery effort.  As one historian put it, “The city needed to demonstrate 
[to the national audience] its determination to rebuild on a grander scale, with projects 
that would convince old and new investors that Galveston’s spirit had not been broken.”  
For this effort, they would not only re-build, but transform the island.  They raised a giant 
sea-wall and increased the elevation of the island by eight feet.  Tourist pamphlets would 
later brag of the city’s major banks, transportation infrastructure, and invite people to 
visit, “the Seawall City.”27   
 Demonstrating the minimal role of the federal government in disaster response 
during this period, federal aid was limited to providing left-over tents from the Spanish-
American war to house the ten-thousand individuals who were left homeless by the 
storm.  Foreshadowing the racialized reaction to Katrina, the Texas National Guard 
would later arrive to enforce martial law among the debris, especially targeting African 
Americans.  Indeed, the only object of national scandal that appears in newspapers of this 
 
27 This may be the exception to prove the rule, regarding the pattern of damage-denial on behalf of boosters 
in Steinburg’s scholarship.  See Stephen P. Kretzman, “A House Built Upon the Sand: Race, Class, 
Gender, and the Galveston Hurricane of 1900,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1995), 
340-345. 
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time are rumors of African American men chopping off the swollen fingers of corpses to 
remove their rings. 
More substantial than the federal response was the extra-institutional action taken 
around the country by private and public actors to serve the victims in Galveston.  
Newspapers circulated accounts of the destruction, and Clara Barton, the founder of the 
American Red Cross, rushed to the site to organize the distribution of food, clothing, and 
other supplies.  Barton’s efforts to publicize the plight and the means to help would 
channel participation from individuals and large companies around the country.  Barton 
made use of editorials in national newspapers and telegraphs to influential figures in 
order to communicate the scale of human suffering and the urgency of need.  She hailed a 
national public as being capable agents of relief in times of emergency.  In one appeal, 
she implored the public to see their suffering in the same light as Americans who suffered 
other natural disasters—citing “the floods of the Ohio and Mississippi, of Johnston, and 
of Port Royal.”  Underlying the national emergency framing of Barton’s appeals, she 
emphasized the urgency of the matter, writing, “He gives twice who gives quickly.”28   
Donations began pouring in with the help of private businesses, shipped without 
cost by the railroad companies.  The telegraph company created an emergency 
communications network among the debris at no cost.  Meanwhile, fundraisers were held 
throughout the nation.  For example, William Randolph Hearst organized a “bazaar” and 
gala, in which he had local stores donate jewels, furs, and other luxury items to be sold to 
 
28 Paul Lester, The Great Galveston Disaster, Containing a Full and Thrilling Account of the Most 
Appalling Calamity of Modern Times, (University of North Texas Libraries, 1900), 
https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth26719/m1/5/, 40. 
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the elites of New York City, who were then entertained at a fancy hotel by Mark Twain.  
The National Afro-American Press Association organized and sent donations to 
Galveston, with a political message of trans-racial solidarity attached: “the colored people 
of this country can do much to assist in helping the suffering here… [They] are willing to 
do their part in every particular to show the people of the world that they are with 
Galveston in her hour of distress.”29  Note how the message frames disaster response as a 
marker of civic duty, “doing their part,” in a special time of emergency, “her hour of 
distress.” 
Like the Yellow Fever epidemic of 1796, what might appear today as the scant 
participation of federal authorities in the provision of aid did not in fact merit concern by 
the victims in Galveston, nor of the national public.  Citizens and institutions around the 
country did respond to the “emergency” of Galveston by watching the news of the event 
in real-time and doing what they could to provide aid from afar.  But there was no 
corresponding political spectacle at the national level.  From a Maslowian perspective, it 
would be remarkable given the scale of destruction and national attention that no one 
thought it relevant to question, for example, whether President William McKinley was 
doing enough—not even his political enemies.  As the hurricane hit Galveston just two 
months before the 1900 presidential election, William Jennings Bryan, President 
McKinley’s opponent, made no mention of the disaster in his national campaign.30  
 
29 Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm. 
30 I base this statement on the fact that there is no record of Bryan commenting on the Galveston Hurricane 
in the Library of Congress’s archive “Chronicling America,” which digitized hundreds of thousands of 
newspaper entries between 1690 and present.  The archive provides ample contemporary documentation 
of both Bryan’s and McKinley’s campaigns.  But Galveston does not feature in any of this coverage.  
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Months after defeating Bryan, McKinley gave his State of the Union Address.  Speaking 
just three months after landfall and while the city was still rebuilding, he made no 
mention of the most deadly storm in the nation’s history.31  This political silence on 
disasters was not unique to McKinley’s reign.  Just seven years earlier, President Grover 
Cleveland denied several requests for federal aid to disaster victims in 1893, and faced no 
political consequences for doing so.32   
The political contestation that did emerge after the Galveston Hurricane was 
entirely local.  Contention and mobilization after the disaster focused on the 
shortcomings of local social and political institutions, not those of Texas, let alone the 
federal government.  One of these arenas of contention was over what kinds of authority 
were needed to protect the welfare of Galveston.  Like other parts of the country during 
the “Progressive Era,” there had already been rumblings to run the town more like a 
business prior to the storm.  The disaster provided an opportunity for local progressives 
to mobilize for such a change.  A group of bank and corporate leaders that had originally 
 
31 On this point, I can anticipate a potential objection from scholars of the changing role of the American 
Presidency.  The objection would sound like this: McKinley’s silence on this issue is unremarkable, 
given the conventions of Presidential speech at the time.  According to scholars of the so-called 
“Rhetorical Presidency,” Presidents prior to the Progressive Era rarely, if ever, addressed the public to 
campaign for themselves or for a particular policy.  It was this convention, and not the absence of a new 
discourse of citizenship, that explains why McKinley made no attempt to use the Galveston disaster as a 
campaign opportunity.  However, recent scholarship on McKinley shows that on several occasions he did 
in fact engage in such campaigning in two speaking tours—one after the Spanish American War, the 
other for the 1898 midterms.  Thus, McKinley was a public-facing politician, and it remains remarkable 
that he did not seize upon the Galveston spectacle to campaign for himself.  On McKinley’s 
campaigning, see Robert Saldin, “William McKinley and the Rhetorical Presidency,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly, 41, no. 1 (2011): 119-134.   
32 The first denial was for drought assistance in Texas.  The second was for hurricane victims in the Sea 
Islands and New Orleans.  The Senate also refused to make appropriations.  On the two hurricanes, see 
Eleonora Rohland, Changes in the Air: Hurricanes in New Orleans from 1718 to the Present, (New York 
City, NY: Berghahn Books, 2019) 157-161.  On the Earthquake, see John M. Barry, Rising Tide: The 
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America, (New York City, NY: Simon & Schuster, 
1997), chap. 31. 
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mobilized to ensure the re-dredging of the shipping port subsequently drew-up plans for 
an entirely different structure of local government.  Their plan would put Galveston in the 
hands of five experts, “commissioners,” each appointed by the governor to focus on a 
specific issue of public concern.  That body would be in charge of all policy decisions, 
blending legislative and executive authority, and eliminating the ability of citizens to 
elect their local leaders.   
Opponents of the plan decried its lack of democratic representation, while 
proponents claimed it would be more “efficient, [with] businesslike management” than 
the corrupt political machines that had ruled Galveston.  The reformers also had the 
advantage of controlling most of the newspapers, allowing them to publicized stories of 
corruption of those they wished to replace in city hall, charging that they were 
“indifferent to the welfare, safety, and health” of Galveston, and that, “businessmen and 
methods are what we need now.”  The labor unions supported these reforms, motivated 
by their mutual interest with the business elite in re-opening the shipping ports as quickly 
as possible.33  This new form of local government was approved after it was agreed that 
some of the commissioners would be subject to democratic election, and after a challenge 
by the courts, all commissioners were be made subject to elections.  This “expert”-driven 
model of local governance was then credited for the rapid recovery of the city.34   
 
33 Bixel and Turner, Galveston and the 1900 Storm, no page numbers. 
34 The “Galveston Plan” then spread throughout the nation as part of the Progressive era reforms that 
sought to make government more efficient by putting it in the hands of experts.  Bradley R. Rice. 
“Commission Form of City Government,” Handbook of Texas Online: Texas State Historical 
Association, June 2010, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/moc01. 
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The other arena for contention and mobilization was in regards to women’s 
participation and issues of public health that had been previously relegated to “private” 
concerns of charity and households.  Prior to the hurricane, white women’s participation 
in promoting the common good was restricted to caring for the city’s most vulnerable—
orphans, children, and the elderly.  But Clara Barton’s arrival, and her appointing of other 
white women to coordinate relief hubs, provided a model for local women to take on 
leadership roles outside of “private” spaces, and to assert power over the local 
government.   
Lacking the right to vote, white women in Galveston organized extra-institutional 
means of asserting power to influence local politicians during and after the recovery.  In 
doing so, they expanded what were considered public matters for government 
intervention in the aftermath of the storm.  For example, elite women founded the 
Women’s Health Protective Association in 1901 to formalize the welfare distribution in 
the aftermath of the storm.  This group was novel in that it was open to white women of 
any social class.  First tending to the relief and recovery effort, it began to lobby the city 
government to conform to nation-wide trends in the Progressive era.  Calling it 
“municipal housekeeping,” they advocated for the stricter enforcement of government 
regulations around public health and sanitation, even taking direct action by creating their 
own, unofficial inspection committees.  They also pressed for new regulations over 
public spaces.  Citing the authority of doctors, they publicized the squalid conditions in 
schools, jails, stables, and the like, as threats to the public good in need of the local 
government regulation.  Signaling the power of this new appeal of expert rule for public 
health goals, Clara Barton herself would be removed from her position as head of the 
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American Red Cross years later.  Her ousters would cite her lack of formal training and 
tendency to not share decision-making power with other “health and charity professional 
or social elites.”35   
These various mobilizations after the Galveston Hurricane demonstrate that at the 
turn of the twentieth century, a new way of communication made it possible for a 
national public to share concern over an event, understanding it as a national emergency.  
With the boosters’ denialism absent, extemporaneous organization among citizens, 
businesses, charities, and local and the national government emerged to provide aid as 
fast as possible.  This recovery effort included political mobilization, but only at the local 
level.  The nascent Progressive movement and women’s organizations found footholds in 
Galveston within the groups that organized to respond to the immediate problems of the 
storm.  Their efforts included expanding the role of political institutions into promoting 
the health and welfare of local citizens, and insisting that those institutions be in the 
hands of a managerial elite.  In short, the response to the Galveston Hurricane is an 
instance of national emergency without a corresponding national debate over its broader 
political significance.  What is conspicuously absent from these emergency responses is 
any concern for the performance of the federal government.36    
 
35 Julia F. Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian 
Awakening, (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 29. 
36 Historical scholarship of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire similarly documents a national 
mobilization for relief, and with political contestation remaining at the local level.  See Andrea Rees 
Davies, Saving San Francisco: Relief and Recovery after the 1906 Disaster, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press, 2012). 
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What explains the lack of public scandal during these early national emergencies 
is the absence of a popular conception that the Federal government ought to make such 
broad-scale interventions into such urgent problems.  Galveston shows how national 
emergencies were initially a national problem with no national problem-solver, and 
certainly no sense of who or what was responsible for serving the victims.  The American 
public stepped in as a form of national solidarity or philanthropy, what was often called 
“charity.”37 But these far-away actors attached no broader political meaning to Galveston.  
They did not raise questions as whether government agencies or federal leadership were 
fulfilling their roles.  Nor did they circulate broader critiques of what the disaster 
“reveals” about the status-quo.  Such political framings remained at the local level, 
between residents and authorities that were directly affected by the calamity.  Though 
these local activists mobilized behind values like public health and hygiene, they 
understood these goals as local concerns, without regard for national institutions and 
values.  They successfully pushed the notion that public institutions should be run by 
“experts,” and have the duty to ensure the well-being of the population by regulating the 
economy and public health.  Previously “private” issues were made public, the 
responsibility of the newly created local government that would oversee the recovery of 
Galveston.  But their vision for political change stopped at shores of Galveston, showing 
us that even as natural disasters came to be seen as national emergencies, it did not 
automatically follow that these emergencies would implicate the standing of national 
authorities.   
 
37 On the distinction between “contract” and “charity” in notions of American citizenship, see Fraser and 
Gordon, “Civil Citizenship against Social Citizenship?” 90-107. 
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The Mississippi Flood of 1927: the Political Capital of National Emergencies 
Both the localism and progressivism of disaster politics in the early twentieth 
century would expand to the national level as such approaches to disaster, sometimes 
referred to as “scientific philanthropy” or “human engineering,” became symbols of 
national citizenship and political legitimacy in the early twentieth century.38  While other 
scholars have argued that Herbert Hoover’s response to the 1927 Mississippi Flood was 
instrumental to transferring disaster response into the hands of the federal government,39 
here I make the case that it also significantly contributed to popularizing a new vision for 
government power and responsibility vis-à-vis disasters.  This consequence certainly was 
not Hoover’s intention, and it resulted largely due to the ambiguity in his public 
performance.  He acted as the nation’s first “disaster czar,” leading the federal charge for 
disaster relief and reconstruction.  Yet, Hoover disavowed the notion that the federal 
government should expand its role in protecting civilians from natural disasters, 
attempting to get the Red Cross and private businesses to provide the bulk of the funding 
 
38 On the face of it, this claim is in tension with Dauber’s scholarship, in which she argues that federal 
responsibility for responding to natural disasters had always been a feature of the social contract of 
America.  According to her, this is why Congress would make special funding available to disaster 
victims since independence, citing its responsibility to oversee the “general welfare” of the nation.  My 
claim is that while providing financial aid to disaster victims or funding the repair of public infrastructure 
damaged by natural hazards had been within the purview of Congress, this aid did not register as a 
demonstration of state legitimacy.  Indeed, Davies’ own work shows that Congressional support for 
disaster provisions was circumstantial, not a guarantee of citizenship.  And my analysis of Galveston 
above shows that the absence of a federal response to disaster victims tended to not trigger a public 
scandal over such “neglect,” precisely because the public face of the national government had not yet 
been become associated with this progressive vision of citizenship.  Gareth Davies, “Review of The 
Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State,” The Historian, 77, 
no. 1, (2015): 116-118. 
39 Roberts, Disaster and the American State. 
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and “boots on the ground.”40  But his actions nevertheless demonstrated to an attentive 
public the value of this expansion of federal power during emergencies.  In trying to 
aggrandize his public reputation and secure his future candidacy for the President, 
Hoover’s attempt to show off his own leadership had the unintended consequence of 
advertising the value of state power in times of emergency.  It would be the New Dealers 
who came after him that would insist that every American ought to be able to depend on 
such power, making it a feature of citizenship, rather than just a feature of Hoover’s 
greatness.   
Before addressing the 1927 flood, it might help to stress that Hoover’s role in 
implicating state power in disasters was only possible because of much larger trends 
within American politics.  In the preceding decades, a collection of bottom-up and top-
down initiatives succeeded in expanding the reach of Washington and turning its efforts 
toward new goals, like the promotion of public health.41   There had been a large 
collection of threats, real or imagined, that citizens mobilized against, often pressuring 
the federal government to establish new agencies and utilize new forms of expertise to 
improve the lives and character of American citizens.  For example, the “Pure Food” 
movement began in the 1870s in response to concerns with public sanitation and the 
dangers of industrial food production.  It gained enough public support to result in 
legislation in 1906 that would establish government regulation on food, drugs, and 
 
40 He implored the Red Cross and private businesses to cover the costs of reconstruction.  The Red Cross 
refused, and the private reconstruction corporations that he helped found all failed.  See Barry, Rising 
Tide. 
41 Other scholars, following the work of Michele Foucault, have labeled these kinds of trends as the 
“governmentalization of the state.”  For example, see Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule 
in Modern Society, Second Edition (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2010). 
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cosmetics through what is now known as the Food and Drug Administration.42  A similar 
movement, often with overlapping personnel, viewed prostitution as a hazard to both 
public health and morality, and stirred a moral panic around the fabled existence of 
“white slavery” within brothels.  By 1910, this panic crystalized into a larger “social 
hygiene” movement which sought to eradicate red-light districts through a combination 
of civic initiatives and expanding the power of the federal government.  Though they did 
not stop prostitution, they left a legacy of state growth and a new government agenda.  
These changes included new regulatory bodies, laws, legal precedents, and a bureaucratic 
agency tasked with federal crime-fighting, which would latter change its name to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations.43  
Just years after the social hygiene movement targeted red-light districts, that same 
coalition of neo-Puritans and Progressives turned their attention toward alcohol.  Like 
prostitution, the new temperance movement viewed drinking as a threat to the family, 
public health, the war effort, and the economic productivity and moral character of 
individuals.  They successfully lobbied the federal government to outlaw alcohol and 
establish laws and regulatory agencies designed to transform the leisure habits of citizens.  
What followed was the era of Prohibition (1920-1933), a rapid expansion of government 
power to destroy the wealthy liquor industry, and a shift towards using the federal 
government to shape the everyday lives of citizens for their betterment.  In their tactics, 
this movement established a number of federal agencies with incredible reach and 
 
42 James Harvey Young, Pure Food: Securing the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1989). 
43 Morone, Hellfire Nation, 258. 
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spending, along with legal precedents that would overrule state laws for federal ones 
during a period that included the 1927 flood.  It was not just an expansion of federal 
power, but a shift in the goals of rule toward changing the habits of the population for the 
sake of public health and economic prosperity.44   
Apart from these bottom-up pressures to expand federal power and extend its 
goals toward the health and well-being of the American citizenry, World War I instigated 
top-down efforts to similar ends.45  For example, President Wilson created the US Food 
Administration in order to feed the incredible number of soldiers fighting in Europe.  
This initiative resulted in a two-year period wherein the Federal government took control 
over domestic food production, and sought to cultivate a culture of donations and 
rationing among American civilians.  A civilian’s eating habits were made into an 
embodiment of patriotism, according to the Food Administration’s propaganda.  Hoover 
himself led the agency in his first role as a public official.46   
These bottom-up and top-down attempts to manage civilian life for its betterment 
established the context in which Hoover could make a political spectacle out of a disaster.  
He was no lone pioneer in expanding government power and changing its aims.  He 
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merely helped extend this increasingly common logic of government to yet another 
problem threatening American citizens.  
 
The Flood 
The Mississippi River has always flooded its banks, but to varying degrees of 
destruction.  The cultivation of its flood plains in the mid-and-late 1800s put a lot more 
human life and property in the way of these flood waters, setting the stage for large-scale 
disasters.  In response to the destruction of multiple floods, Congress began funding the 
construction of levees in 1849 to contain the waters and deepen the river to better 
facilitate shipping lanes for commerce.  But the apparent safety provided by these levees 
only encouraged human settlement in riskier areas, and subsequent floods in 1851, 1874, 
and 1882 destroyed hundreds of thousands of homes.   
The 1927 flood was historic in size, engulfing the newly settled farmlands across 
several states, but primarily in Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.  The water covered 
27,000 square miles, in depths of up to thirty feet.  The flooding lasted for months, 
dominating the front pages of the national press throughout the time period.47  There was 
no conflict between local boosters and the national press in whether and how to cover this 
event.  Much of the destruction occurred in rural areas where boosters were absent.  The 
economic interests of those land owners depended upon keeping poor, African American 
 
47 Barry, Rising Tide, Chapter 23. 
 64   
share-croppers in place to work the fields,48 not upon managing the national reputation of 
the land in the eyes of prospective investors.  Moreover, like Galveston, the capacity of 
local actors to manage the devastation was overwhelmed by the scale of the destruction.   
Like those of Galveston, the local politicians of flooded areas immediately 
appealed to the Federal government for aid in various forms.  President Coolidge initially 
rejected these requests.  A look at their pleas reveals how they imagined, or hoped, that 
the federal government would act during an emergency.  They did not point to an 
established duty of government to respond to the disaster, such as the aforementioned 
congressional precedents of providing relief to disaster victims.  Rather, they asked the 
President to help advertise that they were in the midst of a national emergency, 
encouraging the masses to mobilize and donate.  After being rebuffed twice, the governor 
of Mississippi’s third plea to Coolidge articulates their reasoning clearly: “Your coming 
would center eyes of the nation and the consequent publicity would result in securing 
millions of dollars of additional aid for sufferers.”49 NBC similarly asked Coolidge to 
make use of their new radio networks to appeal for donations from the national public.  
But he continued to refuse all of these overtures to take part in the fundraising efforts.50    
 
48 Robyn Spencer, “Contested Terrain: The Mississippi Flood of 1927 and the Struggle to Control Black 
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pass a generous relief package so as to present their party as more attentive to the needs of flood victims.  
See David Welky, The Thousand-Year Flood: The Ohio-Mississippi Disaster of 1937, (Chicago, IL: The 
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After a few major levees collapsed and intensified the flooding, Coolidge finally 
gave in to calls for federal support.  He appointed then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover to lead a relief effort.  As America’s first “disaster czar,” Hoover embraced and 
further emphasized this understanding of the flood as a national emergency.  Though he 
sought to oversee the efforts and coordinate from above, Hoover saw the national public 
as an important resource for funding, and locals who were directly affected by flood as 
the “boots on the ground” for his plan.   
Hoover sought to frame the role of government and civilians during a national 
emergency through his actions and in some of his public addresses during the event.  For 
example, he took advantage of the emerging mass publics created by radio to give an 
address, which was also transcribed and circulated in the national newspapers, reaching 
audiences beyond the metropolitan limits of radio towers at the time.51  Here, I quote 
from large sections of this address to demonstrate how he framed the event as an ongoing 
emergency that requires mass mobilization of civilians and officials, blending the 
language of war with that of progressive visions of collective power.52  In rhetoric that 
resembles a national leader trying to mobilize a population for battle, he describes on the 
radio what “nature” has done to “our country:” 
I am speaking from Memphis, the temporary headquarters which we have 
established for the national fight against the most dangerous flood our country has 
ever known in its history. We, here, in the midst of the scene, are humble before 
 
51 On the role of radio in the 1927 flood, and the 1937 Ohio River Flood, see Welkey, The Thousand Year 
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such an outburst of the forces of nature and the futility of man in their control, but 
we have the obligation to fight its invasion and to relieve its destruction…. 
A futile collective struggle in the face of the awesome “forces of nature,” Hoover 
described a situation that was simultaneously hopeless, and yet held opportunity for 
heroic action.  He goes on to depict a situation in which massive destruction has already 
occurred, and yet more may follow unless they stop it.  For example, he describes how 
the flood “poured water up to twenty feet deep over several counties, an area up to 150 
miles long and up to 50 miles wide.”  In another passage, he emphasizes that the effort to 
stop the ongoing destruction is happening even as he speaks: “all along the levees a 
gigantic battle is in progress to raise them before the crest is reached.”  He continues:  
The United States engineers and the local communities have thousands of men, 
strung mile upon miles, working in long strings like ants piling the levees higher 
and higher…  It is a great battle against the oncoming rush, and in every home 
behind the battle line there is apprehension and anxiety... 
…It is difficult to picture in words the might of the Mississippi in flood. To say 
that two blocks from where I stand it is at this minute flowing at a rate ten times 
that of Niagara seems unimpressive. Perhaps it becomes more impressive to say 
that at Vicksburg the flood is 6,000 feet wide and 50 feet deep, rushing on at the 
rate of six miles an hour. A week ago when it broke the levees at Mounds 
Landing, only a quarter of the river went through the hole. Yet in a week it poured 
water up to twenty feet deep over several counties…flooding out 150,000 people. 
In spite of this “futility of man in their control,” Hoover lionized the synergy of official 
engineers and “local communities:” “Everything humanly possible is being done by men 
of magnificent courage and skill.”  He does so while simultaneously imploring every 
American citizen to donate to the American Red Cross relief fund to serve the masses 
represented in his population figures.   
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Some historians read Hoover (and Coolidge’s) framing of these events as the 
praising of volunteerism and a rebuke to big-government ideals.53  What gets lost in this 
binary of statism-versus-volunteerism is how Hoover’s approach was fundamentally 
rooted in a new vision of what human organization can achieve, regardless of the actors 
mobilized.  Just as he appealed to the dual power of government engineering and 
volunteerism to serve Americans during the national emergency, Hoover also envisioned 
a way to engineer from above the actions of everyday people to solve the challenge of 
reconstruction.   
Overseeing this next phase, he drew from his progressive ideals to implement a 
series of human engineering projects.  His organization would create 154 impromptu 
cities to host the hundreds of thousands of refugees, some with as many as twenty 
thousand people.  Not only were they creating basic infrastructure to house and feed these 
populations, but they also used the camps as spaces to set refugees on the path of self-
improvement.54  For example, Hoover’s programs provided instruction for how to be 
healthier and more industrious in the future.  The historian John Barry provides a list of 
such interventions, where courses and workshops for the captive audiences taught them 
“how to sew, make soap, can vegetables, raise poultry, protect cistern water from 
mosquitoes, use a toothbrush, bathe, [and] treat gonorrhea.”55 Such activity demonstrates 
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how those same concerns with promoting the health and well-being of the population that 
we saw at the local level after the Galveston Hurricane were now being integrated into 
the federal government’s disaster response by Hoover’s coalition, just as they were being 
integrated into other federal projects, like the fight against brothels and alcohol.   
Hoover used these interventions to bolster his public standing as a national leader.  
He already had the public reputation as “the Great Humanitarian” from his experience 
coordinating famine relief in Europe during the first years of World War I.  But he was 
now an aspiring national politician obsessed with his public image, seeking to use these 
acts of engineering as signs of his fitness for office.   
During his reign as America’s disaster czar, he had staff keep summaries of all of 
the editorials that were evaluating his work over the relief efforts.56  The content of these 
evaluations underscores the political capital he was gaining by being seen as coordinating 
the response to the national emergency.  The national press fawned over his “efficient” 
managerial skills in the face of “emergency,” and ignored his apparent flaws.  For 
example, foreshadowing what today is a regular feature of governments responding to 
disasters, Hoover regularly deflated the flood’s casualty numbers in his speeches, 
presenting a much safer, healthier population of disaster victims than reality would 
allow.57   
Deflating the body count was just one part of a larger strategy of generating 
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emergency.  Electoral politics made the plight of African Americans after the flood 
decisive to Hoover’s political future.  The emerging Progressive movement was a 
powerful constituency for his rise to power, and many of its vocal members, including 
Teddy Roosevelt, had made the enfranchisement of African Americans in the south a 
central campaign issue.  African Americans themselves also had electoral sway because 
of they tended to vote as a bloc in the Republican primaries.  For this reason, historian 
John Barry writes, “Publicity over [Hoover’s] handling of the flood had virtually created 
his candidacy, but it could evaporate in a moment if the seeming triumph exploded in 
scandal.  A scandal over race in particular would make both the party’s Progressives and 
its African American politicians desert.”58  
A scandal did arise when reports emerged documenting the terrible treatment of 
African American refugees in flooded areas.  The vast majority of African Americans 
displaced by the floods had been sharecroppers, working under white landowners for an 
annual share of the profits from each year’s crops on the newly settled flood plain.  When 
the flood hit, white land owners feared their African American labor force would flee, 
leaving their livelihoods impossible without access to African American bodies to work 
the fields.  Following their bottom line, landowners leaned on those directing the relief 
effort to ensure that African American “refugees” were not allowed to leave the relief 
camps, in some cases shooting those who tried to escape.  Similarly, these same refugees 
were forced to work in the rebuilding efforts, often at gun-point, for a dollar a day.  The 
African American national press and the NAACP investigated such reports, 
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communicating to a national audience that these displaced African Americans were 
comparing their station in relief effort to slavery.59 The white national press picked up 
these stories and repeated the claims for a broader audience.60  In an attempt to protect his 
reputation, Hoover created a commission of sixteen prominent African American men 
and women to investigate the charges, all of whom were from the relatively conservative 
Tuskegee Institute, and none from the more radical NAACP that was drawing attention to 
the discrimination.  These public figures in the African American community protected 
Hoover’s reputation from the accusations of discrimination, in the hope that he would be 
an ally to African Americans once he took the White House.61   
Even while Hoover was inadvertently demonstrating to the national public the 
appeal of federal leadership in responding to national emergencies, and its expanded 
goals of reshaping civilian life in the recovery effort, such a message was being contested 
by other loud voices.  For example, President Coolidge used his 1927 State of the Union 
Address to frame the public’s understanding of what he called “a national disaster.” In 
doing so, Coolidge rejected federal responsibility for providing more than just immediate 
aid, emphasizing that such suffering is inevitable and it is not the job of the federal 
government to protect people from such hazards, nor to help them recover their losses.  
He begins by celebrating the nation-wide mobilization in the face of emergency: 
It is necessary to look upon this emergency as a national disaster. It has been so 
treated from its inception. Our whole people have provided with great generosity 
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for its relief. Most of the departments of the Federal Government have been 
engaged in the same effort. The governments of the afflicted areas, both State and 
municipal, cannot be given too high praise for the courageous and helpful way in 
which they have come to the rescue of the people. If the sources directly 
chargeable cannot meet the demand, the National Government should not fail to 
provide generous relief.  
But he then goes on to emphasize how this role of the state must be limited to the 
moment of emergency, and not the longer road of recovery, effectively disavowing 
Hoover’s reconstruction effort: 
This, however, does not mean restoration. The Government is not an insurer of its 
citizens against the hazard of the elements. We shall always have flood and 
drought, heat and cold, earthquake and wind, lightning and tidal wave, which are 
all too constant in their afflictions. The Government does not undertake to 
reimburse its citizens for loss and damage incurred under such circumstances. It is 
chargeable, however, with the rebuilding of public works and the humanitarian 
duty of relieving its citizens from distress.62 
 But Coolidge’s position was not accepted by the public.  John Barry notes that 
there was now widespread public sentiment that the Federal government should be 
responsible for serving its citizens in times of disaster.  This notion culminated in the 
1928 Flood Control Act, which authorized the US Army Corps of Engineers to manage 
the nation’s major water-ways for flood mitigation.  The scale of this public works 
project was unprecedented: “[it] would cost more than anything the government had ever 
done except fight World War I.”63 
Once President, another disaster would provide Hoover with an opportunity to 
gain popularity during a national emergency.  His reputation had suffered greatly from 
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the fallout of the stock market 1929, and political observers at the time expected him to 
recover from this by re-establishing his role as “the Great Humanitarian” in the face of 
the Great Drought of 1930.  The dramatic lack of rain was destroying crops and bringing 
death in the Mississippi and Ohio River valleys.  The editors of the New Republic 
optimistically wrote that the drought represented “an opportunity [for Hoover] to play 
again the role which he knows by heart, and in which the public fancies him… this is 
bound to restore a certain amount of the confidence which he has lost…”64 
As public officials and citizens wrote to Hoover imploring him to act, he ordered 
a survey of the damage and told the nation that he would rapidly deploy a relief 
operation.  But he faced a dilemma in doing so.  Hoover was weary of what he regarded 
as statism, using large, federal bureaucracies and passing new laws to solve local 
problems.  He believed such institutions stepped on American character, specifically self-
government, individual initiative, or “movements of collective self-help.”  However, like 
the Mississippi Flood of 1927, it was clear that local communities were overwhelmed 
with the scale of the disaster and urgently needed help.   
Hoover’s attempted solution to this dilemma was to create a hierarchical 
bureaucracy that sought to supply, organize, and direct the efforts of local communities.  
The “self-help Drought Relief Program” included several tiers of authority, such as 
Federal officials, along with state-level relief committees appointed by the governor.  The 
latter included business representatives from banks, railways, farmers, and the American 
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Red Cross.  These state-level committees would then appoint county-level committees 
made up of local business leaders, bankers, farmers, and an agricultural agent.  The more 
local actors were to determine the need on the ground, and the state and federal-level 
committees were to provide the necessary supplies and organize the logistics.  Hoover 
believed that such a federated system would tackle the emergency need for aid, without 
threatening the self-government of local communities.  The press initially agreed.  The 
Nation praised Hoover for effectively organizing in the face of this national emergency: 
“Mr. Hoover is not a man to be stampeded by a national disaster, and his attitude toward 
the present crisis seems to us to have been eminently sensible.”65 
But this distribution of responsibilities proved to be underfunded, as Hoover 
insisted that the American Red Cross, through charitable donations, foot most of the bill.  
The Red Cross was unable or unwilling to do so.  Congressional representatives from 
drought-stricken states insisted on new legislation that would appropriate federal funding 
to fill these financial gaps.  Hoover was adamantly opposed, insisting that the problem 
would be solved through private charity.  In the following public address in which he 
denounces these representatives, he downplays the danger facing the drought victims, and 
insists that the democratic, national character of America would be undermined if the 
federal government were to allocate more money to the cause:   
This is not an issue as to whether people shall go hungry or cold in the United 
States. It is solely a question of the best method by which hunger and cold shall 
be prevented. It is a question as to whether the American people on one hand will 
maintain the spirit of charity and mutual self-help through voluntary giving and 
the responsibility of local government as distinguished on the other hand from 
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appropriations out of the Federal Treasury for such purposes. My own conviction 
is strongly that if we break down this sense of responsibility of individual 
generosity to individual and mutual self-help in the country in times of national 
difficulty and if we start appropriations of this character we have not only 
impaired something infinitely valuable in the life of the American people but have 
struck at the roots of self-government. Once this has happened it is not the cost of 
a few score millions, but we are faced with the abyss of reliance in future upon 
Government charity in some form or other. The money involved is indeed the 
least of the costs to American ideals and American institutions.66 
Hoover would eventually give in, agreeing to a compromised bill that offered twenty 
million, as opposed to the proposed sixty million dollars of funding.  But this amount also 
proved to be too little.  In refusing to do more, Hoover greatly damaged his public image.  
Rather than living up to the title of “the Great Humanitarian,” his performance in the face 
of the drought matched that of his response to the stock market crash.  He was painted as 
a negligent, ultra-conservative by his opponents.  Democratic propagandists seized on 
this episode, playing up the agricultural calamity of the drought and giving his name to 
some of its features, like calling rabbits “Hoover hogs,”67 just as they would call 
homeless encampments “Hoovervilles.”  Hoover’s rise and eventual fall in the public eye 
underscored the political capital to be gained by using government power to respond to 
national emergencies.    
 
The New Deal and the Great Society 
The public scandal over Hoover’s handling of the Great Drought foreshadowed 
his defeat by FDR and the New Dealers.  They tapped the appeal of expanding state 
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power to protect citizens from hardship and used it as a political platform, making 
campaign talking points out of both ecological and economic catastrophes.  People like 
Senator Bob La Follette and FDR would cite examples of federal aid to disaster victims 
in America’s past as if they were established traditions of a social contract, arguing that 
such responses to “natural” disasters should be expanded to included “economic 
disasters.”68  Though in doing so, they were really inventing a tradition of government 
responsibility, rather than citing one.69  As already discussed, aid to disaster victims had 
been irregular and contested within Congress. 
When Hoover lost his re-election to FDR, he was facing a candidate that touted 
the power of centralized administration and its capacity to respond to national 
emergencies.  When referring to what is today called the Dust Bowl and the Great 
Depression, and what FDR called the “economic disaster” or “national disaster,” he 
articulated his vision for a new social contract: “government in a modern civilization has 
certain inescapable obligations to its citizens, among which are protection of the family 
and the home, the establishment of a democracy of opportunity and aid to those 
overtaken by disaster.”70 In his words, the power of the federal government to plan 
projects should be tapped to provide, “security against the hazards and vicissitudes of 
life,” providing “safeguards against misfortunes which cannot be wholly eliminated in 
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this man-made world of ours.”  In framing these hazards, FDR used the same term as 
Coolidge did for the Mississippi Flood, a “national disaster.”  But unlike Coolidge, he 
framed it as a problem to be solved through central planning, as opposed to Hoover’s 
mixed-bag of private and public institutions: “We no longer believe that human beings hit 
by flood, drought, unemployment, or any other national disaster should be left to 
themselves with the sole help of such charity as may be available to them.”71  
Beyond the rhetoric, FDR established a large collection of federal agencies that 
took on disaster response and mitigation in the executive branch, and like Hoover, he 
sought to mobilize civilian volunteers.  Congress would no longer be the primary site for 
how the US government took on disasters.  For example, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation was established to be the new purse of rebuilding public works after 
disasters, while other already-existing agencies were given authority to fund disaster 
recovery or mitigation.  Meanwhile, the Civil Defense Corp was created to prepare 
everyday people for Axis attacks on American soil, training tens of millions of citizens to 
be first-responders to chemical spills, black-outs, and bombings.  While the Corp was 
never used to respond to such events during WWII, it served as an institutional model for 
government-volunteer responses to future calamities under the Cold-War Civil Defense 
agencies, and later, FEMA.72 
Once in power, the New Dealers did not just change how the state pursued its 
goals.  They capitalized on the symbolic power of these new ends of government, using 
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their interventions as advertisements for their own fitness for rule.  For example, David 
Welky points out how rural development programs, centered on the taming of rivers, 
were a central feature of the New Deal.  Federally funded dams, canals, and the like 
brought jobs, electricity, and environmental conservation to impoverished communities.  
But they also popularized this new form of government power: the river management 
programs acted as “physical advertisements for the New Deal.”73  For example, the 
Nooris Dam was named after Senator George Norris, a Republican progressive who 
supported FDR’s candidacy against Hoover.  Other dams were photographed or 
illustrated, to be printed on propaganda posters supporting FDR, and later, emphasizing 
how such projects support the new war effort.74  Meanwhile, as the Supreme Court was 
ruling on the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) monopolistic practices, the New 
Deal’s Federal Theatre Project, which funded artistic performances as a public works 
program, put on the play Power, which dramatized the value of energy production to 
consumers.75  Energy production just happened to be one of the selling points of the 
TVA.   
While I have emphasized the political power that FDR and the New Dealers had 
to gain from these advertisements, it is also appears to have been a sincere expression of 
their political ideology.  In discussing the plans for the TVA with his engineers, FDR 
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spoke of “setting an example of [social and environmental] planning, not just for 
ourselves, but for generations to come… What we are doing [with the TVA] is … trying 
to make a different type of citizen.”76  These “new citizens” would form the popular base 
for further reforms, pushing against the interests of the then-severely weakened 
“capitalists and financiers” that were lobbying against the New Deal reforms.77 
Like Hoover, the New Dealers were held accountable to this new vision of state 
power during the next national emergency.  Occurring while their policies were in full 
swing, the public response to the 1937 flood of the Ohio River illustrates how dissidents 
made the destruction into an occasion for framing national citizenship and contesting the 
legitimacy of FDR’s performance.  The flood stretched across multiple states, causing 
approximately eight billion dollars in damages, killing 285 people, and leaving one 
million homeless.  By this time, radio had become a much more common mode of 
consuming the news, and several stations began dedicating constant coverage of the 
event.  As Welky puts it, “[the flood] became everyone’s crisis as audiences everywhere 
experienced the woes of its actual victims.”78 
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The public response to the flood shows a great deal of blame-making.79 Some 
ministers and authors insisted that the flood, like depressions, wars, and other natural 
disasters, was God’s punishment for the nation’s public vices, such as drinking alcohol, 
gambling, and greed.  Others provided causal explanations blaming human technology: 
airplanes caused the downpours; dams caused the overflows, they speculated.  But the 
politically charged narratives mostly implicated the federal government.  One prominent 
correspondent saw the floods as an instance of inequality, blaming FDR for ignoring the 
Ohio River valley: “you have been so engrossed singing the praises of the TVA citizens 
in other river valleys are left to drown.”  Similarly, a widely re-printed editorial attacked 
FDR for not living up to his own vision of the protection that “civilized nations” provide 
their citizens: “There is no reason why Americans should suffer from the floods like the 
Chinese, when we have the wealth, the will, and the skill to control them.”80  These 
critics were accusing the New Dealers of failing to follow through with their own vision 
for America’s new social contract. 
In response, a debate ensued over how, not whether, the federal government 
should control the nation’s rivers to prevent future disasters.  Some advocated moving 
major cities out of the path of future floods.  But there was a much broader agreement 
and public pressure behind the notion that the proper response required the state to 
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Gareth Davies, “Pre-Modern Disaster Politics: Combating Catastrophe in the 1950s,” Publis: The 
Journal of Federalism, 47, no. 2 (2017): 260-281. 
80 Welky, 225-226 
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intervene and protect these cities from future floods.  A political battle ensured over how 
to provide this protection.  The Army Corp of Engineers wanted to build upon their 
experience with the Mississippi River, establishing a series of levees and spill-ways.  The 
Corps advocated for this plan out of fear of losing their jurisdiction over the river ways.  
One congressmen who supported this option similarly invoked Hoover’s militaristic 
language to denounce those contemplating abandoning flood-prone areas: “I oppose 
retreat; I oppose the abject surrender of progress and advancement to the rule and reign of 
the beasts of the forest and of the jungle.”81     
Indeed, FDR and his New Deal allies in Congress wanted a more comprehensive 
plan than just flood control.  They sought to create a series of “mini TVAs” across the 
country, which combined flood control with economic development and soil 
conservation, all under the jurisdiction of a central planning body.  While the Army 
Corps of Engineers wanted to wall off the forces of nature, and be in charge of those 
walls, the New Dealers wanted to channel these forces to deliver on much broader 
aspects of progress.  But FDR’s attention and priorities were directed toward other 
events, and the Army Corps’ position would win out, establishing the Flood Control Act 
of 1937.82  The New Dealers failed in their effort to pass policy that would link this 
project to social and economic development goals.  But for our purposes, noteworthy is 
that both proposals took as their starting point that it was now the federal government’s 
responsibility to protect civilians from future disasters. 
 
81 Ibid., 237. 
82 Ibid., 236. 
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As the experience of Hoover and FDR demonstrate, new visons and experiments 
in organization emerged for dissidents and officials to draw from in making sense out of 
national emergencies.  Hoover rode the progressive wave, using the Mississippi Flood to 
build his public reputation as a leader who could successfully wield federal power to 
achieve goals that had been beyond the purview of government, such as helping victims 
of disaster not just survive, but rebuild or even improve their lives.  For this, he rejected a 
fully centralized response, insisting that these goals could be achieved through some kind 
of synergy between local, state, and federal government, along with private businesses 
and charities.  FDR’s promise for America’s New Deal would frame such goals as a 
feature of citizenship, a new guarantee from the government, pursued instead through 
central planning.  The competitions over public meaning-making following large-scale 
natural disasters would increasingly raise the question of what more the federal 
government can and should do in the face of national emergencies, implicating the 
legitimacy of the government and its policy platform.   
The political potency of national emergencies and these new visions of citizenship 
is further underscored by how they shaped other hot-button issues in American politics.  
For example, the failure to control a large wildfire in Malibu, California in 1956 
implicated the legitimacy of the entire Civil Defense establishment.  That program had 
been marketed to the American public as protection against “all-hazards,” whether 
nuclear war or natural disasters.  But the apparent inability of the Civil-Defense system to 
extinguish the blaze before it created, in Eisenhower’s words, a “fire disaster of a national 
scope,” raised questions of its ability to protect Americans in case of a Soviet nuclear 
attack.  Seeking to quell such concerns, Congress took up debates over how to provide 
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“complete fire prevention and protection,” and the Eisenhower administration, in spite of 
its insistence on “small-government,” authorized massive public spending to subsidize 
rebuilding suburbs in what were, and still are today, fire-prone areas in Southern 
California.83    
A more consequential example for the politics of disasters was the political battle 
that resulted in legislation which would lead to the establishment of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Local activists and politicians weaponized 
the political capital of national emergencies of the 1960s to pressure the Nixon 
Administration into passing legislation that would put disaster response in the hands of 
the federal government.  After a series of tornadoes tore through the Mid-West and killed 
140 people in 1965, Indiana Senator Bayh remarked that the local state response was a 
mere “Band-Aid” by virtue of its limited funding, and needed the purse of the Federal 
government.84  His concern gained him more allies when Hurricane Camille hit 
Mississippi and caused major flooding in Virginia, killing 259 people.  Senator Muskie of 
Maine joined him in publicizing the shortcomings and racial discrimination of disaster 
relief by local agencies.  Civil rights organizations, such as the NAACP, which had 
already mobilized in the south to fight segregation, began working with Bayh and Muskie 
to document cases of racial discrimination in the provision of disaster aid.  They targeted 
 
83 Quote from Stephen Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 404; as cited in Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and 
the Imagination of Disaster, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 1998).  On the role of the civil 
defense initiative in expanding federal influence on local disasters, see Roberts, Disasters and the 
American State, 41-69.  
84 Morris, “Hurricane Camille and the New Politics of Federal Disaster,” 410. 
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government agents, both local and federal, as well as the Red Cross, which had a 
government mandate to provide individual-level assistance.   
This campaign culminated in a public hearing in Biloxi, Mississippi, one of the 
areas hit hardest by Hurricane Camille.  The hearings highlighted for the national press 
the lack and inequalities of aid, and gave an opportunity for the Senators to make public a 
proposal which would become the Disaster Relief Act of 1970.  There were two main 
oppositions to this act.  The first came from the congressmen who had until then enjoyed 
the political capital of getting individual bills passed for their disaster victim constituents.  
Making federal money automatic, as opposed to the accomplishment of a local politician, 
threatened their local popularity.   
The second opposing group was the Nixon administration.  Ever the opportunist, 
President Nixon had distributed disaster aid during a drought in Texas after a local 
politician convinced him that it would demonstrate his decisive leadership and 
compassion.85  But he was opposed to institutionalizing this federal role through new 
legislation.  As Bob Hope held a large public fundraiser for victims of Hurricane Camille, 
Nixon’s speech writer, Ray Price, wrote Hope a letter, which Nixon signed, highlighting 
the ability of victims to “bounce back,” and, referring to their placing American flags on 
their own rubble, he insists, “we should be as proud that they are Americans as they are 
to be Americans.”86  In the same letter, he states that aid is more meaningful as something 
performed extemporaneously by the people, and not by government: “This 
 
85 Gareth Davies, “The Changing Presidential Politics of Disaster,” 244. 
86 Ray Price to President Nixon, “Suggested Remarks by the President on the Bob Hope Telethon,” Nixon 
Presidential Library, August 24, 1969. 
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[volunteerism] is the kind of help that means more than anything Government can give, 
because it comes from the heart—and by giving it so generously, those people are 
showing that the heart of America is good.”  His letter included a financial donation from 
him and his cabinet, which he provided while resisting the coalition of Senators and civil 
rights groups that were pushing for federal funding and oversight of disaster response.   
Nixon eventually gave in under the public pressure generated by the public 
hearings in Biloxi.  He signed the 1970 Disaster Relief Act, which provided the template 
for the later acts that would establish FEMA under the Carter administration.  FEMA 
itself was simply the consolidation of the many, often over-lapping, administrative bodies 
created in the decades since FDR to fund and organize disaster response at the federal 
level. 
  Disasters were not unique in this respect. The expansion of government power 
for new ends was happening in other arenas during the Great Society era, which saw the 
Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the War on Poverty, the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, Medicate, the Clean Air Act, water pollution control, and 
wilderness legislation.87  Thus this form of local patronage was undone by the high-
minded ideas of the Great Society initiative at the level of Congress and its alliances with 
Civil Rights organizations who were fighting the exclusion of African American 
communities from disaster relief on the ground.88  The progressive visions of what human 
organization can accomplish during a national emergency became defining features of 
 
87 Ibid., 239. 
88 Morris, “Hurricane Camille and the New Politics of Federal Disaster.” 
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American citizenship, moving from the campaign promises of the New Deal, to the laws 
of the land in the 1960s. 
 
Conclusion: National Emergencies and the Contestation of Citizenship  
Natural disasters have not always been treated as spectacles of government 
success or failure.  Crucial to the political spectacles of disasters today is the discourse of 
“national emergency,” a way of thinking about agency and solidarity in sudden 
cataclysms happening elsewhere.  Also crucial is a new way of thinking about 
citizenship, namely that those suffering in emergency are entitled to help, whether from 
their fellow citizens or the federal government, or some combination of the two.  In these 
contexts, political capital is made out of the representation of efficiency, efficacy, and 
care in the face of emergency.  It is why, in times of emergency, political entrepreneurs 
focus on body counts, the amount of aid provided, and stories of solidarity, or its reverse, 
discrimination against disaster victims.  
These new ways of thinking about citizenship were not monolithic.  Religious 
interpretations of the causes of the disasters and the appropriate response to them 
persisted.  Moreover, there was a fundamental ambiguity over who was capable of 
looking after the victims of disaster.  As a progressive, Hoover embraced the role, 
envisioning a nation in which emergencies were addressed through a synergy of 
volunteerism, private businesses, and the guidance of a well-coordinated government 
hierarchy.  FDR similarly advocated for a government-run approach, but was less 
concerned with the notion that such top-down interventions would corrupt the people it 
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served.  He advocated for a model of state power that fully embraced the charge of 
central planning, with a much more explicit mandate for funding environmental 
conservation and economic development than Hoover.   
This ambiguity gave political entrepreneurs a great deal of latitude in their ability 
to frame state responsibility during a national emergency.  When Eisenhower fully 
federalized the official disaster response system in 1950, he echoed Hoover’s appeal to 
the synergy of federal power and local response efforts.  
Federal government should be kept always…as a partner, to participate in a 
helpful way, but to keep the maximum responsibility and direction of action of 
operations in the local scene.  Only in that way I believe can we get the efficiency 
and the economy that come from someone who is spending his own time—
sometimes his own money—in the project… 
Moreover, in 1955 Eisenhower responded to Hurricane Diane by supporting federal 
funding to rebuild public infrastructure, while insisting that relief to individuals be 
funded through the Red Cross.  In what appears to be a rebuke of FDR’s speech about 
civilization meaning the protection of people form the vicissitudes of life, Ike stated that,  
The great real disasters that threatens to engulf us when we are unready as a 
nation, as a people, to meet personal disaster by our own cheerful giving… [There 
is a] misunderstanding that government is taking the place even of rescuing the 
person, the individual and the family from his natural disasters.89   
He later signed the Federal Flood Insurance Act in 1956, again insisting that this was not 
an expansion of government responsibility but a means for helping “our private system” 
to absorb rebuilding costs.  In spite of Eisenhower’s assurances, in the next decade the 
federal government would finally begin to spend a great deal more on disaster response 
 
89 Gareth Davies, “Pre-Modern Disaster Politics,” 266-267. 
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than would the American Red Cross, a rate of increasing spending that has consistently 
risen, regardless of which party is in office.90 
All of these presidents were embracing the idea that national emergencies were 
not just an avenue of solving humanitarian problems.  These events were unplanned 
political spectacles, and therefore an arena of political opportunity.  Hoover and FDR 
clearly saw national emergencies as ways of gaining political support and attaching these 
new visions of citizenship to a more specific political agenda, whether it be Hoover’s 
progressivism or FDR’s New Deal.  Indeed, viewing the federal government as capable 
of providing security and welfare in the face of disasters made it possible for people to 
advocate for institutionalizing this role, making protection from the forces of nature a 
feature of citizenship, rather than just a gift of charity for the innocent people who 
suffered.  The coalition of Senators and civil rights advocates seized upon national 
emergencies to embarrass the Nixon administration into federalizing the official disaster 
response system, against Nixon’s conviction that this should be the role of charity.  While 
this kind of activity might seem normal to a contemporary reader familiar with the 
political scandals surrounding events like Hurricane Katrina, such political battles are 
actually quite specific to our historical circumstances in recent decades.  As the next 
chapter shows, this evolution of the politics of disaster is not unique to the US. 
 
90 Roberts, Disaster and the American State, 77. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
HOW NATURAL DISASTERS BECAME UNPLANNED POLITICAL 
SPECTACLES IN OMAN 
 
The incredible destruction dealt to the Omani coast by Cyclone Gonu in 2007 
created a political battlefield that looks a lot like what we see in the US after a large-scale 
disasters today.  Omani dissidents used the publicity of the flooded neighborhoods and 
torn roads as an occasion to air grievances of governmental neglect and poor planning, 
while other dissidents framed the disaster as a sign that Omani society and the 
government have strayed from its core moral and political values.  The regime itself 
mobilized to spin the destruction as well, minimizing the casualty count, and emphasizing 
the national strength and honor on display in the recovery effort.  It was an occasion of 
heightened debate about Oman’s collective future and the capacity of the standing 
government to protect it.  In short, despite all the cultural, political, and economic 
differences between the US and Oman, disasters have become occasions for similar kinds 
of framing contests around citizenship.   
As I showed in the previous chapter, this similarity cannot be explained as basic 
human responses to disasters.  As the cultural and political history of natural disasters in 
the US demonstrates, it is only recently that such events have implicated the legitimacy 
of the state, and sparked such contests over meaning.  What we are seeing in the US is 
not a natural response, but a historically constructed one.  
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In this chapter, I argue that a similar convergence happened in Oman.  Omanis, 
like Americans, show changing interpretations and framings of natural disasters at 
different points in history.  As in the US, the emergence national emergency as 
frameworks for interpreting disasters, along with new visions for government power, 
likely explains why these events have recently become occasions for governments to 
legitimatize their rule and for dissidents to contest it.  While the reasons these changes 
occured in Oman are context-specific, they do share a resemblance to those in the US, 
including changes in communication technologies and the success of political reformers 
seeking to hold power over the state by appealing to the promise of protection from 
economic and environmental hardships.   
My argument is built on a number of corroborating primary and secondary 
sources.  The former includes two Omani historical-theological treaties, two archival 
collections and a number of other British imperial documents.  It also includes published 
accounts from British allies to Sultan Qaboos, US diplomatic cables, Omani print media, 
and oral history interviews.1  However, the available documentary record is thinner than I 
would have liked.  Print media appears to have been absent in Oman until the mid-
twentieth century, and even then, it was under the control of British-sponsored 
authorities.  Unlike Americans, every-day Omanis did not have local and national 
newspapers to submit letters to register their views in public, leaving behind a substantial 
record of public-meaning making.  Moreover, the rise of Sultan Qaboos following his 
1970 palace coup saw the establishment of a state willing to use force to quell both 
 
1 The full citations for these sources are provided below. 
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separatist rebels and labor dissidents.2  Surely there are many voices and perspectives that 
did not make it into the available archive for us to consider, and whose voices did get 
recorded is likely a function of pre-existing hierarchies that would bias our reading of 
history.3  For this reason, parts of my argument here are more tentative than others.  On 
the one hand, the documentary record permits a high degree of confidence in the claim 
that disasters have been variously politicized throughout Omani history, only recently 
becoming a problem for the state as they have in the US.  On the other hand, my claim 
that similar cultural and political changes explain that shift is more provisional than my 
account of the US in the previous chapter.  While I have exhausted the archival sources 
currently available to me, it is likely that future sources will become available as the 
Omani Ministry of National Heritage makes more historical documents available to 
researchers.4 
I begin this chapter by examining the documentary record on natural disasters in 
the mid-nineteenth and early-twentieth century of Omani history to chart the different 
discursive frameworks that people used to make sense out of these events prior to the 
establishment of the current regime in the 1970s.  The second section of this chapter 
explains the shift toward a similar vision of citizenship to that of the United States.  I 
argue that British colonial officers in the mid-twentieth century increasingly saw it to be 
 
2 Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution: Republicans, Sultans, and Empires in Oman, 1965-1976, 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
3 See Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1995); and Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival 
Science, 2, (2002): 87-109. 
4 The Ministry holds a monopoly on most Omani documents which comment on social and political matters 
of the twentieth century, from which they publish selectively.  See Valeri, Oman, 141. 
 91   
within their strategic interests to build an Omani state that would look after the health and 
prosperity of its population.  This effort was part of what they called a “hearts and minds” 
strategy against anti-colonial forces in the British Empire.5  It also fit with a growing 
notion among British imperial officers that political stability requires a modern 
government committed to the development of its population.  The third section examines 
how this new vision of citizenship tied state legitimacy to its ability to protect Omanis 
from the forces of nature, making disasters into spectacles of state responsibility and 
Omani citizenship.  The fourth section examines how the politicization of such 
expectations was shaped by the state’s control of information surrounding natural 
disasters.  The lag-effect of such control prevented Omani citizens from understanding 
them as national emergencies until the spread of unofficial communication networks, 
such as social media and internet discussion forums, allowed Omanis to learn about such 
calamities in real-time, as in Cyclone Gonu. 
 
Responsibility and the Public Meaning of Disasters in Oman before Qaboos 
A key claim of this chapter is that Oman saw a major political and cultural shift 
with the rise of Sultan Qaboos in the 1970s that helps us understand how disasters 
became theatres of power.  In this section, I hope to show a sort of “before” picture of 
 
5 By then, the British had a repertoire of cultural warfare tactics developed to undermine nationalist and 
Marxist movements in other parts of the empire. This repertoire included the control of information in 
order to isolate the movements from their local base and foreign sympathizers, and propaganda as a 
means of psychological warfare. The latter was focused on undermining the radical elements of 
nationalist movements and empowering moderates.  For example, some of the same British personnel 
who designed anti-Marxist propaganda to target the Malayan insurgency (1948-1960) later came to do 
the same in Oman.  On these British strategies of governing what they called “colonial emergencies,” see 
Frank Furedi, “Creating a Breathing Space: The Political Management of Colonial Emergencies,” The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21, no. 3 (1993): 89-106.  On the overlap in British 
personnel between Malay and Dhofar, see Takriti, Monsoon Revolution, 24. 
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how ecological ruin figured in how people understood responsibility and membership 
within larger communities in the face of such ruin.  To do so, I analyze the documentary 
record of the public meaning attributed to natural disasters in Oman prior to the 1970s.  
Building on albeit partial records, I argue that there is enough corroboration among the 
available sources to demonstrate that there existed a similar political culture surrounding 
disasters to that of the US prior to the early 1900s.  They were similar in that there was no 
single framework through which disasters were explained, nor a single understanding of 
who was capable of, or responsible for responding to them.  What documentation does 
exist shows that while Omanis understood their environment as being shaped by natural 
forces outside of their control, calamities were placed within different frameworks that 
appealed to human and divine agency, and therefore questions or moral and political 
responsibility.  But notably absent from this moralizing and politicizing of the causes of 
disasters is any talk of government responsibilities for aid or recovery, that is, for looking 
after the well-being of everyday Omanis who are facing environmental hardship.  
 
Omani Perspectives   
As is typical to preindustrial societies, both natural and supernatural 
understandings of the universe appear in the records of Oman.  Arab references to the 
natural forces that shape their environment in the Persian Gulf date back to the tenth 
century.6  Omani sea-faring traders of the Indian Ocean were especially interested in the 
 
6 G.R. Tibbets, Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean before the Coming of the Portuguese, Being a 
Translation of Kitab al-Fawa’id fi usul al-bahr we’l-qawa’id of Ahmad b. Majid al-Najdi, Together with 
an Introduction of the History of Arab Navigation (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain 
and Ireland, 1971). As cited in Mohammed Redha Bhacker, “Cultural Unity of the Gulf and the Indian 
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mechanics of wind and storms so as to better predict the times for safe and efficient 
sailing.  But it is also true that, like in the United States and other countries, 
environmental phenomena that caused significant human suffering were also given 
meaning within more cosmic, supernatural frameworks.  Hence, Omani history is not 
unique in that naturalistic interpretations of the environment existed alongside of the 
supernatural, attributing significant changes to God, spirits, the stars, and other celestial 
elements, often with some underlying moral or political meaning.  For example, Omani 
folklore recorded in the early 1970s attributes supernatural origins to the aqueduct 
systems (falaj) that use only gravity to feed water to towns in the interior mountainous 
areas of Oman.7  Such regular access to fresh water was essential for larger human 
settlements to persist in this area prior to the introduction of motorized water delivery 
systems in the mid-to-late 1970s.  Not only did the presence of these aqueducts make life 
possible, but their varying productivity can bring fortune or great hardship to those who 
rely upon them.  When water would become scarce for subsistence farmers in Oman, 
prices for irrigation rose and many went into debt, lost their land and herds, or became 
farm-hands for more wealthy families.8  While the falaj were regularly repaired as 
needed, some are thought to have been established over a thousand years ago.  So long 
ago, that apparently no one knew how to build them when one ethnographer conducted a 
 
Ocean,” in The Persian Gulf in History, ed. Lawrence G. Potter (New York City, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), 164. 
7 John C. Wilkinson, “The Organization of the Falaj Irrigation System in Oman,” School of Geography, 
University of Oxford, 1974.  While it was likely the villagers who told him this, Wilkinson does not 
address who his sources were and from what time period these notions came. 
8 Dale Eickleman, “From Theocracy to Monarchy: Authority and Legitimacy in Inner Oman, 1935-1957,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 17, no. 1 (1985) 7-8. 
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study of their use in the 1970s.  The villagers merely inherited them, believing that “the 
falaj are something ‘from God’ and their origins are attributed to the supernatural powers 
of the legendary Sulayman b. Dau’ud.”9   
Omanis used these supernatural causal stories to explain large-scale ecological 
phenomena that affected people’s livelihood, as was the case with rain and drought.  My 
purpose in discussing them here is to highlight how they attempted to implicate human 
agency, and therefore understandings of moral and political responsibility, when 
explaining these environmental goods and ills.  For example, rain’s lack or abundance 
could be attributed to God’s will and judgment for those who rely upon it.  This 
theological relationship with nature is a central theme in Bedouin oral poetry, which often 
treats rain and its corresponding season, spring, as cyclical movements of a natural world 
that is directed by God.  In these poems, a generous spring rain is an affirmation of God’s 
power, a gift to worthy believers as the moisture awakens the dormant roots underfoot 
and brings forth a green food-stock for the Bedouin’s camels to feast upon.  The loss and 
grief that these Bedouin attribute to periods of drought is replaced by celebration and 
abundance once God gives them rain.10  
In this supernatural understanding of the environment, humans do have a degree 
of agency over rainmaking or other natural phenomena through demonstrations of piety 
and petitionary prayers.  A version of this practice continues today in the form of the 
 
9 Wilkinson, “The Organization of the Falaj Irrigation System in Oman,” 11. 
10 For examples, see P. Marcel Kurpershoek, The Story of a Desert Knight: Oral Poetry & Narratives from 
Central Arabia, Vol 2. (London, UK: Brill, 1995), 30. Contemporary critics of modernization in the Gulf 
look with nostalgia upon this emotional connection to the harsh and rewarding aspects of a communal 
life directly dependent on nature.  For example, see the novel, Abdulrahman Munif, Cities of Salt, 
(London, UK: Vintage International, 1989). 
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salat al-istisqa’, a communal prayer wherein the devout ask God for rain.  Likely an 
Islamic adaptation of a pagan practice that pre-dates the religion, this prayer is still 
conducted today in various communities in the Middle East, including in Oman.11  
Similarly, some scholars speculate that Bedouin rain poems were not just used as 
entertainment on the theme, but were also recited as a way to ask God for a rain 
blessing.12 Such supernatural causal stories underscore a specific arena of human agency 
in the face of environmental goods and harms.  On a material level, Omanis were at the 
mercy of God.  However, an individual or community could garner divine favor through 
prayer, sacrifices, or general pious living, getting help in their worldly affairs.13 
Inversely, they could also derive punishment through sinful behavior.   
This interplay between natural and supernatural explanations for environmental 
phenomena is illustrated by an Omani chronicle of political history written in the 
nineteenth century.  On the one hand, the chronicle provides accounts of disasters with no 
cosmic significance.  For example, it documents the drowning of an upright Imam and 
 
11 In Saudi Arabia, the prayer has been made into a national event led by the King, with newspapers calling 
upon citizens to participate.  A Christian version of this practice also occurs in the United States, and has 
similarly been appropriated by public figures.  The most famous instance of this may have been in 2011, 
when then-Texas Governor Rick Perry asked Texans to pray for rain, as the state was experiencing a 
long-running drought and wildfires.  On Oman, see “Prayers for Rain,” Muscat Daily, January 1, 2017, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/Prayers-for-rain-4wpg.  On Saudi Arabia, see Tamara 
Pupic, “Saudi King calls on Muslims to pray for rain to ease drought,” Arabian Business, November 12, 
2014, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-king-calls-on-muslims-pray-for-rain-ease-drought-
571542.html#.V0GNa5F97b0.  On Texas, see Kate Galbraith, “Governor Declares Days of Prayer for 
Rain,” The Texas Tribune, April 21, 2011, https://www.texastribune.org/2011/04/21/texas-governor-
declares-weekend-of-prayer-for-rain/. 
12 Kurpershoek, The Story of a Desert Knight, 30. 
13 Regarding sacrifice, one prominent Omani essayist and blogger has described practices she had 
witnessed in her community as “pre-Islamic” and “pagan” traditions, where people sacrifice animals to 
convince the sea—which is talked about as a man—to be calm and safe for fishing, or to convince a 
spring to bring forth water, or a jin (spirit) to not harm the camel herds. See “Sacrifice to the Sea,” 
Dhofari Gucci (blog), http://dhofarigucci.blogspot.com/2010/03/sacrifice-to-sea.html. 
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seventy of his followers when they tried to cross a torrent during a flash-flood in order to 
free some of the Imam’s prisoners who were threatened by the rising water.  The flooding 
and deaths are treated as merely the encounter between people and rushing water.14  On 
the other hand, in two other passages it discusses drought as a sign of divine judgement 
upon the community affected: 
During Hamed’s administration there was a severe drought in Oman… Most of 
the date-trees died, and the greater portion of the inhabitants fled to el-Batinah 
and [Muscat], and the price of a buck of water at el-Matrah rose to ten fals, the 
owners of the wells there refusing to sell it for less.  When Hamed heard of this he 
went forth with the people to pray for rain… While he and the people were so 
engaged, a cloud appeared in the heavens, followed by lightning and thunder; then 
the clouds covered the sky, and the rain descended, as if poured from buckets… 
Great fertility throughout Oman followed, and its inhabitants returned thither; the 
crops became abundant and prices were low.15 
 
Later, the chronicle praises another Omani ruler (A.D. 1793), citing as evidence of his 
achievements that there was so much rain that there were floods, “no drought occurred in 
[Oman] during the whole term of his administration; on the contrary, its produce 
increased to a surprising extent… At [Muscat], in that year, the water nearly drowned the 
people who resided on the level ground…”16  
This ambiguity over how much people could impact God’s will, and by extension 
shape the weather, made room for the politicization of ecological events.  People could 
frame storms and droughts in ways that attribute moral or political responsibility for their 
 
14 G.P. Badger, History of the Imams and Seyyids of ‘Uman, by Salil-ibn-Razik, from 661-1856 (London: 
Hakluyt Society, 1871), 12. 
15 Ibid., 212. 
16 Ibid., 237. 
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impact.17  Hoffman points out how Nur al-Din al-Salimi, who led the successful 1913 
Imamate rebellion against the Sultan in Muscat, engaged in such framing in his historical, 
theological writings, in which he seeks to justify Islamic rule in Oman.  Hoffman 
summarizes his political, theological framing of ecological phenomena thusly:   
Nur al-Din al-Salimi’s Tufat al-a’yan fi sirat ahl U’man, a chronicle of the [early] 
Omani Imamate, reads in a fashion similar to the book of II Kings in the Hebrew 
Bible: under good Imams prices are low, rain is abundant, crops flourish and 
people are happy; under bad Imams prices rise, drought prevails and people die of 
starvation.18    
 
The same chronicle includes a notable example of a Sultan’s fleet and clove crop that was 
destroyed by “strong winds” (rih shadida) on the sea that were sent by God, in favor of 
the Imam.19   
While these sources demonstrate a tendency to moralize or politicize instances of 
extreme ecological hardship, there is no record of similar attempts to address the 
provision of relief and rebuilding efforts, and who was responsible for them.  Part of the 
reason for this absence might be that the record keepers of this time period tended to be 
the British-Omani government, and such concerns were constrained to fields of social 
relations that occurred largely out of their view.  For example, in the 1970s, many Omani 
 
17 Scholars of disasters under colonial rule in South Asia and East Africa during the early twentieth century 
have similarly noted the capacity for locals to appeal to supernatural forces to moralize and politicize the 
events.  However, Omani history does appear to share their tendency toward millenarianism, wherein 
disasters are seen as signs from the heavens that encouraged anti-colonial mobilization, perhaps because 
the colonial presences in Oman was relatively less visible and intrusive.  See Michael Adas, Prophets of 
Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order, (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 138-164. 
18 Valerie Hoffman, “The Articulation of Ibadi Identity in Modern Oman and Zanzibar,” Muslim World, 14, 
no. 2 (2004): 205. Emphasis added. 
19 Nur al-Din al-Salimi, Tufat al-a’yan fi sirat ahl U’man, 2 vols. Cairo: Al-Matba'a 'l-Salafiyya, 1928-
1929, 300.  I am thankful to Valerie Hoffman for pointing out this passage to me.   
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villages withered and died in the face of drought, and yet sought no assistance from the 
state.   Anthropological studies of Omani villages in the late 1970s illustrate an apparent 
absence of any attempt to hold the state accountable for providing relief in the face of 
drought.20  The study found that several rural communities were disappearing as people 
abandoned their homes, land, and now-dry aqueducts.  Their villages had not yet been 
touched by development programs underway elsewhere in the country.  These ecological 
hardships received no attention from the national government.  Neither were the drought-
stricken communities themselves appealing to the state for help.  It was understood in 
that context that the upkeep of the local aqueducts (aflaj), the sole source of water for 
many villages, was the prerogative of the local tribal elite.  But these authorities were 
absent due to the allure of the new oil wealth which drew them to the capital city in the 
early 1970s.  In their eyes, the water infrastructure of their village became a pointless 
investment, as the unstable profits of subsistence living became frivolous in comparison 
to the large and steady government salaries on offer in Muscat.  Without reliable 
irrigation, the lower-class members of the tribes who worked the lands were forced to 
abandon their homes, often moving to larger population centers in search of work 
themselves.  Later, the government would eventually build water infrastructure in the 
rural communities that remained, as part of larger development projects happening 
 
20 I do not suggest that the findings of these studies are clear evidence for an absence of grievances and 
contention.  It is possible that the apparent silences can be explained by other factors, such as an 
unwillingness of villagers to share their grievances with the researcher.  Without knowing more about the 
methods behind the research, it is impossible to judge with certainty.  However, the studies’ findings do 
cohere with those of other sources, discussed below.  J.S. Birks, “The Reaction of Rural Populations to 
Drought: A Case Study from South East Arabia,” Erdkunde, 31, no. 4 (1997): 299-305; and J.S. Birks 
and S.E. Letts, “Qiqal and Muqayda: Dying Oases in Arabia,” Tijdschrift voor Econ. En Soc. Geografie, 
68, no. 3 (1977): 145-151.   
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nationwide.  But tellingly, these projects were not undertaken in response to political 
mobilization by those Omani farmers suffering from drought.  Instead, they were efforts 
to slow down the rapid urbanization of Muscat.   
 
Imperial Perspectives 
British imperial Agents and their local informants provided ample documentation 
of public life from the perspective of the Omani state from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-
twentieth century.  These records corroborate the theory that Omanis did not concern 
themselves with what are the state’s responsibilities in the face of ecological disaster.  
The British had been using the Omani coast as an imperial rest-stop for their India-
centered empire, stationing imperial offices in Muscat first in 1800, and establishing in 
1840 a Political Agency responsible for recording public matters relevant to the crown, 
focusing especially on sources of contention and political instability.  Though “Muscat” 
was independent on paper, practically speaking its foreign and internal affairs were 
subject to British control through the Sultan.  By the late nineteenth-century, the Sultan 
was completely dependent on British support.21   
The archives show that the British payed close attention to both disasters and 
contention in nineteenth and twentieth century Oman, but there is scant overlap between 
these two topics.22  Indeed, cyclones were not studied by the British as potential sources 
 
21 Sultan Taimur bin Faisal largely abdicated his rule to the British officers Bertram Thomas from 1913-
1932.  See Francis Owtram, “A Close Relationship: Britain and Oman since 1750,” Qatar Digital 
Library, December 11, 2014, https://www.qdl.qa/en/close-relationship-britain-and-oman-1750. 
22 These documents have been collected in R. W. Bailey (ed.), Records of Oman 1867-1947, 
Buckinghamshire, England: Archive Editions, Volumes I-XI.  Others have been recently digitized and 
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of political or social grievances, as were kinship networks, land claims, and tribal 
alliances, for example.  Instead, cyclones were natural phenomena posing challenges to 
other imperial interests.  Discussed in more detail below, the earliest colonial documents 
represent cyclones as hazards for trading vessels in the Indian Ocean.  The term 
“cyclone” itself was coined in 1848 by British meteorologist Henry Piddington to 
connote the uniquely circular wind patterns of extremely powerful storms in the Indian 
Ocean.  British traders working with colonial officers collected and compared data to 
understand the pathways of cyclones.  Discerning “the law of storms,” they made 
handbooks by the same name for sailors that contained cyclone-shaped transparences that 
could be placed over a map to find safe shipping routes to the colonies of the 
subcontinent.23   
Later, British concern for cyclones was incorporated into their economic and 
agricultural planning.  After several famines in the 1870s, British officers in India would 
begin tracking the rainfall of cyclones, as it was seen as important for understanding 
India’s capacity for agricultural production.24  In 1945, the British Colonial Office would 
establish the Anti-Locust Research Centre, which sought to study and control locust 
outbreaks in Africa and the Middle East.  Seeing rainfall patterns as relevant to their 
 
made available in the Qatar Digital Library, available online at 
https://www.qdl.qa/en/search/site/?f%255B0%255D=document_source%3Aarchive_source. 
23 Caroline Blyth, “Henry Piddington (1797-1858),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2004).  For Piddington’s connections to other Colonial studies of Atlantic 
“hurricanes,” see Dick DeAngelis, “Early Tropical Cyclone Chroniclers,” Environmental Data Service, 
55, (July 1977): 16-19.   
24 For example, see Henry F. Blanford and John Eliot, Indian Meteorological Memoirs: Occasional 
Discussions and Compilations of Meteorological Data Relating to India and the Neighboring Countries. 
(Calcutta, India: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing) Government of India, 1903), Vol 
XVI, Part I, https://archive.org/details/dli.granth.108630/page/n3/mode/2up. 
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concerns, they too would begin to establish studies of cyclones that impacted the Arabian 
Peninsula.25  These numerous documents demonstrate a meteorological perspective of 
British traders and officers on cyclones.  Their goal was to understand the storms’ 
mechanics so as to further British commercial interests in the colonies.  
The lack of any mention of disaster-caused grievances within these accounts of 
cyclones is a good indication that these kinds of events did not generate contentious 
politics to which state authorities had to respond.  Since their arrival in 1840, the British 
Political Agents of Oman were tasked with documenting, among other things, any real or 
potential flash-points of contention in the region that might threaten the Sultan, and 
therefore, British interests.  It was prudent to do so in an environment of shifting tribal 
alliances and their propensity to launch attacks against the coastal Sultan, who 
occasionally struggled to hold power over Muscat, let alone the territory beyond the 
city.26  Often relying on local informants, the Agents filled volumes with accounts of 
local grievances, demands, tribal vendettas, attacks, shifting alliances, and compromises 
among tribes, the Imam of the interior, and the Sultan of the coast.  That none of the 
British commentary on major storms is accompanied by any mention of aggrieved 
parties, complaints, or threats to the Sultan is evidence that Omanis themselves were not 
publicly mobilizing behind any disaster-related grievances.27  Had they done so, the 
 
25 For example, see D.E. Pedgley, “Cyclones Along the Arabian Coast,” Weather, 24, no. 11 (1969): 456-
470. 
26 On the political tumult of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see J.E. Peterson, Oman in the 
Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016).   
27 To be clear, I am not claiming that there were no grievances circulating out of view from the British.  But 
if they were there, they were not accompanied by significant enough mobilization that the British would 
deem them worthy of record.  On the distinction between public and “hidden” grievances, see James C. 
Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. 
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British would have likely documented it, as they did regarding territorial disputes, 
economic grievances, and protests over British influence on the region, among many 
other issue of local dispute.28   
The imperial view of disasters in Oman is illustrated in the British volumes that 
describe massive storms affecting the Omani coast and interior in 1890, 1898, 1912, and 
1917.  The storm of 1890 appears to have been the most destructive, and received the 
longest commentary relative to the subsequent storms.  A look at how the Political Agent 
describes the storm demonstrates the extent of the Agent’s concern.  He dedicates a 
significant portion of the report to the meteorological details, including the wind behavior 
and the precipitation rate: “11 inches and 24 cents” of rain over a 24-hour period.  He 
then goes on to describe the impact on the local community and economy:   
The Sultan computes the number of deaths due directly to the effects of this storm 
to be about 727, but I am inclined to be of opinion that it is under the mark, as 
there are several places from which no report has yet been received.  The damage 
done to the property which in Oman consists principally of date trees, is 
considered enormous, as several thousands of trees are reported to have been 
uprooted and carried away by the floods.  The back of the eastern portion of the 
town became dangerously flooded.  The low-lying ground between the small gate 
and the Sadab Pass being converted into a lake.29  
The agent later wrote a financial report of the destruction: $871,875 in agriculture, on 
account of how long it would take to replace the date palm trees and return to normal 
production rates, and a loss of $25,000 in Omani boats, noting that the larger, more 
 
28 For example, the Imam’s judge (qadi) wrote to the PAM objection to the British “permitting the 
forbidden, such as the sale of wine and tobacco, and forbidding the permitted, such as the trade in arms 
and slaves.” See Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century, 172. 
29 ‘File XXVIII/1 Internal Politics & Relations with Oman. Narrative of Muscat Affairs 1872-1893’ [147v] 
(294/316), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/6/36, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100044275644.0x00005f> 
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expensive ships that were destroyed were owned by foreign traders.30  The only mention 
of local responses to the storm, other than the Sultan’s casualty report, is of an effort to 
drain the flooded areas.  A report written a year later mentions that many of the houses 
were “still in ruins,” though made no mention as to why.  Nor does the document note 
that the poor conditions of those living in the ruins would be a source of instability that 
threaten British interests, a common position taken by later imperial Agents commenting 
upon the squalor of Omani life in the 1950s and 1960s.  The apparent lack of rebuilding 
had no broader significance, as the British were concerned.31   
It is unlikely that the absence of records regarding any contention around the 
disaster is due to a lack of concern or attention on behalf of the British.  The same 
document that noted the lack of rebuilding, but gave no mention of any corresponding 
grievances, also provided several pages of accounts of other local grievances.  These 
disputes included the recurring inter-tribal conflicts and “contending factions” which 
were conducting border raids against one another; a tribal “Chief” who complained of 
“the tone of letters addressed to him” in regards to an attempt of extradition within his 
territory; the need to placate the Bedouin tribes that were raiding trade caravans; and 
multiple inner-tribal conflicts over succession.   
 
30 The Agent was so disturbed of the storm’s power that he searched through local records for similar 
events, noting that he found mention of one in the Islamic year of 251 A.H. [865 A.D.].  File XXVIII/1 
Internal Politics & Relations with Oman. Narrative of Muscat Affairs 1872-1893’ [148r] 
(295/316), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/6/36, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100044275644.0x000060> [accessed 7 July 2020].  
31 ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency and Muscat Political Agency for 1890-
91’ [116r] (7/54), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/V/23/60, no. 
285, in Qatar Digital Library, 
https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023549721.0x000009. [accessed 7 July 2020]. 
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Later disasters in the British record of Oman appear with even less detail, 
especially regarding the local response.  There is a one-sentence report of a disastrous 
cyclone on June 3rd 1898, simply stating that it destroyed homes in Muscat and date palm 
orchards in surrounding areas.32  A storm in 1912 received two-sentences of mention: it 
destroyed 30 boats, and killed a man.33  A larger cyclone was reported to have devastated 
the coastal city of Sur in 1917, destroying a great deal of the agricultural infrastructure by 
uprooting 1,200 date palm trees, and wrecking people’s homes.34  The only recorded 
response to that storm concerns two Omanis who rescued a crew of seven sailors aboard 
a stranded refrigerator barge, and a band of Bedouins that looted the weapons and other 
materials on board before the British could retrieve them.35  As with the previous 
documents, these records show a close attention to the political affairs and concerns of 
Omanis.  For example, the 1917 records give detailed accounts of the ongoing Muscat 
Rebellion (1913-1920) in the interior, Omanis’ apparent contempt for the Sultan in both 
the interior and coastal regions, and concerns with the financial corruption of one of the 
 
32 'Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf. Vol I. Historical. Part II. J G Lorimer. 1915' [2210] (727/1262), British 
Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/C91/2, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023514763.0x00007d> [accessed 7 July 2020]; and 
Persian Gulf Administration Reports 1883/84 - 1904/05 [211r] (426/602), British Library: India Office 
Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/1/709, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100023373227.0x00001b> [accessed 7 July 2020]. 
33 File 4/4 Muscat Administration Reports and related correspondence' [13r] (25/712), British Library: 
India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/6/337, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100059396987.0x00001a> [accessed 7 July 2020]. 
34 File 2297/1919 ‘Persian Gulf Residency Monthly Reports. 1912-20.’ [137v] (279/1044), British Library: 
India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/10/827, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100063236932.0x000050> [accessed 7 July 2020]. 
35 File 4/4 Muscat Administration Reports and related correspondence' [150r] (299/712), British Library: 
India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/R/15/6/337, in Qatar Digital 
Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100059396988.0x000064> [accessed 7 July 2020]. 
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Sultan’s underlings.36  But the British Agents do not appear to see the destruction of the 
coastal city of Sur, or any potential response to it, as relevant to their concerns with the 
Sultan’s popularity in this region.  The British do not note any overlap between Omani 
politics and the suffering and destruction caused by these cyclones.   
This apparent irrelevance of disasters to political contestation is perhaps 
corroborated by Dawn Chatty’s anthropological work on public health development 
projects in 1980s Oman.  She documented some of the notions of political membership 
that development practitioners encountered in rural areas that had not yet been touched 
by Sultan Qaboos’s new regime.  For example, in 1980, she accompanied a team of 
doctors who traveled across the desert interior of Oman, which is sparingly inhabited by 
nomadic herders that move between Oman and the United Arab Emirates.  On that trip 
they came across a group from the Harasiis tribe that was getting ready for a wedding.  
The doctors asked if they could vaccinate the children, and the parents were confused.  
Chatty recorded the dialogue in her field notes: 
We said, “The Sultan of Oman wishes to see all Omanis immunized against these 
diseases.”  
“Why would he want to do this for us?” they persisted.   
We were initially at a loss for an answer.  We had assumed that the sense of 
belonging to one nation and of the obligations of leadership had reached this part 
of the country.  It had not.37 
 
Chatty would go on to study this tribe over the next fourteen years, especially the 
government’s attempts to offer development programs, and the Sultan’s efforts to make 
 
36 Ibid., 289-295. 
37 Excerpt from Dawn Chatty, Field Notebook 1, May 1980; as cited in Dawn Chatty, “Rituals of Royalty 
and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman: View from the Edge,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 41 (2009): 39. 
 106   
his rule synonymous with what she calls a modern state.38  She found that during this 
period, the Harasiis tribe went from having no clear expectations from the Omani state, as 
illustrated above, to expecting that the Sultan would take care of their needs.  Indeed, 
when the they would later become convinced that the Sultan was unable to live up to this 
role, many of them moved their homes over the border to the United Arab Emirates, 
refusing calls from the Omani government to return.39  This change in the way that the 
Harasiis understood their citizenship, their membership within the Omani community and 
what they were entitled to accordingly, nicely illustrates the “before and after” of the new 
ideas and practices of citizenship associated with Qaboos’ regime.   
Considered together, these sources provide a patchy yet coherent image that is in 
contrast to what would come later.  Omanis living before the influence of Sultan Qaboos’ 
development programs, or in the case of Chatty’s observations, outside of them, had a 
variety of different ways of understanding their environment, providing causal 
explanations that appealed to both natural and supernatural forces.  When it came to 
ecological calamities, these events appear to have been placed within moral and political 
frameworks.  When weather phenomena led to collective suffering or prosperity, there 
was some mix of human agency and divine judgment behind it.  But these sources do not 
comment upon the responsibilities of the state to its subjects in regards to responding to 
these hardships.  Moreover, the British and their local informants who monitored and 
recorded political and social grievances in the area saw disasters as irrelevant to the 
 
38 Sultan Qaboos also used such terms in his public speeches.  See Joseph A. Kéchichian, “A Vision of 
Oman: State of the Sultanate Speeches by Qaboos bin Said, 1970-2006,” Middle East Policy, 15 no. 4, 
(2008): 112-133. 
39 Ibid., 58. 
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maintenance of power in the region.40  To them, cyclones were natural hazards that 
interfered with trade routes, and variables that affected their agricultural planning.  This 
pattern of record suggests that Omanis made little trouble for the Sultan, and therefore the 
British, when disasters struck.  There are no records of public contestations of rule 
surrounding issues like aid provision or rebuilding.   
The confused Harasiis parents, the ruins of Omani ghost villages that could have 
easily been saved by state development programs already underway in other parts of the 
country, the silence of the British archive on any protests or grievances toward the Sultan 
following a disaster despite the other grievances being recorded—these are indicators of 
an absence of a discourse of citizenship that would make environmental hardship 
something for the state to address.  Taken together, they suggest that the state in Oman 
was not understood as being responsible for attending to people’s needs in the face of 
forces outside of their control, such as storms, drought, or disease.  A skeptical reader 
could argue that there may have been quiet or deliberately hidden grumblings among the 
Omanis regarding the state’s shortcomings after disasters, left unrecorded by both 
Omanis and the British.  But such a reader would have to explain why these grievances 
were never made public in a context where the power of the Sultan over Omanis was so 
minimal, and contention and even open rebellion was so common among the Omani 
tribes.41  The Sultan’s subjects were not shy in their discontent.  That they did not use 
 
40 On the use of native agents in the Persian Gulf during this period, see James Onley, The Arabian 
Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf, (New 
York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
41 On the correlation between the extent of state control and surveillance on one hand, and the existence of 
a “hidden transcript” of grievances and resistance on the other, see Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance, 89-90. 
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disasters as occasions to protest or mobilize is a clear indication that disaster relief was 
not understood as being the responsibility of the Omani state.  As the next section shows, 
that would begin to change at the behest of colonial and anti-colonial forces. 
 
Imperialism and the Origins of a New Omani Citizenship 
 Conceiving of government responsibility vis-à-vis natural disasters became a 
feature of Omani political culture via the state-building efforts of British imperialism.  
This is not to argue that the Omani state and broader political culture were simply 
reiterations of those found in Europe.  Rather, the rationalities and strategies of rule 
deployed by Omani Sultans were substantially shaped by British Colonial officers and the 
challenges they faced, such as anti-colonial rebellions.  For this, the officers drew from 
their own European understandings of how to rule, and what kinds of protection and 
welfare government can offer its citizens.  This development is central to my analysis of 
contemporary politics in Oman because the legacy of these colonial strategies is that they 
shaped the contemporary social contract.  They made such protection and welfare 
prominent within Omani discourse as one of several ways for framing political 
membership, and what states are responsible for providing their citizens.  
While my goal is not to make an intervention into the frameworks used by 
scholars to study Omani politics, it bears mentioning here that the political significance of 
this new social contract is often overlooked in the literature.42  The most prominent 
accounts of Omani politics have emphasized its otherness to “Western,” industrialized 
 
42 Exceptions include Valeri, Oman; and M.H. Ilias, “Neoliberalism and the New Means of Art of 
Government in the Persian Gulf Monarchies,” International Politics, 3 (2010): 31-52. 
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polities.  Peterson classifies the Omani state as “neo-patriarchal,” that is, a modern-gloss 
on the pre-modern feudal systems of patronage and the expectations and power-relations 
therein.43  Takriti emphasizes the nature of the Sultan’s sovereignty, calling it a 
Hobbesian, absolutist monarchy.44  Valeri and most others emphasize its characteristics 
as a “rentier state” on account of how its hydrocarbon wealth has shaped its state 
institutions and what citizens expect of them.45  While these labels help us notice patterns 
that may be in some ways peculiar to Omani politics, they also obscure consequential 
patterns that are common to other states.  My attention to the changing ideas and 
practices of citizenship helps us understand why Omani politics, for all their uniqueness, 
are nevertheless structured by familiar frameworks of membership and state 
responsibility found elsewhere.  This approach helps us see why disaster politics in Oman 
follow a similar historical pattern to those in the US, making new political opportunities 
possible in both countries. 
The changes to conceptions of political membership and state responsibility  
emerged out of a strategy of rule in Oman imposed by British imperial officers.  Readers 
of some of the scholarship concerning British imperialism in other parts of the world will 
find this argument familiar.  For example, David Scott’s analysis of British colonial 
practices in India documents the emergence of “colonial governmentality” as a new way 
of thinking among British colonizers.  In Scott’s account, between 1796 and 1832, 
colonial officers had been concerned with maintaining “sovereignty” over a territory, as 
 
43 J.E. Peterson, “The Emergence of Post-Traditional Oman,” Durham Middle East Papers, no. 78, (2004). 
44 Abdel Razzaq Takriti, Monsoon Revolution, 19-20. 
45 Valeri, Oman. 
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part of a larger mercantilist framework of resource extraction.  This approach consisted of 
establishing a defensive position on the territory, and enforcing laws with the ultimate 
goal of extracting wealth from the colony.  The primary concern of this colonial 
sovereignty was making sure that subjects obeyed their commands.  Hence, the habits and 
religious proclivities of the colonial “society” or “population” was of little concern to the 
colonizer at this time.   
This approach to colonial rule in India was eventually subsumed in the mid-
nineteenth century by what Scott calls colonial governmentality, as British officers 
complained that their current strategies were hindering the development of commerce and 
the improvement of the moral character of their colonized subjects.  The new approach to 
rule was much more intrusive, concerned with transforming the population itself, 
“disabling old forms of life by systematically breaking down their conditions, and with 
constructing in their place new conditions so as to enable… new forms of life to come 
into being.”46  In Sri Lanka, it meant creating a new kind of citizenry, a liberal colonial 
society, providing an education and a free press so that the population might rid itself of 
“ignorant prejudices,” like religious traditions, which have “obstruct[ed] the 
improvement of the country.”  Officers believed that such “moral and intellectual 
improvement,” combined with a free press, would allow this now-improved popular 
opinion to promote “good government,” and habits of free market commerce.   
British colonizers in Oman would not go so far is to try and promote a liberal 
society as their predecessors did in Sri Lanka.  But as I argue below, a similar shift 
 
46 David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,” Social Text, 43 (Autumn, 1995): 193. 
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toward colonial governmentality by the British in Oman occurred in the mid-twentieth 
century, precipitating the emergence of a new discourse of citizenship in Oman.  This 
shift was consequential for explaining how disasters would later become trials for the 
Omani government.   
 
From Colonial Sovereignty to Colonial Governmentality in Oman 
In the early twentieth century, the British were primarily concerned with 
maintaining colonial sovereignty in the territory of modern-day Oman.  The area had 
been split into multiple polities, including the coastline, “Muscat,” ruled by a British-
backed Sultan, and an interior, “Oman,” ruled by a confederation of tribes, headed by an 
elected Imam.  Sovereignty over any given area or community was diffused, commanded 
through oaths of loyalty from tribal leaders, and all the variance that attends personalized 
rule.  For example, a British surgeon visiting Masirah Island in 1939 described the local 
ruler as a Sheikh who spent only one month a year on the island; he was hated by the 
inhabitants as an outsider, and split his allegiance between the Imam of the interior and 
the Sultan of the coastline, depending on the circumstances.47 The historian Takriti 
summarizes the scene well: “The most [the Sultan] could achiev[e] was control over 
some major towns and forts and the successful accumulation of customs from coastal 
trade.”48   
 
47 “Visit by H.M.S. Challenger, 1939,” in Records of Oman 1867-1947. (Farnham Common, 
Buckinghamshire, England: Archive Editions), 1988.  
48 Takriti, Monsoon Revolution, 12. 
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Responding to this complicated picture, British Imperial officers argued that it 
was best to leave these “Arabs” to their own devices as much as possible.  For example, a 
handbook created to prepare British officers for deliberations in the post-World War I 
peace conference detailed the make-up of “Arabia.”  Its entry on current-day Omani 
territory describes “primitive people, incapable of economic development,” and a 
desolate and harsh geography that makes it impossible for any foreign or local rulers to 
conquer.49  In short, Omanis were viewed by the colonizers as part of a larger 
ungovernable landscape.  This anarchic character did not present a major problem to 
British interests, however, as they were only concerned with maintaining access to ports 
on this part of Arabian Peninsula for assisting its shipping routes to India, where, as 
described above, they were much more involved in governing their colonial subjects.  
Thus, in Oman, the British restricted themselves to the practices of colonial sovereignty, 
investing money, military intervention, and diplomatic efforts to prop-up the coastal 
Sultan of Muscat as a British ally.   
The extent of what could be called government administration during this period 
was limited to a handful of advisors to the Sultan, usually his family members and British 
officers.  Noteworthy here is that this administration did not seem to be focused on 
governing the lives of Omanis.  Rather, it was concerned with exercising sovereignty, the 
enforcing of the Sultan’s will as law, and the extraction of taxes on traded items.50  In the 
 
49 G.W. Prothero (ed.), Arabia, (London, UK: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920), 41. 
50 For example, the major administrative adjustments under Sultan Said bin Taimur (1932-1970) were not 
done in pursuit of new public policy goals.  Rather, he made these adjustments to try and give himself 
more autonomy from British advisors, for example, by establishing a council of administrators that 
would be subordinate to him.  J.E. Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 78. 
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eyes of the British, this minimalist version of a state was enough. There was no need to 
get further involved in the lives of “Arabs,” especially of those in the interior region, 
“Oman,” ruled by the Imam.  The exceptions that prove the rule are when the interior 
tribes would attack the British-backed Sultan of the coast.  In these instances, the British 
would intervene, but only to establish treaties that would keep the peace with the interior 
tribes, thus protecting their access to the coastline. 
This minimal intervention into the lives of Omanis would change in the mid-
twentieth century.  Robust development projects slowly came to be seen as a key tool of 
British interests throughout the British Empire, when Britain came under growing 
international and domestic criticism for its imperialism.  Beginning in the inter-war 
period and escalating thereafter, such global domination was becoming harder to justify 
through the values of trusteeship and the so-called civilizing process, as conquered 
peoples suffered from economic stagnation and social unrest, and organized rebellions 
emerged against the British and their local allies.   
This pressure resulted in the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act in Britain in 1940.  As Constantine puts it, the Act had the, “explicit purpose of 
improving social conditions in the colonies… as a method of removing legitimate 
grievances in the colonies, reestablishing the empire and defusing criticism of British 
colonial rule.”51  Among these British imperial reformists, the developmental goals of the 
1940 act were seen as potential solutions to the multiple problems facing Britain after 
WWII.  Investing in agriculture, industry, and infrastructure in their territories abroad 
 
51 Stephen Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940, (London, UK: 
Routledge, 2005), 259. 
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might simultaneously increase the productivity of British colonies and temper the 
radicalism of anti-colonial movements for the time being.   
But such development efforts could not ensure the sustainability of empire in the 
eyes of British authorities.  Just years after the Act was passed, the ruling party was 
convinced that decolonization was inevitable.52 The aftermath of World War II only 
cemented this conclusion: maintaining an empire in this post-war context appeared 
increasingly difficult, as the British government was financially bankrupt and facing 
food-shortages at home.  There was also increasing international pressure from the newly 
formed United Nations to replace empire with independent nation-states.  Moreover, the 
British had failed to achieve quick, decisive victory over anti-colonial movements in 
places like Kenya, Malaya, India, and Burma.   
By the 1950s, the inevitable independence of the remaining British colonies 
appeared close at hand.  Thus a group of reformists among the British officers concluded 
that it was in Britain’s interests to ensure that they left in their wake a stable political 
infrastructure and allies to oversee it.53  In regards to the Middle Eastern areas of British 
control, imperial politicians like Foreign Secretary Bevin (1945-1951) feared both an 
Islamic war against Britain, as well as communist infiltration in “backward” societies.54  
 
52 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
53 Furedi, “Creating a Breathing Space,” 102-104.  A similar shift occurred in the French Empire, beginning 
in 1946.  See Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of 
Difference, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 420. 
54 Reflecting the domestic debates within Britain, this Cold War calculation was used to advocate for 
sustaining the British presence in key areas, especially the Persian Gulf.  A 1965 cable for the British 
Cabinet Defense and Oversea Policy Committee warned, “We could be certain that both the United Arab 
Republic [the union of Syria and Egypt from 1958-1971] and the Soviet Union would be fishing in these 
troubled waters [of the Persian Gulf].  Iran’s confidence would be so shaken [by a British withdraw] that 
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The idea was that radicals, especially Marxists, had to be isolated and the moderates 
empowered before the British withdrew.   
The logic of colonial governmentality would be repurposed for these aims.  In 
many parts of the empire, while the British fought insurgencies, they also invested in 
development projects and allowed some forms of moderate self-governance, and more 
importantly, improved the living conditions of the “backwards” populations.  As Hyam 
puts it, “[Foreign Secretary Bevin] wanted joint co-operation, a partnership on a common 
basis, a mutual interest in ‘a great design’ for security and prosperity, fighting 
communism by raising living standards for the common people and fellahin [peasants] 
through the whole core-area from Turkey to Pakistan.”55  
While this reformist movement within the British ranks made improving the 
population a strategy for Britain’s post-imperial interests, Oman remained a hold-out for 
conservative British officers who clung to the old model of colonial sovereignty.56  For 
example, in the mid-1950s, Sir Bernard Burrows, the conservative British political 
 
we would have to reckon on her abandoning her pro-Western alignment.  There might also be 
consequences for the supply of oil, the profitability of the British oil investment and the strength of 
sterling.”  CAB 148/23, OPD (65)174, “Some considerations of foreign policy with particular reflections 
on the Middle East”: memorandum by Mr. Stewart for Cabinet Defense and Oversea Policy Committee, 
22 November, 1965, in East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964-1971, S. R. Ashton and Wm Roger 
Louis (eds.), Series A, Volume 5, (London, UK: The Stationary Office, 2004). 
55 Although Britain more often failed to leave behind strong allies in most of their former empire, Oman 
and other Gulf monarchs were exceptions to the trend.   
56 The British wished to maintain influence in Oman because they valued Oman’s geostrategic location at 
the mouth of the Persian Gulf, which made it essential for controlling shipping routes through this major 
trade artery.  Additionally, Oman’s southern coastline and the island of Masirah were important for 
British trade routes and communication in the Indian Ocean.  Perhaps most importantly, British oil 
prospectors eventually came to believe that the interior of Oman had substantial oil wealth (later 
confirmed in 1963).  Ensuring access to these fields was seen as synonymous with propping up the 
Sultan Said bin Taimur after he conquered the interior region, abolishing the Imamate in 1955.  This put 
the land and the hoped-for oil beneath it under his jurisdiction.  
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resident in the Gulf explained that, “There is quite a lot to be said for a reasonably 
efficient feudalism.”57 Rejecting the utility of colonial governmentality, he harkened to 
the Orientalist perspective of the interwar period, seeing Oman and Omanis as 
ungovernable and incapable of progress.  In his eyes, keeping local order required that 
Omanis fear the British enough to obey the laws and pay customs; the British need not 
bother improving the lives of Omanis themselves.  In contrast, Burrows’ later 
replacement lamented the backwardness of Omani life, and identified it as a threat to 
British interests:  
The condition of the people is miserable, the Sultan is unpopular, there is no 
central administration… and, under the present regime, not a great deal of hope 
for the future… What surprises me, is not that there is still a rebellion but that 
there are not half a dozen similar uprisings in other parts of the country.58   
 
It is worth dwelling on the ideas expressed in this complaint, as they clearly 
articulate the policy goals that would eventually shape the repertoire of citizenship that 
would emerge in Oman.  In his eyes, what Oman has is a government lacking in 
administration and therefore lacking in legitimacy.  This absence is a threat to British 
interests because Omanis are understandably taking up arms in hopes of a better future 
without the negligent Sultan.  What Oman needs, it follows, is a capable and willing 
central administration to make the population happy and hopeful.  Note that he is not just 
calling for governmentalizing the state, i.e. more administration, but for advertising a new 
social contract.  Political stability would come not just from improving people’s material 
 
57 W. Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region, (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 86.  
58 As quoted in Mark Curtis, Unpeople: Britain’s Secret Human Rights Abuses, (London, UK: Vintage, 
2004), 302-304. 
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conditions, but by using the public goods that such rule would generate as a way to re-
frame the state’s legitimacy, feeding images of progress to the imaginations of the 
population, and making that progress synonymous with the Sultan’s rule.     
This officer’s misgivings about the squalor of Omani civilians was not shared by 
his immediate superior, and the reformist move toward development would be 
continually frustrated for another fifteen years until the coup of 1970.  Those imperial 
officers who were convinced that “development” was the best way to secure British 
interests were eventually galvanized to overthrow Sultan Said bin Taimur by what 
appeared to be a pattern of rebellion in Oman.  The rebellion against the Sultan in the 
interior, (Jebel Akhdar War, 1954-1959), and the anti-colonial Dhofar War (1963-1976) 
were both understood by the British as expressions of Omani frustration with their 
poverty and the harsh rule of the Sultan Said bin Taimur.  Underscoring this need for 
development, other tribal leaders were allying with the Sultan in hopes that he could 
deliver the same fruits of modernity on display in those neighboring countries who had 
already tapped their oil reserves, like Kuwait and Bahrain.59  That is, the pressure to 
modernize was coming from both the Sultan’s enemies and his allies.   
The international context was also changing, lending credence to the notion that 
colonial governmentality was a better strategy for British interests.  Arab nationalist 
movements in the region had been overthrowing British proxy rulers and expelling 
colonial troops in Iraq (1958), Egypt (1952 and 1956), and South Yemen (1967), and 
were receiving financial and military aid from the USSR and China.  As a version of this 
 
59 John Townsend, Oman: The Making of a Modern State, (London, UK: Croom Helm, 1977). 
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nationalist-Marxist movement emerged in Oman in the mid-1960s in the southern region 
of Dhofar, the rebels sang of Arab independence from the British and their Omani 
monarch, and of a socialist vision of transforming a “traditional” Oman into a “modern” 
one.60  Acting as the People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman, they built some of the 
first modern schools, agricultural projects, and medical centers in Oman.61  In other 
words, parallel to the imperial reformist emphasis on the needs to develop Oman, there 
was a competing nationalist movement, also calling for transforming the country into a 
modern one.  And this modern alternative rejected the British-supported Sultan, and was 
ideologically allied to their Cold War enemies, the USSR, China, and Egypt.   
This bottom-up and international pressure in Oman, and the specter of spreading 
independence movements throughout the remaining British Empire, especially in the 
Middle East, thoroughly discredited the conservative approach of colonial sovereignty 
among a cohort of British officers in Oman.  Reformists advocated for developing Oman 
with increasing urgency.  That is, the pressure gave credence to the notion among some 
colonial administrators that they needed to counter the socialist vision of modernity with 
a monarchal one, and do so quickly.62  It was here that Oman saw its first Sultan-backed 
programs for development, targeting the well-being and attitudes of everyday people 
 
60 The most thorough account of this is in Takriti Monsoon Revolution, 2013.  
61 Fred Halliday, Mercenaries: ‘Counter-Insurgency’ in the Gulf, (Nottingham, UK: Russell Press Ltd., 
1977), 48.  Limited by funds and counterinsurgent bombing, these public goods would be eclipsed by the 
Sultan Qaboos’ own development programs. 
62 Takriti, Monsoon Revolution, 155.  At the time, many observers believed that the slow modernization of 
India contributed to the popularity of the independence movement, instilling a lesson that quicker 
development is better.  See Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire. 
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living under the biological ancient regime in Oman.  For example, there were efforts to 
build model farms, roads, health centers, and a school for the sons of elite Sheikhs. 
But these development programs were insufficient to serve as propaganda for 
Sultan Said bin Taimur.  One reason is that they were coming too slow.  For example, the 
British Political Officer of the Persian Gulf wrote in 1965, 
If the Sultan is to make his people more contented and thus reduce the danger of 
revolution (at present they tend to be discontented either because they are at heart 
supporters of the ex-Imam, or are frustrated by the Sultan’s regulations, or have 
seen what oil-rich Rulers elsewhere have done for their people), then it is 
important that his Civil Development Programme be accelerated and expanded… 
There is a real danger that he may leave it too late.63 
 
Another problem with the Sultan’s development programs was that they reflected the 
favoritism of patronage, rather than a social contract that would serve all, including the 
poorest Omani citizens.  After a British officer’s tour of the Persian Gulf in 1967, he 
remarked upon his meeting with Sultan Said Ibn Taimur:  
I am concerned about the future of the Sultanate.  It is possible that this… will be 
the next target of revolution in the Middle East.  The Sultan is set in the ways of 
fairly benevolent despotism… He says that he is going to set up a ‘development 
board’ to spend the oil money on improvements.  But it is clear that he… will 
favor the loyal areas of his Sultanate at the expense of the disaffected.  Nothing I 
could say could budge him from this visionless policy.64 
 
Note how in the eyes of the more conservative imperialists, the Omanis were a threat to 
stability because they were racially anarchic, incapable of acquiescence to authority.  But 
 
63 “Muscat Annual Report for the Year 1965,” published in Francis Carey Owtram, “Oman and the West: 
State Formation in Oman since 1920,” PhD diss., University of London, 1999, 338. 
64 FCO 8/31, no 30: report by Mr. Roberts to Mr. Brown on his visit to the Persian Gulf and Iran, 31 Oct to 
12 Nov 1967, 17 November, 1967; in East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964-1971, S R Ashton and 
Wm Roger Louis (eds.), Series A, Volume 5, (London, UK: The Stationary Office, 2004). 
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in the eyes of the above liberal imperialist, Omanis were “disaffected,” and therefore 
progress and stability can be achieved by improving their conditions.   
In 1966, the British Political Officer at Abu Dhabi advocated for such an 
approach when he discussed the importance of establishing “good government” in the 
interior of Oman in order to convince local tribes not to sabotage the newly built oil 
pipeline.  He expressed distress at Sultan Taimur’s austerity, who was offering only a 
small bribe to the tribal Sheikh for cooperation: 
I have very grave doubts, amounting to certainty, as to whether he will pay them 
enough.  Army patrols along a pipeline have been found often enough to be 
ineffective in such a situation and the only way in which a pipeline can be 
preserved from attack lies in absolute cooperation from the local people (which 
must be purchased), and a very high-class intelligence service…  The loyalty of 
the tribesmen must be purchased not so much by money as by good government 
and respect shown to the Sheikhs.  Substantial bribes will help.  Small ones will 
not.65 
 
He goes on to comment on the external and internal pressures to modernize life in Oman, 
and Sultan Taimur’s dangerous reluctance to heed them. 
I believe that the Sultan still operates with the tribes on a basis of minute bribes 
backed up by convincing terror tactics in the form of the threat of imprisonment in 
Jalali.  The trouble will be that with outside influence and money and a growing 
feeling among the people that they would like to advance with the times, the 
Sultan’s old-fashioned tactics are likely to become more out-of-date and 
ineffective as the days go by… 66 
 
These expressions of British frustration with the Sultan make it clear that colonial 
administrators in the region came to see “development” or “modernization” as a tool for 
achieving their interests in the region.  Instead of leaving the lives of Omanis to a 
 
65 E.F. Henderson, “Security – Muscat and Oman,” PRO, FO 371/185384, July 19, 1966.  Published in 
Owtram, “Oman and the West.”  
66 Ibid., p. 350. 
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“relatively efficient feudalism,” as in the previous policy, the British would now try to 
improve Omanis by making them moderns.  In contrast to selective favoritism, these 
reformers were pushing for projects that made all of the Sultan’s subjects feel taken care 
of, a notion of relative equality among Omanis that resembled citizenship more than it 
did cronyism, or “small bribes.”  In short, the imperial administrators reasoned that to 
pacify the population and cement British interests, the Omanis needed to see the Sultan as 
their leader into a more prosperous and peaceful future—a British-friendly modernity.   
But the Sultan disagreed.  Some historians speculate that his reluctance to 
conform to the demands for development came from his desire to find some political 
autonomy from the British.  He saw British power over previous Sultans as coming from 
their financial debts to the British.  Thus, austerity measures and heavily taxing traders 
may have been a means to minimize the extent of British control over his matters, since it 
was not until 1967 that Oman began exporting oil.  Other historians speculate that he saw 
his rule threatened by the rapid social changes that come with development.  He is 
reported to have refused a proposal from a British reformist to build schools with the 
quip: “That is why you lost India, because you educated the people.”67 
Whatever the reasons for Sultan Said bin Taimur’s reluctance to conform to this 
new vision of citizenship in Oman, the now-empowered British reformists orchestrated a 
 
67 Quote from Uzi Rabi, The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman under Sa’id bin Taymur, 1932-
1970, (Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 156.  On Taimur’s austerity and anti-modernism, 
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coup in 1970 to replace him with his son, Qaboos bin Said.68  As I show in the next 
section, the development programs that followed ultimately succeeded in securing 
popular loyalty to the Sultan.  The coup enabled a successful counter-insurgency strategy, 
ending the civil war.  This strategy expanded into a nation-wide development program 
that transformed both the quality of life for Omani citizens,69 and how they understood 
their relationship with the state.   
 
Qaboos’ New Social Contract and the Environment  
The details of Qaboos’ rise to power and his state- and nation-building projects 
are complex and have been documented thoroughly by other scholars.70  In this section, I 
focus on how new ideas and practices of citizenship became a major feature of these 
changes.  The project of cultivating popular loyalty to the Qaboos regime made his rule 
synonymous with modern prosperity, and ultimately, into a way of life that was secure 
from the forces of nature.   
As other scholars have pointed out, Qaboos was virtually unknown to Omanis 
when he was given the throne.  Making himself known and popular included a concerted 
effort of propaganda.  For example, Qaboos made tours around the country, held parades, 
and gave radio addresses; he appeared in the newly established newspapers, and 
 
68 The British orchestration of the coup was denied publically until finally confirmed by the accidental 
declassification of British documents in 2005.  See Mike Thomson, “Document” BBC 4, November 23, 
2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00ny7nb. 
69 Oman has been ranked by the United Nations Development Program as having “the fastest progress in 
human development” since 1970.  See UNDP, Human Development Report 2010, The Real Wealth of 
Nations: Pathways to Human Development. (New York City, NY: UNDP), 27. 
70 See Peterson, Oman in the Twentieth Century; Valeri, Oman; and Takriti, Monsoon Revolution. 
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eventually, on Oman’s first TV channel, largely created for this purpose.  A royal 
photographer was hired to travel to rural areas and show pictures of Qaboos to people 
who had no access to telecommunications.71  The consistent narrative presented in these 
advertisement campaigns made Qaboos appear as the mirror opposite of his father.  
While Sultan Said bin Taimur was framed as an austere, slave-owning, “anti-modern” 
ruler, Qaboos’ brand would be modernization through massive spending on public 
goods.72  Qaboos was not just liberating Omanis from a despot.  He was also liberating 
them from the hardships of subsistence living under the biological anciene regime, 
transforming the means of economic production and the introducing new technology and 
social services to Omani citizens.  
The initial steps of advertising this new social contract occurred within the 
context of a counter-insurgency strategy to put down the anti-colonial rebels in the 
Dhofar region, who had been waging war on the previous Sultan since the mid-1960s.  
The British strategy was a mix of, on the one hand, tactics of punishing rebels and 
advertising this violence to the larger public as a threat.  This included practices like 
hanging tortured bodies in public, filling with cement the drinking wells of villages who 
supported the rebels, and dropping leaflets that read: “Military planes, cannons and 
automatic weapons are out hunting for you.  Wherever you have crept, they will teach 
 
71 For a detailed account of how the British developed Omani media as a means of popularizing Qaboos 
and creating a national culture, see Takriti, Monsoon Revolution, 199-233.  See also, Chatty, “Rituals of 
Royalty and the Elaboration of Ceremony in Oman.”  On the royal photographer’s travels, see Madiha 
Asif, “Our Oman: I captured Queen Elizabeth’s first visit to Oman in 1979,” Times of Oman, July 7, 
2018, https://timesofoman.com/article/137692.   
72 Valeri, Oman. 
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you a lesson and in the end will kill you all.”73  On the other hand, their tactics adopted a 
“hearts and minds” campaign that targeted both the rebels and the Omani population 
writ-large.74 The campaign was designed to isolate and disable the socialist rebels by 
winning over the larger audience of Omani tribal leaders who were either aiding the 
rebels or watching from the sidelines of the conflict.  This attempt to rally the larger 
Omani audience to the side of the Sultan had been a tactic in the previous British counter-
insurgency in Oman during the Jebel Akhdar War (1954-1959).  But in that earlier 
conflict, the emphasis was on advertising punishment, as political officers rationalized 
bombing the water aqueducts and agriculture of the villages of the rebelling interior to 
teach them that “resistance will be fruitless and lead only to hardship.” The aim was,  
To show the population the power of weapons at our disposal and convince them that 
resistance will be fruitless and lead only to hardship. I am most conscious of the need 
to avoid casualties and to give as little opening as possible to adverse publicity. (b) 
Thereafter to inflict the maximum inconvenience on the population so that out of 
discomfort and boredom they will turn against the rebel minority.75  
 
In the later Dhofar war, Qaboos’ regime would add the idea of a new social 
contract to the repertoire of their hearts and minds campaign.  The counter-insurgents 
sought to advertise the material “development” of Omani life, and a cultivation of a new 
“Omani” under the Sultan, in contrast to the rebels’ “Arab,” national culture, which the 
 
73 Quote from Halliday, Mercenaries, 55. 
74 The British officers used this phrase regularly in their documentation of the rebellion.  For example, see 
“Military Assistance to Oman from UK,” FCO 8/1856, 1972 Jan 01-1972 Dec 31, 
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75 FO 371/126876, “Bahrain Telegram No. 769 to Foreign Office,” 
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British painted as atheistic, communist, and foreign to Omani culture.76  One British 
counter-insurgent fighting the Arab nationalists aptly summarized this overall strategy:  
…there was a conscious dynamic at work on the government side which sought to 
convey this consistent message: if you were with the government you would get 
money and security.  If you were on the insurgent side, you would stay poor and 
get killed or captured.77  
 
Such was the evolution of British counter-insurgent thinking in Oman, targeting the 
imaginations of the broader Omani population to isolate the rebels and consolidate 
loyalty to the new Sultan.   
Crucially for the purposes of this study, the kind of security that the British 
counter-insurgents offered to Omanis in exchange for allegiance to the Sultan was not 
just of protection from human-to-human violence—often that of the British themselves.  
It also consisted of having access to new sources of water, income, health care, food, and 
roads; the latter is significant on account of the mountainous terrain which encumbered 
travel to land-locked areas in Oman.78  In the earliest phases, British “Civil Aid Teams” 
entered areas recently cleared of rebel forces.79  As early as 1973, British officials 
expressed hopes privately that the counter-insurgents’ “visible economic development” 
 
76 However, Halliday notes that the Sultan’s forces did try to appropriate the symbols of Arab nationalism, 
as well.  One of the pro-regime militias were named after Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Muscat radio 
broadcasted Nasserist songs from the 1950s.  See Halliday, Mercenaries, 57. 
77 “Personal notes: Lessons Learnt by Lt Col (Retd) Alan Abbott, Int Corps MBE, GSO3 Int, HQ Dhofar 
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563. 
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the building of physical infrastructure.  On this process in Jordan, see Yoav Alon, The making of Jordan: 
Tribes, colonialism, and the modern state, (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2007). On its ideological effects of 
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79 Peterson, Oman’s Insurgencies, 392-393. 
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around Dhofar was hurting rebel morale and encouraging defection.80  Moreover, these 
development projects were seen as necessities to counter what British officers saw as 
popular resentment of the Sultan’s military spending in the Dhofar War.81  Note that the 
officers clearly believed that these development projects needed to be advertised, 
anchored to a specific political message: this is the progress that Qaboos’ rule will bring.  
Beginning with token gestures of new water wells, food distribution centers, and 
mosques, these British-led development projects became systematized by 1974.   
Such projects eventually expanded nationwide.  They demilitarized their “hearts 
and minds” strategy of promising of a new social contract, and used it as a tool of state- 
and nation-building.  Much of Oman’s bureaucratic state was born of this process, as 
development programs were deployed in other parts of Oman to win loyalty to the Sultan, 
first in those areas of the greatest importance to the British, and later to the rest of the 
nation.  For example, after the Dhofari rebels either defected to the side of the Sultan or 
fled the country, ending the Dhofar War in 1976, the non-violent elements of the “hearts 
and minds” playbook were deployed in the Musandam Peninsula, on account of its 
geostrategic location to control the Persian Gulf shipping lanes.  The company Tetra 
Tech, owned by the former CIA agent James H. Critchfield, was tasked with developing 
the area to prevent local loyalties from “floating away,” on account of the internal tribal 
 
80 US Department of State, “Arabian Peninsula Discussion with British,” Wikileaks, June 22, 1973, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973LONDON07238_b.html. 
81 US Department of State, “Some Notes on Oman,” Wikileaks, December 4, 1973, 
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divisions, cultural proximity to Iran, and a history of political allegiances to Sheikhs in 
the United Arab Emirates.82  
The Qaboos regime’s development projects created a buffer between people’s 
well-being and the forces of nature.  In doing so, they not only overthrew the previous 
Sultan’s regime, but also the biological anciene regime that had shaped the everyday 
lives of Omanis.  The forces that once dictated people’s well-being now appeared to be 
subject to further human control through new sources of wealth, technology, and 
bureaucratic organization.  Everyday people in the new Oman would no longer starve or 
fall into debt and poverty during a drought or a bad fishing season.  In the “renaissance,” 
wealth comes from government salaries and food from supermarkets.  Water is no longer 
a seasonal gift from God, but something that comes out of a faucet, fed by a desalination 
plant or a newly sunk well with motorized pump.  Oman’s notoriously craggy landscape 
no longer isolates villages by virtue of the long and difficult journey to a major city, as 
endless paved highways now make it a few hours’ drive, to the shopping malls of Muscat 
or Salalah.  Air-conditioning, luxury cars, and supermarkets are now part of people’s 
daily existence.   
These changes were not just material.  They were used by the regime as symbols 
of a larger re-writing of the Omani social contract.  Much like the new infrastructure of 
the New Deal era in the US, Qaboos’ public works projects were given names to anchor 
their political meaning.  Qaboos’ namesake, or that of his era of rule, “al nahda,” are 
used to name the major bridges, interstates, hospitals, schools, large, ornate mosques, and 
 
82See Christopher Dickey “Va. Firm has Big Role in Oman,” Washington Post, March 24, 1986.  Tetra 
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Said to have Major Roles in Oman,” The New York Times, March 26, 1985. 
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universities that embody modern life for everyday people living in Oman.  These 
attempts to advertise the regime through its modern infrastructure also occurred in rural 
areas.  A UNDP program was shut down by the Ministry of Housing because it gave 
canvas tents to Omani herders.  Although the movable tents were practical for the 
purposes of nomadic herders, the Minister thought they did not look “progressive” 
enough, and demanded that permanent cement buildings be provided instead.83    
Qaboos’ public appearances and speeches more explicitly endorsed new ways for 
everyday Omanis to understand their well-being as a public good now provided by the 
state.  Upon taking office, he gave speeches, broadcasted by a British radio station built 
for this purpose, which regularly emphasized the lack of public services under his father, 
and how he would be different.84  Official rhetoric would continuously frame Oman as a 
“transformed” or “reborn land” dubbing the period of his rule the “renaissance” (al 
nahda).  As early as 1974, Qaboos’ Foreign Minister was bragging in the foreign press 
how the Omanis have escaped the biological anciene regime: “we have made great 
advances in the past six months… clouds of dust we have [are] not kicked up by camels, 
but by workshops of construction and progress.”85  The statistics that would be relevant 
to an administrator became features of official rhetoric that framed the legitimacy of the 
Sultan in his public relations efforts.  For example, in the initial years of Qaboos’ rule, all 
 
83 Dawn Chatty, Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman, (New York City, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 1996) 139. 
84 Sarah G. Phillips and Jennifer S. Hunt, “’Without Sultan Qaboos, We Would Be Yemen’: The 
Renaissance Narrative and the Political Settlement in Oman,” Journal of International Development, 29, 
(2017): 652. 
85 Reuters, “Zawawi Criticizes Gulf Nations for Abetting Dissidence,” Kuwait Times, February 23, 1974, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974KUWAIT00920_b.html. 
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the way up to his recent obituaries, the number of schools, hospitals, and kilometers of 
roads built under his rule are all continually cited as indicators of his care for his people, 
and therefore the legitimacy of his rule.  This narrative of the Sultan’s agency in 
transforming the country would be so ensconced in public discourse that decades later 
researchers would regularly hear Omanis repeat, “without Sultan Qaboos we would be 
Yemen,” referring to Oman’s impoverished, war-torn neighbor.86   
It should then be no surprise that the first recorded instances of state-provided 
disaster relief came under Qaboos, and that he framed it as a demonstration of national 
triumph.  In 1977, a powerful cyclone hit Oman’s Masirah Island.  Its winds reached 140 
miles per hour, dropping six-years’ worth of rain in a single day.  The storm killed 105 
people, left thousands, or even tens of thousands homeless by flattening nearly all built 
structures on the island.87  It also swept away thousands of livestock, and wiped out the 
island’s few lime and palm orchards.   
Unlike the aforementioned rural droughts, the response to the 1977 cyclone 
demonstrates an early application of the new social contract to a disaster.  The residents 
of Masirah Island were rescued by the Omani military.  The Sultan himself publicized the 
 
86 Phillips and Hunt, 2017, 651.  The extent to which this equivocation between Qaboos and the common 
good of all Omanis was successful could also be seen in the extent of anxiety and speculation around the 
fate of the country after the Sultan’s death.  His lack of an heir and poor health made public discussion of 
Oman’s future politically incorrect, to say the least, and tempted private hopes that he has a secret heir 
that will emerge upon his death.  Further underscoring the equivocation, when Qaboos died in 2020, the 
Royal Court abdicated their role in picking a new Sultan.  It deferred to the Sultan’s choice, which he had 
sealed in an envelope.  One can reasonably speculate that in deferring to the Sultan’s pick, they hoped the 
new Sultan would inherit some added legitimacy from Qaboos.  Indeed, upon taking office, the new 
Sultan, Haitham bin Tariq, pledged to maintain continuity with Qaboos’ policies. 
87 Death count is from Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, “Disaster History: Significant Data on 
Major disasters Worldwide, 1900-Present,” Washington DC, (1993) 158,  
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABP986.pdf.  The count of homeless varies between sources.  The 
aforementioned document lists 5,000.  Other sources count 20,000.  For the latter, see “Aid Sent to 
Oman,” Spokesman Review, June 23, 1977. 
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efforts as a show of the regime’s competency in assisting these “citizens” (muwatanyyn) 
in his annual address to the Omani people later that year.  He ennobled the relief effort as 
a demonstration of Oman’s military strength, on par with its recent victory over a 
rebellion in the Dhofari region of Oman.  In Qaboos’ framing, the military demonstrated, 
“magnificent work in bringing help to our people when our country was struck by a 
violent hurricane earlier this year…”88  Here we see for the first time in Oman an attempt 
to frame disaster response as a commentary on the legitimacy of the government, here 
portrayed as the deliverer of relief from such environmental dangers. 
 
National Emergencies in Oman 
While the 1977 cyclone was publically framed in official rhetoric as something 
that happened to “Omani citizens” (al muwatanyyn al omaniyyn), illustrating the new 
vision of citizenship under Qaboos, the event was not understood as a national 
emergency.  The disaster did not instigate public debate about how to respond to the 
urgency of the problem; nor did it beckon an ad hoc, national mobilization for relief 
efforts, as would Cyclone Gonu in 2007.  In this section, I argue that the reason the 
disaster was treated as a national event and not a national emergency lies within the 
culture of time made possible by new communications technology.  State control of the 
media in Oman precluded Omani citizens from understanding the event with any 
urgency.   
 
88 Emphasis added.  Sultan Qaboos, “Speech of His Majesty on the Occasion of the 7th National Day, 18th 
November, 1977,” The Royal Speeches of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Ministry of Information, 
2015. 
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Historical records and oral history interviews show little public debate or concern 
with the disaster outside of Masirah Island.89  Indeed, there seems to be a larger national 
amnesia of the event.  In my field work in Oman, from 2014 to 2016, few Omanis that I 
spoke with had any knowledge of the disaster, with the obvious exception of people from 
Masirah Island itself.  For the latter, these individuals recalled the government’s response 
as a positive contribution to the island.  The recovery process included building 
infrastructure and concrete houses for the residents, who until then, were largely living in 
shacks constructed from spare materials gleaned from the British air base on the island.90  
The larger national amnesia surrounding this event is also evidenced by the interviews 
conducted by a team of oral historians interviewing victims of Cyclone Gonu (2007).  
These individuals repeatedly stated that Gonu was the first storm of its kind to hit 
Oman.91   
 
89 While I am using these records and interviews as evidence that there were no substantial political 
grievances as a consequence of this disaster, it is important to note the current limitations of my 
knowledge of this event.  Published records that provide a window into Omani politics tend to drop off in 
the early 1970s.  For example, John Townsend’s insider account of the state-making process in the late 
1960s and early 1970s was published in 1977, the year of the cyclone; it contains no reference to the 
event.  Leaked diplomatic cables regarding the cyclone show no knowledge of political grievances, but 
that does not mean that they did not exist.  It is possible that grievances did emerged and I have yet to 
uncover their documentation.  It is also possible that they went undocumented because Omanis thought it 
too risky to voice them publicly.   
90 At the time of the storm, the British base was the only concrete buildings on the island.  There is an 
apocryphal story that the tribes of Masirah had been forbidden by Sultan Faisal bin Turki (1888-1913) to 
build permanent housing on the island as punishment for the slaughter of 21 British sailors who arrived 
to the island on a life boat after their steamship, the Baron Innerdale, became disabled in 1904.  Both the 
slaughter and the Sultan’s execution of the killers are confirmed in the records of the British Under-
Secretary of State for India.  See “The Case of the S.S. ‘Baron Innerdale,” 21 March, 1905, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1905/mar/21/the-case-of-the-ss-baron-innerdale.  However 
there is no official acknowledgement of the ban on permanent housing, beyond rumors circulated among 
British soldiers stationed at Masirah in the 1960s and 1970s.  For example, see “Masirah Island,” 
Website, http://home.kpn.nl/lilian_jan_schreurs/oman/Masirah.htm#A%20bit%20of%20History.  
91 See for example, Anonymous, “A02sur002,” ,” Interview by Ali al Riymai, Gonu Oral History Project, 
Omani Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and 
Tyler Schuenemann.  It is also evidenced by Omani internet forums after Gonu, where writers worried 
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In terms of what Gonu meant to these individuals, they were correct that this 
storm was the first of its kind.  Gonu, not the 1977 storm, would be the first to be treated 
as a national emergency.  Omanis do not appear to have understood the 1977 hurricane as 
an urgent event calling for extraordinary action, as they would later storms.  Most 
Omanis lived hundreds of miles away from the devastation and had a radically different 
experience of the storm cell than that of the residents of Masirah Island.  Leaked US 
Embassy cables from the days surrounding the storm describe a placid atmosphere in the 
capital, more than two hundred miles away from Masirah, with people welcoming a 
refreshing change of weather on the day of the cyclone:  
MAIN REACTION OF CAPITAL'S INHABITANTS WAS RELIEF 
THAT INCREASINGLY HOT SUMMER DAYS (TEMPERATURES 
GOING OVER 120 DEGREES F) WERE SUDDENLY BROKEN BY 
"COOL" SPELL HOVERING BELOW 100 DEGREES. RAIN 
SQUALLS AND WINDS IN CAPITAL WERE NOT A SERIOUS 
PROBLEM.  
 
Even people living in Sur, the closest main-land population center to Masirah Island, 
reported no memory of the event to oral historians in 2007.92  It appears that, on one 
hand, the few Omani citizens who had first-hand experience of the disaster understood 
the event as a demonstration of the Sultan’s good governance, providing this far-flung 
island with the relief effort that reflects their membership in the national community 
under Qaboos.   
 
about their ignorance of the nation’s cyclonic history, and called for an official investigation of previous 
storms in Oman so as to better inform government policy.  See “hal hadith al ‘aSar fee ‘uman qabla hatha 
al ‘aSar,” Sabla ‘uman, June 11, 2007,  http://www.s-oman.net/avb/archive/index.php/t-44538.html. 
92 Some Omani residents speculate that this is the reason that many elderly Omanis there refused to believe 
the government warnings about Gonu.  Anonymous, “A02sur002.” 
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On the other hand, the majority of Omanis who had no first-hand experience of 
the event learned of it through the lag and filter of the state-controlled media.  The 
significance of this mediated experience is best understood in a broader consideration of 
how news media affects individuals’ sense of time and membership in a political 
community.  As Benedict Anderson argues, the rise of nationalism was made possible by 
the proliferation of cheap newspapers and novels which allowed people to imagine 
themselves as sharing a common territory and a common set of concerns with others 
within that territory.93  The stories produced in these mediums created a sense of 
simultaneous existence, where individuals could imagine others carrying on with their 
own affairs “meanwhile.”  Anderson argues that this ability to imagine others plugging 
away in their lives simultaneous to our own was a precondition for making it possible for 
us to imagine a larger “national” community of individuals sharing a common fate, 
though never meeting each other in person.  
The Omanis of 1977 had this capacity to imagine a national community.  As 
demonstrated in the previous section, the discourse of national membership and the 
media technology that makes such understandings of membership plausible was on hand 
by virtue of a Qaboos’ propaganda machine, starting with the establishment of weekly 
Arabic and English broadsheets and occasional radio addresses in 1970.  Some town 
squares in the capital even hosted TV viewing sessions where the Sultan would appear on 
the screen and update the citizens on the ongoing battles against the rebels in the southern 
 
93 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 22-26. 
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Dhofar region.94  As this media was directed to report on the 1977 cyclone, Omanis could 
learn of the hardship of their fellow “citizens” in Masirah. 
But what is crucial to this new capacity to think in terms of “meanwhile” is that 
Omani civilians could not learn of that hardship in real-time.  The state-controlled news 
coverage did not inform the Omani public about the disaster until eight days after the 
fact.95 This lag in official reporting was not for lack of information on the event.  Leaked 
US cables reveal that the Omani government knew of the storm before it hit the island on 
June 13th, 1977.  In less than 24 hours after landfall, it also communicated the island’s 
damage to the American and British military who had personnel stationed at the island.  
Nevertheless, it did not inform the Omani public.  At this time, the state-controlled 
Omani newspaper, ‘uman, was published twice a week, and released two editions 
following the storm with no mention of the disaster, including June 14th and June 18th.  
In the available archives, coverage of the storm first appears in the government press on 
June 21st.  This delay was so significant that audiences reading The Washington Post in 
the US would have read about the disaster two days before Omanis would in their own 
papers.  ‘uman then gave the story front-page status for three more editions, June 21st, 
June 25th, and July 2nd, describing the destruction and recovery effort. 
Stephen Kern’s work helps explain the significance of this lag in public 
information.  He has shown how the invention of the telegraph provided a sense of 
 
94 Interview with Author, February 22, 2016. 
95 US Embassy, “Initial Report of Cyclone Damage,” Wikileaks Cable: 1977MUSCAT00918. Dated June 
14, 1997, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 1977MUSCAT00918_c.html.  For Omani and American 
news coverage, see ‘uman, 1977, June 21, 25 and July 2, 1977, Vol 4, no 320-322; and “Hurricane Fatal 
to 50 in Oman,” The Washington Post, June 19, 1977. 
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“overarching simultaneity” that allowed people to learn of major events as they 
happened.  It became possible to have a more specific, real-time sense of “meanwhile” 
than provided by daily newspapers.  For example, the sinking of the Titanic was 
communicated through wireless telegraph, allowing for people to imagine the horror as it 
unfolded in those very moments, not after the fact.96   
The difference between these two kinds of simultaneity is crucial to 
understanding the lack of political impact made by the 1977 cyclone.  While the Omanis 
of 1977 did have Anderson’s more general sense of “meanwhile,” they did not have the 
urgent, real-time sense described by Kern.  The lag was not due to a lack of media 
technology in Oman.  It was because the Omani state monopolized the means of 
informing the public imagination of events as they happened elsewhere.  The lag in 
information conveniently gave enough time for the Ministry of Information to finally 
report the event as a problem already being solved.  The effect was that the Omani public 
audience outside of Masirah would not learn of an emergency but of a “cyclone” (‘aSar) 
or a “nagging disaster” (al kartha al mazeja) that happened more than a week ago and 
was already being addressed by state authorities.97 The understanding of urgency was 
contained to the official channels of information, keeping the public in the dark.  It was 
not plausible for those outside of official channels to conceive of this national event as a 
national emergency—an ongoing problem demanding urgent mobilization.  Instead, the 
 
96 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003), 78. 
97 Quotes are from ‘uman, 1977, July 2, 1977, 5, no. 323. 
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Omani public could only learn of this event as a problem being solved by the state 
authorities, who are already on the ground fulfilling their role in new social contract.    
To clarify the political significance of the distinction I am making here between a 
national event and a national emergency in Oman, consider two purported coup attempts 
by small circles of Islamic dissidents, one in 1994 and 2005.98  In both cases, the Omani 
regime announced news of the alleged threats only after the purported coups were averted 
and the alleged perpetrators were arrested.  While both events were of dire national 
importance, everyday Omanis were unable to understand them as emergencies because 
they had no knowledge of the alleged problem until it was reported as solved by state 
authorities.  With no direct knowledge of the event, most Omanis were left to speculate 
about it after the fact, based upon rumors and official accounts.  For example, popular 
speculation abounds that there were no actual plans for a coup, and that these arrests were 
pretexts for squashing religious teaching and organizing outside of official institutions.99  
The public question is one of retrospection, “what was that?”, and not of emergency—
“what must be done now?”  The stakes are different, perhaps lower, because there is no 
impending, uncertain future that makes the answer appear pressing to the audience.  In 
Calhoun’s words, “the emergency imaginary” is absent. 
As the subsequent chapter will show, this manner of interpreting national events 
is in stark contrast to what happened during and after Cyclone Gonu.  In that case, the 
suffering and death dealt by the storm was understood by hundreds of thousands of 
 
98 For details on these coup attempts, see Valeri, Oman, 194.   
99 For popular skepticism on the regime’s narrative of these events, see Harith al-Ghassany, Kitman and 
Renaissance: Domination and the Limits of Development, (PhD Diss., Harvard University, 1995), 185-
186.   
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Omanis in real-time, whether through first-hand experience or through the flow of social 
media images that were out of the control of government censors, despite their best 
efforts.  The 1977 cyclone, like the purported coups, was publically framed by official 
communications as a problem already being solved by the authorities—a social contract 
fulfilled.  In contrast, Gonu was a plainly tangible emergency with a solution held in 
suspense for the broader public to contemplate, argue about, and mobilize for.  For Gonu 
there was a plurality of interpretations participating in a broader production of meaning.  
In contrast, in 1977, there was a monologue; public meaning was delivered from on high, 
in a context in which the situation was plausibly construed as an accomplishment of state 
power to respond to disaster, rather than a question of whether it could.  For this reason, 
the 1977 hurricane never put Qaboos’ regime on trial.  Indeed, it became a feature of 
Qaboos’ propaganda.  The disaster recovery was made a spectacle of the promise of 
Qaboos’ rule, illustrating the capacity of his regime to protect citizens from the forces of 
nature.   
 
Conclusion  
I have shown here that prior to the Qaboos regime, Omani’s appealed to a variety 
of natural and supernatural understandings of disasters.  While these various frameworks 
provided some possibility for attributing moral or political causes to disasters, there was 
little commentary on the significances of disaster response, especially regarding who was 
responsible for what.  The Omani state does not appear to have provided much in terms 
of disaster response, nor does it appear that everyday Omanis expected it to.     
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Indeed, these expectations reflect the political context of pre-1970s Oman.  The 
previous Sultans of what was then called “Muscat,” and today, the larger territory of 
“Oman,” had overseen a minimalist, feudal state until the 1970s, wherein political 
authority was often fragmented among local tribal authorities, and the potential influence 
of the Imams of the interior, prior to their ouster in 1954.  Moreover, the Sultan’s 
sovereignty entailed minimal intervention into the lives of everyday Omanis, after 
disasters or otherwise.  This minimalist state approach was initially favored by the British 
sponsors of earlier Sultans as a mode of colonial sovereignty that protected their access to 
Omani ports.   
But the shifting context of international and domestic pressures to disassemble the 
British Empire changed the British’s approach to rule.  In the eyes of imperial reformers, 
propping up a regional ally in Oman required establishing a new kind of state, and a new 
kind of citizen.  The “modernizing” regime of Sultan Qaboos attempted to quell a 
rebellion and make itself popular among civilians in part by promising modern progress 
to all Omanis.  For my purposes, key to this new vison of authority was the notion that 
the state would liberate citizens from the dangers of the biological anciene regime, which 
included protecting them from the forces of nature.  This new discourse of citizenship 
helps us understand why the hardships of natural disasters did not generate political 
grievances until very recently.  The notion that Omanis can expect help from their 
government in the aftermath of disaster is a very new development in the country.   
But showing the emergence of this way of conceptualizing state responsibility is 
not enough to explain how disasters became unplanned political spectacles in Oman.  The 
new communications technology in Oman have also mediated how political authority is 
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evaluated.  Omanis have only very recently had the capacity to learn about nationally 
significant events in real-time, including natural disasters.  Prior to such changes in 
communication technology, Omanis’ ability to size-up their rulers according to the new 
social contract and in light of an urgent, unsolved problem was limited to local events of 
which they had direct knowledge.  In contrast, national events, problems happening to 
citizens outside of one’s personal networks, were learned about in retrospect, as having 
been already addressed by the state.  The records of the 1977 cyclone appear to 
substantiate this claim.  The capacity of Omanis to use a national emergency to evaluate 
the performance of their government is a very new development in the country, which I 
will examine in detail in the subsequent chapter.   
I have thus provided evidence that political grievances in Oman are not 
automatically generated out of universal, psychological needs, but have been derived 
from discursive repertoires that change over time.  Like in the case of the US, 
understanding disaster contention requires that we investigate when and how the 
discursive frameworks that give meaning to the disaster and its consequences became so 
prominent.  As I have argued above, central to the story is the role of the British colonial 
powers and how they believed they could secure their interests in the region by propping 
up local rulers who were seen as guardians of their population’s well-being, and replacing 
those rulers who were not.  In exporting their own visions of modern, “good government” 
to Oman, they made such discourses into powerful frameworks for discussing political 
belonging and responsibility.  In framing such top-down improvements upon the 
everyday lives of people as being synonymous with being an Omani under Qaboos’ rule, 
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they created a symbolically powerful way for people to understand their new relationship 
with the state and their fellow citizens.100   
Associating Qaboos with the promises of modern order and prosperity was an 
effective means of securing popular support for the regime, especially when the 
government had so much oil wealth to throw at this performance.  As part of this new 
vision, disasters became events that were about the state and citizenship, and thus 
opportunities for the Sultan to curate a public image of progress and good governance, 
especially when the public’s knowledge of such improvements was limited to first-hand 
experience and state-controlled media.  
 But as chapter five shows, this new stage also becomes the site of contestation, 
allowing dissidents to put the state and the status-quo on trial.  Qaboos’ new social 
contract inadvertently created the conditions in which such a regime could be discredited 
by large-scale natural disasters.  As new media technology gives Omanis access to real-
time information outside of official channels, disasters, now understood as national 
emergencies, are not merely being framed by officials, but by dissidents as well.   
 
 
100 In this sense, it was a case of what Eisenstadt calls “multiple modernities,” wherein Western notions of 
progress and national identity spread to developing countries and are subsequently combined with local 
cultures and institutions.  See Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus, 129, no. 1, 
2000: 15. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL CONTESTATION AFTER HURRICANES 
KATRINA AND SANDY 
 
Hurricanes have become reliable occasions for anti-Trump political satire, each 
playing off the apparent mismatch between his conduct and public expectations of 
presidential leadership in times of emergency.  Consider the following examples.  
“Nabisco Baffled After Trump Administration Gives It $200 Million Contract To 
Rebuild Puerto Rico’s Roads.”1 The joke in this 2017 headline from the satirical 
newspaper The Onion plays upon the public weariness toward an aloof statesman off-
loading to a cookie company the duty to provide disaster recovery to its citizens.2  A year 
later, The Late Show with Stephen Colbert made an illustrated children’s book about the 
President’s visit to areas damaged by Hurricane Florence (2018) as a fundraising effort 
for hurricane victims.  The text and the book’s title, “Whose Boat is this Boat?” is 
“accidently” authored by Trump himself, as it is composed of his verbatim comments 
during his visit to the disaster zone.  The joke of the project plays off of the apparent gap 
 
1 The Onion, “Nabisco Baffled After Trump Administration Gives It $200 Million Contract To Rebuild 
Puerto Rico’s Roads,” October 26, 2017, https://politics.theonion.com/nabisco-baffled-after-trump-
administration-gives-it-20-1819886593. 
2 The fake headline referenced the widely publicized cases of the Trump administration handing out 
government contracts to private companies with no qualifications for the duties that they would be 
charged with, such as the 300 million dollar contract for rebuilding Puerto Rico’s electric grid that was 
given to a Montana company with only two full-time employees.  Richard Wolffe, “The forgotten 
scandal in the Trump administration: Hurricane Maria,” The Guardian, September 11, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/11/trump-scandal-hurricane-maria-puerto-rico. 
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between the President’s response to the disaster, which appeared rambling and off topic, 
and the somber recognition of American suffering that the public purportedly expects of 
their political leadership.3  A year later, Trump was lampooned again for his conduct 
regarding Hurricane Dorian (2019).  Then, he had falsely tweeted that the storm was 
projected to hit Alabama, prompting the National Weather Service to issue an apparent 
refutation of his claim.  In response, Trump appeared on television with a map charting 
the projected path of the storm.  The map had a black circle that appeared to have been 
drawn on with a sharpie marker, conspicuously altering the printed map to include 
Alabama within the storm’s path.  Social media quickly filled with mockery, accusing 
Trump of doctoring the presumably authoritative map to fit his mistake in warning 
Alabama.  The mockery included other photos similarly doctored by sharpie markers to 
make the image fit Trump’s politics.  For example, an image of open desert, presumably 
at US border, received a drawn-on wall; images of the sparse crowd at Trump’s 2016 
inauguration ceremony received a larger audience of stick-figures to match his boasts of 
crowd size.4 
While these mockeries might just be petty squabbles, they point to a more 
consequential universe of political competition that disasters make possible today.  This 
chapter examines how officials and dissidents are politicizing the tangible manifestations 
of climate change in light of recent, extraordinarily powerful hurricanes in the US.  I find 
 
3 The book sold over 400,000 copies and raised 1.25 million dollars.  Hillel Italie, “Trump spoof book 
‘Whose Boat is this Boat?’ raises 1.25 million,” SFGate, December 24, 2018, 
https://www.sfgate.com/books/article/Trump-spoof-book-Whose-Boat-Is-This-Boat-13489671.php. 
4 Emily Stewart, “The incredibly absurd Trump/Cnn SharpieGate feud, explained,” Vox, September 6, 
2019, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/6/20851971/trump-hurricane-dorian-alabama-
sharpie-cnn-media. 
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that the kinds of politics that these disasters make possible complicate theories as to the 
relationship between calamity and political power.  Disasters are not merely occasions for 
government officials to assert power, as some kind of technocratic, authoritarian opening 
as some scholars fear.5  Not only are citizens politicizing these events, calling the 
government into account for its inability to provide material protections against the 
suffering of disaster, as the Maslowians would expect, they go on to do much more.   
Officials and dissidents treat the mass devastation wrought by hurricanes as 
unplanned political spectacles whose meaning is up for grabs.  Political entrepreneurs 
attempt to frame the images of suffering and aid to tell a larger story of citizenship, 
ennobling values beyond safety and prosperity.  The post-disaster agenda is complicated 
by those who are making disaster response into symbols of national character, invoking 
values of equality, piety, strength, solidarity, and heroism.  Thus, these emergencies 
generated by large cyclones are being made into stages upon which the public evaluates 
not just a material needs-meeting government, but broader values upon which both 
government and civil society actors are evaluated. 
Government officials thus respond to disasters with more than just humanitarian 
logistics.  They similarly try to frame these moments of public attention and debate, 
promoting meaning of the unplanned political spectacle that either deflects criticism or 
generates their own political capital.  Officials enter into the debate, attempting to 
 
5 Urlich Beck, Risk Society, 21; Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi, Contemporary States of Emergency: 
The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions, (New York: Zone Books, 2010); and Craig 
Calhoun, “A World of Emergencies: Fear, Intervention, and the Limits of Cosmopolitan Order,” 
CRSA/RCSA, 41, no. 4, (2004). 
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forward their own version of events, contesting or appropriating these discursive frames 
to defend their office.  In doing so, they take on multiple roles, advertising their capacity 
as technocrats, but also as leaders witnessing and standing in solidarity with those 
suffering, and as an appreciative audience to civic volunteerism and piety.  It is through 
this discursive contestation over American citizenship that these attention-grabbing, 
tangible manifestations of climate change are being given meaning in public discourse.   
In the sections that follow, I examine the contested process of public meaning-
making after Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy.  I show that officials and dissidents treat the 
devastation of these hurricanes as unplanned political spectacles which implicate state 
authorities and the larger status quo.  Preexisting social and political visions for the 
nation shaped the political fallout of these disasters, as officials and dissidents drew upon 
them to attribute meaning to the disaster.  These contests made the disasters contentious, 
not unmet psychological needs, as Maslowians would claim.  The disasters were at once 
understood as a material problem that governments ought to solve, ennobling the 
authority of the technocrat.  But at the same time, they were also treated as unsolvable 
problems for the broader nation to heroically address through acts of solidarity and/or 
piety.  Instead of just calls for “adapting” or “recovering,” what emerged was a broader 
set of conflicting visions for the role of official experts and the mobilization of laymen to 
address emergencies.  Political entrepreneurs seized upon these hurricanes-cum-
spectacles to draw public concern to larger frames of meaning, attempting to tell a larger 
story about the American state and the national community.   
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Contestation in the Debris of Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina was the third-most deadly storm to hit the US, directly causing 
1200 deaths.  With a price tag of $160 billion in damage, it the most costly hurricane in 
US history, surpassing what was then the second most costly, Hurricane Andrew (1992), 
by a factor of three.6  The public, visible character of this devastation provided the people 
of the Gulf Coast with a sense that they had just experienced an event of major 
destruction to their public goods and private lives.  Moreover, the media publicized the 
destruction in real time, allowing a wider American public to experience the event 
vicariously. 
From the initial approach of the storm to the eventual bursting of the levies and 
subsequent flooding, the media coverage of the storm evolved over time.  At first, it was 
covered as a typical disaster for technocrats to address.  The New York Times coverage of 
the destruction on the first day of impact was typical.  Writing the morning before the 
levees broke, and thus prior to the largest amounts of destruction in New Orleans, the 
article documents the initial destruction, enumerating the different areas along the coast 
that were damaged, and quoting local and federal leaders, including President Bush and 
then-head of FEMA Michael Brown, who were giving advice on how to stay safe among 
the debris.  The article depicts a government well-prepared, citing logistics already in 
 
6 Figure is adjusted for inflation to 2017 currency.  Note that since Katrina there have been three other 
hurricanes that have also surpassed Andrew’s price tag, including Harvey (2017), Sandy (2012), and 
Irma (2017).  See National Hurricane Center, “Costliest U.S. Tropical Cyclones Tables Updated,” U.S. 
Department of Commerce: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, January 26, 2018, 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf. 
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place prior to the storm’s landfall.7  In this sense, the hurricane created a national 
emergency for the nation to watch, wherein urgent, extraordinary action by the 
government was expected, and apparently in place.   
But this expectation would soon be broken, and the coverage shifted to frame 
Katrina as a political spectacle.  As the levees collapsed, water gushed to cover an 
additional 100,000 homes.  Scenes from New Orleans quickly generated a theatre of 
human suffering and chaos, with the government overwhelmed, unable to answer.  In an 
example that was typical of the media’s new framing, The New York Post quoted the head 
of emergency operations for New Orleans who drew an unfavorable comparison between 
the response to Katrina and the response to the 2005 Indian Ocean tsunami: “This is a 
national emergency. This is a national disgrace… FEMA has been here three days, yet 
there is no command and control.  We can send massive amounts of aid to tsunami 
victims [in other countries], but we can’t bail out the city of New Orleans.”8  Note the 
national framing and appeal to the values of citizenship in the quote: if we can help them 
after disaster, we should be able to help our own. 
This notion in the media coverage that the technocrats were functionally absent 
when urgently needed applied to more than humanitarian concerns with the flooded out 
civilians.  Officials and the media engaged in an “elite panic” about social disorder, each 
exaggerating reports of looting and violence to a public audience, often criminalizing 
 
7 Joseph B. Treaster and Kate Zernike, “Hurricane Katrina Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens are Dead,” New 
York Times, August 30, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/30/us/hurricane-katrina-slams-into-
gulf-coast-dozens-are-dead.html?searchResultPosition=25. 
8 Lukas I. Alpert, “Nightmare of Robbery, Filth, Death & Rape in Superdome,” New York Post, September 
2, 2005, https://nypost.com/2005/09/02/nightmare-of-robbery-filth-death-rape-in-superdome/. 
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African Americans.9  Although they turned out to be false rumors, the Mayor and the 
Police Superintendent reported as fact that civilians were murdering each other and that a 
baby was raped in the Superdome where civilians had taken shelter by the thousands.  
These authorities also falsely reported that rescue helicopters and law enforcement 
officers were being shot at by panicked civilians.10  Such an image of public disorder 
shaped a number of government and civilian responses to Katrina.  It led to the 
deployment of the National Guard to keep order in the streets; it slowed the deployment 
of rescue missions for fear of violence against aid workers; and officials in the 
neighboring town of Gretna ordered law enforcement to shoot evacuees who attempted to 
flee across a bridge into their town.11  It also prompted the formation of armed 
neighborhood vigilantes, who shot African Americans attempting to flee to higher 
ground.12   
Hence, a prominent version of the political spectacle was that of a technocratic 
government on trial for its failure of duty in a moment of national emergency.  Both elite 
and grass-roots dissidents were making the destruction, suffering, and apparent disorder 
into symbols of government failure on account of its inability to respond quickly and 
effectively to the emergency.  Michael Ignatieff exemplified this dissent when he wrote 
 
9 Adeline Masquelier, “Why Katrina’s Victims Aren’t Refugees: Musings on a ‘Dirty’ Word,” American 
Anthropologist, 108, no. 4 (2006): 735-743. 
10 See for example, Associate Press, “’Desperate SOS’ from Mayor,” The Denver Post, May 8, 2016, 
https://www.denverpost.com/2005/09/01/desperate-sos-from-mayor/. 
11 Channing Joseph, “Police Chief Says He Exaggerated Post-Katrina Crime,” The New York Sun, August 
21, 2006, https://www.nysun.com/national/police-chief-says-he-exaggerated-post-katrina/38268/. 
12 A.C. Thompson, “New Evidence Surfaces in Post-Katrina Crimes,” The Nation, July 11, 2009, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/new-evidence-surfaces-post-katrina-crimes/. 
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in the New York Times, “when the levees broke, the contract of American citizenship 
failed.”13  Prominent news magazines also made this point in their cover images, all using 
photos of African Americans in distress under headings like, “the Shaming of America,” 
“System Failure,” and “Why Bush Failed.”14  
The reasons behind the technocratic failure were variously attributed to problems 
of racism and classism on the one hand, and government cronyism and bumbling 
incompetence on the other.  For example, national advocates for the African American 
community charged that the suffering caused by the hurricane was multiplied on account 
of the racism of the Bush administration.  Reverend Al Sharpton articulated this narrative 
to the Press:  
I feel race was a factor [in the response to Katrina].  Why? I remember almost a 
year ago to the day I was in Florida when a hurricane was coming, not a point 
four, not a point five, and I saw the White House move. I saw the government of 
the president’s brother move. National Guard was already alerted before the storm 
ever hit. It seems to me that if we can be alert in Palm Beach, Florida, we could 
have been alert in New Orleans.15 
This sentiment received much more publicity three days earlier when Kanye West went 
off-script during a live fundraiser on NBC.  In his statements, he criticized the 
accusations of African American looters, emphasized that Katrina victims are 
 
13 Michael Ignatieff, “The Broken Contract,” The New York Times, September 25, 2005, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/25/magazine/the-broken-contract.html. 
14 The Economist, “The Shaming of America,” The Economist, September 8, 2005, 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2005/09/08/the-shaming-of-america.  Time Magazine, “System 
Failure, Time Magazine, September 19, 2005, 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20050919,00.html; and Newsweek, “Poverty, Race, and 
Katrina: Lessons of a National Shame,” Newsweek, September 19, 2005.  
15 Al Sharpton, “Rev. Al Sharpton: President Bush’s Response ‘Inexcusable’,” Democracy Now! 
September 5, 2005, https://www.democracynow.org/2005/9/5/rev_al_sharpton_ 
president_bushs_response. 
 149   
predominately African American, claimed that had the military not been in Iraq, they 
would have been able to help in New Orleans, and that the military had been given 
permission to shoot African Americans; and in a statement that went viral, “George Bush 
doesn’t care about Black people.”16  Reverend Jesse Jackson expressed similar 
sentiments, adding that African Americans should be appointed to leadership positions in 
the recovery effort, on account of most of the victims being African American.17  Other 
prominent activists in the African American community, such as the civil rights lawyer 
and founder of the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, Chokew Lumumba, declared that 
Katrina ought to reinvigorate the African American struggle for equality.  Recalling the 
highly publicized photographs within the African American press of the mutilated body 
of the 14-year-old Emmett Till, which helped galvanize participation in the Civil Rights 
movement, Lumumba stated that Katrina was “the Emmett Till of our generation.”18  
Other prominent voices in the national public denounced or deliberately avoided 
such charges.  Columnists in the Wall Street Journal and Boston Globe dismissed the 
above accusations against the Bush administration as “racial paranoia.”19  The 
 
16 West made this accusation on live television during a celebrity-driven fundraiser for the American Red 
Cross.  Kanye West, “Kanye West Hurricane Katrina,” Youtube, March 3, 2006, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9pVTrnxCZaQ. 
17 Doug Simpson, “Jesse Jackson lashes out at Bush over Katrina response,” Associated Press, September 
2, 2005, https://web.archive.org/web/20080327035254/http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/ 
wwl090205jackson.1c68e297.html. 
18 In 2013, Lumumba would later be elected as the Mayor of Jackson, Mississippi.  His hopes on the 
political salience of Katrina were noted in Rachel Luft, “Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism: Social 
Movement Developments in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina,” American Quarterly, 61, no. 3 
(2009): 502-506.  Jordan Flaherty, Floodlines: Community and Resistance from Katrina to the Jena Six, 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010), 418.   
19 Michael Dawson, “After the Deluge: Publics and Publicity in Katrina’s Wake,” Du Bois Review, 3, no. 1, 
(2006): 247.  
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Congressional Black Caucus withheld charges of racism in their public statement on 
Katrina, instead claiming the slow federal response was because most of the victims were 
poor.20 
The mainstream press as well as congressional Democrats more often leveled 
charges of cronyism and incompetence against the Bush administration.  In this sense, 
Katrina was a “predictable and predicted hurricane,” that a properly functioning 
bureaucracy should have been able to handle.21  Bush’s sin was allowing political favors 
to corrupt the rule of experts in putting an amateur, Michael Brown, at the head of 
FEMA.  Media coverage focused on how Brown lacked any expertise to be leading the 
Katrina response.  It described how he came to the Bush administration through a thirty-
year old friendship with Joe Allbaugh, Bush’s campaign director in the 2000 presidential 
election.  Brown’s most recent job experience had been ensuring that the judges at horse 
shows followed the rules, a position he kept off his public resume after his appointment 
to FEMA.22  It was also uncovered that he was asked to resign from that position for 
potentially taking bribes; and he was castigated in a Time exposé that demonstrated that 
 
20 USA Today, “Black lawmakers angry about federal response to Katrina,” September 9, 2005, 
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-02-katrina-blackcaucus_x.htm. 
21 This is the wording of Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman in the Senate hearing on Katrina.  Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, “Transcript: Senate Hearing on Government’s 
Response to Hurricane Katrina,” New York Times, February 10, 2006, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/10/national/nationalspecial/senate-hearing-on-governments-response-
to-hurricane.html. 
22 Scott Shane, “Michael DeWayne Brown: Facing Blame in a Disaster,” The New York Times, September 
7, 2005, https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/07/us/nationalspecial/michael-dewayne-brown-facing-blame-
in-a-disaster.html. 
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other parts of his public resume were fabricated, including a claim that for years he was 
“overseeing the emergency services division” for the city of Edmond, Oklahoma.23   
Media commentary put Brown’s actions after Katrina under similar scrutiny.  His 
most embarrassing moment came when he demonstrated the extent to which he was aloof 
from the latest, urgent details of the national emergency.  In a televised interview he 
revealed that he was unaware of the 20,000 evacuees who were taking shelter at the 
convention center, despite the fact that this was widely reported upon for the last 24 
hours.  In response, several high-profile Senators called for his resignation, leading to 
congressional hearings on the conduct of Brown and his team.  These hearings made 
public several emails between Brown and other parts of his team, which provided several 
anecdotes for critics to seize upon, illustrating his lack of seriousness and concern during 
the emergency.  For example, the emails demonstrate a preoccupation with what Brown 
should wear in his public appearances, and asking FEMA personnel on the ground to 
make sure that he and his staff would not have to wait too long to be served at an up-scale 
restaurant during his visits to the disaster area—all while evacuees remained in the 
squalor of the convention center.   
But dissidents did not merely frame the storm as a problem of technocratic failure, 
wherein the proper response is a return to normal through top-down governance as 
quickly as possible.  Grassroots organizations mobilized to make the disaster response 
into a venue for social and political transformation.  This mobilization included 
 
23 Daren Fonda and Rita Healy, “How Reliable is Brown’s Resume?” Time, September 8, 2005, 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1103003,00.html. 
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intervening in public discussions around Katrina in attempts to anchor the meaning of the 
spectacle to goals beyond material recovery, such as the spread of Christian piety or the 
pursuit of social and racial justice.  It also included the organization of relief efforts that 
took direct action toward these goals, for example the building of Churches or activist 
networks in the rubble, and orienting the work of volunteers, including some of the 1.5 
million arriving from other areas.  Both of these mobilizations saw the disaster as 
something requiring more than a return to the status-quo, and the national mobilization of 
federal, state, and civilian actors as an opportunity to pursue these goals.  They called for 
a transformation of the larger values of American society, and used the recovery effort as 
a venue for pursuing these ends. 
Christian organizations were among the most prominent of the estimated five 
hundred new charities formed to funnel money and logistics to the recovery effort.  
Measured in terms of funding, among the top-ten charities involved with the recovery 
efforts, six of them were run by Christian organizations.24  While providing material 
resources to disaster victims was a central goal of these organizations, some of these 
faith-based relief efforts would also include, or even foreground religious evangelism and 
the promotion of Christian piety among the denizens of New Orleans.  Adam’s 
ethnographic work on this aspect of the Katrina recovery effort describes how some of 
these volunteers saw Katrina as “the ultimate missionary tool—an opportunity to ‘win 
souls for Christ…’”  She quotes one evangelical organization stating, “[The recovery 
 
24 Jacqueline L. Salmon and Leef Smith, “Two-Thirds of Katrina Donations Exhausted,” Washington Post, 
February 27, 2006.  As cited in Vincanne Adams, Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith: New Orleans in 
the Wake of Katrina, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013): 133-134. 
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effort] really has very little to do with repairing buildings; it’s repairing lives. The goal in 
New Orleans is not to return lives ‘back to normal.’ Rather, the goal is to reshape people 
spiritually so they have a strengthened new capacity for life.”25  This activity is illustrated 
in one “success story” documented by an evangelical organization’s promotional 
materials: “After striking up a conversation with the group, who expressed their gratitude 
to Southern Baptists for serving their neighborhood, [a volunteer] led one of the young 
men to faith in Christ. It would be the first of eight people he would lead to Christ in less 
than three hours.”26   
Christian salvation was not the only gospel heard among the rubble.  Grassroots 
organizers used the national mobilization in the disaster zone to spread their messages of 
citizen power and social justice, attempting to integrate these ideas into the public debate.  
One prominent form that this took was the contestation over the appropriateness of state 
authority and the power of big-business in shaping people’s lives, as well as experiments 
in self-governance outside the logic of technocratic problem-solving.   
We can see this activity in how already existing social movement organizations 
shifted their efforts into new areas in light of the disaster.  For example, the tenants’ 
rights organization ACORN mobilized to protect African American and lower-income 
families from eviction and property demolition in the aftermath of the storm.  Similarly, 
local members of the national feminist organization INCITE! founded a clinic for 
 
25 Adams, Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith, 135. 
26 Tobin Perry, “A decade later, Katrina viewed as defining event for Baptist Relief,” North American 
Mission Board, August 18, 2015, https://www.namb.net/news/a-decade-later-katrina-viewed-as-defining-
event-for-baptist-relief/. 
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women’s healthcare in the aftermath of Katrina, anticipating that the recovery effort 
would otherwise revert to what they saw as racist programs of population control that 
targeted African American women.27   
The disaster also provided a venue for new activist mobilization.  Much of this 
was done for the sake of providing immediate relief to Katrina victims, but within a 
larger vision for political reform.  For example, “The New Orleans Workers’ Center” 
emerged to protect from abuse the day laborers who arrived to New Orleans after the 
disaster, and later came to organize against the visa restrictions for these temporary guest 
workers.  “Safe Streets” emerged as an emergency relief group, conducting triage in the 
streets, but eventually turned to advocate for reform of the criminal justice system.28  
Anarchists and a former Black Panther activist also founded the “Common 
Ground Collective,” organizing anywhere between 13,000 and 23,000 volunteers to 
provide rescue and relief services to Katrina victims.  Many of these volunteers were 
white college students who traveled to New Orleans to help during holiday breaks, and 
were put to work serving African American, low-income communities in the disaster 
zone through a program that the organization dubbed, “Roadtrip Relief,” modeled after 
the Freedom Riders of the Civil Rights movement.  The more permanent participants 
formed clinics and aid distribution centers.  On guard against what they saw as co-
optation efforts by state agencies, they continuously refused resources from FEMA.  
They saw their aid as a form of sustaining dissident communities, harkening to the 
 
27 Luft, “Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism,” 502-506. 
28 Ibid.    
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“survival programs” of the Black Panther Party.29  The organization also joined other 
activist groups in direct action and protests against eviction, helping families re-occupy 
their homes post-eviction.   
Aside from these tangible goals of providing relief, recovery, and alliances 
against eviction, members of the Common Ground Collective also attempted to change 
the way that volunteers and community members understood their own ability to self-
govern and change larger structures.30  Scott Crow, one of the Collective’s founders, 
describes this work in the following way: “Not a seizure of state power, but a revolution 
of a different kind, the revolution of exercising grassroots power to make the changes we 
all wanted to see.  Our revolution challenged the standard pessimism about people’s 
limited agency in their own lives.” Elsewhere he went on to say, “We are developing 
ways to move beyond just protesting the ills of the world.  We are creating just and 
sustainable practices and opening other possibilities for the futures.”31  Note how this 
vision sees disaster response as a necessarily political task, rather than a technocratic one.  
Hence, it is not government experts who can provide for these communities.  Beyond the 
 
29 One of the organization’s founders, Malik Rahim, was a former member of the Black Panther Party.  
This connection to the survival programs is from Ibid., 509. 
30 To put it in the language of social movement scholarship, the organization used the hurricane as an 
opportunity to mobilize people into political action through framing work.  They “bridged” like-minded 
individuals by doing out-reach activity both inside and outside the disaster zone.  They also “amplified” 
the values of social justice in the context of the hurricane, as well as the beliefs of participants regarding 
their efficacy in making the recovery efforts more effective and just.  On these different modes of 
framing work, see David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, 
“Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological 
Review, 51, no. 4 (1986): 464-481. 
31 Scott Crow, Black Flags and Windmills: Hope, Anarchy, and the Common Ground Collective, (Oakland, 
CA: PM Press, 2011). 
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immediate value of aid is the larger goal of building mutual aid networks for further 
social justice activism, or what Crow referred to as “revolutionary infrastructure.”   
In contrast to the Common Ground Collective, members of the African-
American-led “People’s Hurricane Relief Fund” rejected the political value of providing 
direct services to disaster victims.  They claimed that such projects pacified the African 
American community from seeking more radical change.  Rather than redressing the 
post-Katrina grievances through aid, they sought to channel Katrina victims directly into 
political action.  As such, they organized a tenants’ rights group and protested the state 
government of Louisiana and the company ICF International, which was employed to 
administer the ten-billion dollar re-housing program.  The People’s Hurricane Relief 
Fund also attempted to mobilize international pressure on the Bush administration by 
documenting and reporting to the UN what they regarded as human rights violations of 
Katrina survivors, while advocating for a “right to return” for Katrina survivors.32   
These and other examples of mobilization of Christian and social justice 
organizations not only contest the priority, or even the value, of state-set agendas of what 
a response to disasters should look like.  They also tried to spread that understanding of 
Katrina to a public audience.  In doing so, they intervened in public discussion to render 
the Katrina disaster as more than a technical problem.  Rather than an accident or 
 
32 They deliberately used this language to connect their plight to that of Palestinian refugees.  Luft, 
“Beyond Disaster Exceptionalism,” 499-527.    
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aberration, the disaster was a more extreme version of chronic problems already plaguing 
the United States.33 
Members of the Bush administration defended themselves from public attacks by 
forwarding a defense of their technocratic prowess.  George W. Bush famously made a 
press event on the ground of New Orleans three days after the Hurricane where he 
congratulated the leaders of the federal response for getting food and medicine to people 
rapidly: “Brownie [Michael Brown], you’re doing a heck of a job.”  Emails between 
Brown and his FEMA staff show a preoccupation with the public’s perception of him 
fitting into the role of a competent, engaged technocrat.  Consider the following email 
from Brown’s Press Secretary in the initial weeks after Katrina. 
From: Worthy, Sharon 
To: michael.d.brown[redacted] 
Subject: Your shirt 
 
Please roll up the sleeves of your shirt... all shirts. Even the President rolled his 
sleeves to just below the elbow. In this crises [sic] and on TV you just need to 
look more hard-working... ROLL UP THE SLEEVES!34 
 
Months later when these emails were made public in a Congressional hearing on the 
government failures surrounding Katrina, they were used to make him appear as someone 
pantomiming expertise.  In those hearings, Brown would insist that his organization did 
 
33 Ibid., 508.   
34 Sharon Worthy, Email to Michael Brown, August 31, 2005, 
http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2005/images/11/03/brown.emails.pdf. 
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everything it could and blamed the Department of Homeland Security and other 
bureaucracies for stepping on FEMA’s preparation and response.35   
But the Bush Administration also sought to protect itself from criticism by seizing 
upon public attempts to render the recovery effort as a reason to celebrate the national 
character.  It framed Katrina as a demonstration of “our” ability to come together in the 
face of calamity and “bounce-back.”  They adopted rhetoric that emphasized the 
overwhelming, uncontainable forces of nature, and the heroism of Americans in spite of 
the enormity of destruction.  In an apparent attempt to counteract the image of him as 
being aloof—largely on account of continuing his vacation for two days after the storm 
hit—Bush toured the destruction on camera and made several speeches lionizing the 
government and civilian response, not in terms of their ability to control or conquer 
nature, but in a synergy between civilians and the state to serve one another.36  For 
example, the White House praised “The Good News Camp,” an evangelical Christian, 
expressly non-political grass-roots recovery effort that hosted approximately 17,000 
volunteers.37  Months later, Bush would frame this notion of synergy in his first State of 
 
35 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, “Transcript.”  
36 The amount of criticism that his administration faced in what was commonly seen as a botched response 
to the Hurricane spawned a phrase to describe the political failures of future Presidents responding to 
unforeseen events.  The Washington Post identified, twenty-three events that critics of the President 
labeled as “Obama’s Katrina;” and critics of President Trump have similarly labeled his response to 
Hurricane Maria.  Jaime Fuller, “Which of these 23 things was the MOST Obama’s Katrina’s moment? 
No one can decide.” Washington Post, January 13, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2014/07/11/which-of-these-tk-things-was-the-most-obamas-katrinas-
moment/?utm_term=.5b7deb67ef3d. 
37 The organization that organized the camp, the Disaster Pastor Network, emphasizes their anti-political 
nature on their website.  “[We] are not a political organization and will not be involved in nor used as 
such.  We are not protesters or demonstrators…”  “About,” Jerry Davis Disaster Pastor Network, 
http://disasterpastor.net/about. 
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the Union address after the hurricane.  In that speech, he adopts some of the language of 
social justice advocates, but depoliticizes it by blurring the distinction between all actors, 
using words like “America,” “we,” “us,” and “society:”  “America is a great force for 
freedom and prosperity. Yet our greatness is not measured in power or luxuries, but by 
who we are and how we treat one another. So we strive to be a compassionate, decent, 
hopeful society.”  He went on to list progress in various social problems such as drug use 
and welfare reform, progress in science and education, before addressing Katrina 
specifically: 
A hopeful society comes to the aid of fellow citizens in times of suffering and 
emergency—and stays at it until they're back on their feet. So far the federal 
government has committed $85 billion to the people of the Gulf Coast and New 
Orleans. We're removing debris and repairing highways and rebuilding stronger 
levees. We're providing business loans and housing assistance. Yet as we meet 
these immediate needs, we must also address deeper challenges that existed 
before the storm arrived. 
In New Orleans and in other places, many of our fellow citizens have felt 
excluded from the promise of our country. The answer is not only temporary 
relief, but schools that teach every child, and job skills that bring upward 
mobility, and more opportunities to own a home and start a business. As we 
recover from a disaster, let us also work for the day when all Americans are 
protected by justice, equal in hope, and rich in opportunity.38  
While these dissident and official responses to Katrina utilize a variety of 
different framings of the disaster and what the proper response ought to be, they also 
share some core assumptions surrounding the discursive frameworks of citizenship and 
national emergency.  The responses all agree that Katrina was an event that clarified who, 
if anyone, different groups of citizens could rely upon for help in the face of a national 
emergency. This clarification created a public trial for state authorities, and debates over 
 
38 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address by the President,” January 31, 2006, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/. 
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the agency of everyday people in the aftermath of such events.  As the media, officials, 
and civil society members conceived the identity of those suffering and those who could 
help in terms of citizens and state authorities, they all deployed a national framing to 
characterize much of their various political themes.39  Many of these charges focused on 
accusations of administrative neglect—bad management—as the source of suffering.  For 
example, the public contestation around the actions of the Bush administration in the 
aftermath of Katrina demonstrates this shared premise: it is the duty of the American 
government to serve disaster victims because they are American citizens.  And when 
journalists began describing Katrina evacuees as “refugees,” for example, there was a 
public backlash against the foreign connotations of the label.  This was taken-up by the 
Congressional Black Caucus, as well as Rev. Jesse Jackson and Rev. Al Sharpton, who 
insisted that “refugee” is demeaning because “[they] are Americans.”40 Some journalists 
defended their use of the term, not contesting the American character of the victims, but 
insisting that “refugee” appropriately described people fleeing from danger.  Other news 
organizations, like National Public Radio and The Washington Post, conceded to the 
backlash and stopped or restricted their journalists from using the term.41  President Bush 
also weighed in on the debate, likely perceiving it as an opportunity to respond to charges 
 
39 A notable exception to this were the aforementioned migrant-worker advocacy groups that pre-existed 
Katrina. 
40 David Remnick’s coverage of Katrina for The New Yorker dismissed this as mere political correctness 
that distracts from the material hardships of those effected by the hurricane. See his “High Water: How 
Presidents and citizens react to disaster,” The New Yorker, October 3, 2005.  
41 Masquelier, “Why Katrina’s Victims Aren’t Refugees,” 738. 
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of racism.  Bush insisted, “The people we’re talking about are not refugees.  They are 
Americans.  And they need the help and love and compassion of our fellow citizens.”42 
What these various representations of Katrina demonstrate is that the calamity 
was understood as more than just a terrible accident, or a “national tragedy,” in the 
language of fundraising efforts.43  The public spectacle of the disaster made the 
widespread suffering of hurricane victims an object of common concern, and difficult to 
accept as natural.  The suffering appeared unnecessary.  Bush himself would later 
comment in his memoire on how the storm stimulated the political and sociological 
imagination of the viewing public.   
Just as Katrina was more than a hurricane, its impact was more than physical 
destruction. It eroded citizens’ trust in their government. It exacerbated divisions 
in our society and politics. And it cast a cloud over my second term.44  
It was as if political representatives, disaster victims, the media and the viewing public all 
received a prompt from the hurricane, “what does this destruction and suffering mean for 
us?” And a cacophony of responses followed. 
Both elite and grassroots dissidents seized on the spectacle as a vehicle for 
mobilizing more people behind their cause.  In their framing, the suffering was the sign 
of a mistake, or more acutely, an injustice.  In the framing of public trial, the disaster was 
 
42 Lou Dobbs, “Survivors of Hurricane Katrina face new deadly threats.” Lou Dobbs Tonight. CNN, 
(September 6, 2005), as cited in Louisa Edgerly, “Difference and Political Legitimacy: Speaker’s 
Construction of ‘Citizen’ and ‘Refugee’ Personae in Talk about Hurricane Katrina,” Western Journal of 
Communication, 75, no. 3 (2011): 311. 
43 This was the scripted terminology used in the now famous celebrity telethon in which Kanye West broke 
from script to emphasizes that Katrina victims were mostly African American and poor and their 
suffering was on account of the racist government.   
44 George W. Bush, Decision Points, (New York: Random House, 2010). 
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an indictment of the government, calling for more attentive technocratic expertise in the 
halls of government.  However, other dissidents used the disaster to forward alternative 
agendas, whether in the name of Christian piety or racial and social justice.  Officials 
responded in kind, defending their technocratic bona fides, while also forwarding a 
parallel narrative of unmanageable threats and national triumph over adversity.   
The overlap between these various framings of Katrina helps clarify the kinds of 
politics that ecological emergencies impel today.  The disaster did not just beckon state 
and civil society actors to solve a commonly understood problem in a single location.  
Katrina helped to create an unplanned political spectacle, wherein authorities had to try 
and justify their power and what they were doing both to the disaster victims and to a 
larger national audience.45  In this way, the public discussions of Katrina were made into 
an arena of defining citizenship and the proper role of state power in a world filled with 
hurricanes and other unpredictable threats to their well-being.  The state response and the 
recovery agenda became avenues for a larger contest over defining the values of 
government beyond the immediate drama of the individual disaster.   
 
Contestation in the Debris and Spectacle of Hurricane Sandy 
These hurricane-prompted competitions to capture the meaning of an unplanned 
political spectacle were not unique to Katrina.  We see similar contests in the case of a 
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death toll and the cost of destruction in comparison to average hurricanes, doing 
approximately 73.5 billion dollars’ worth in damage in the US—the fourth most 
expensive hurricane in American history.  It also killed 117 people, mostly in New York 
and New Jersey.46  But this impact was nowhere near the level of Katrina, which was 
nearly twice as expensive and ten-times more deadly.  Moreover, there was no specific 
constituency that was harmed, no equivalent to the African American urban poor of New 
Orleans.  In terms of the social facts, Hurricane Sandy was both quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from Katrina.  But the media, officials, and elite and grassroots 
dissidents similarly treated it as an unplanned political spectacle, at times, even likening 
it to Katrina.  Indeed, they treated Sandy as a national emergency that could serve or hurt 
the careers of politicians and the platforms of grassroots organizers.  What follows is an 
analysis of how such political entrepreneurs attempted to anchor the meaning of that 
spectacle. 
Just as the Democratic representatives sought to damage the public image of the 
Bush Administration during Katrina, outspoken Republicans initially attempted to make 
Sandy into “Obama’s Katrina.”  For example, Donald Trump, who just finished a failed 
run for the Republican presidential ticket, used his platform on twitter to make the 
 
46 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Deaths Associated with Hurricane Sandy – October –
November 2012,” CDC Home, May 24, 2013, 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6220a1.htm. 
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comparisons days after the storm: “The federal gov. has handled Sandy worse than 
Katrina. There is no excuse why people don't have electricity or fuel yet.”47   
Defending themselves in this trial, many of the state and federal representatives 
made public statements and appearances to demonstrate how well they provided relief 
and recovery resources, and made public displays of mourning and empathy for the 
disaster victims.  While Obama halted his official campaign for reelection to oversee the 
relief effort, he spent much of this time giving speeches and posing for photo-ops with 
disaster victims among the rubble.  It was a form of unofficial campaigning that was well 
understood by his opponents.  In the words an advisor to Mitt Romney’s then-ongoing 
presidential campaign, “You have to strike a balance between looking presidential [by 
showing up to the disaster area], but not looking like you’re a politically crass politician 
who’s parachuting in for a photo-op.”48   
Prominent media outlets provided the verdict on how well these performances 
went, evaluating them according to how well the politicians dually fit the roles of 
overseeing practical problems of recovery and giving national recognition to the suffering 
of American citizens.  For example, the media castigated Mayor Bloomberg for not 
fitting into this role, responding to Sandy as merely a technical problem.  Commentary by 
the New York Times asked why he was so tone-deaf, unaware of the consoling role that 
 
47 Amelia Mavis Christnot, “A 2012 Tweet Criticizing the Response to Hurricane Sandy Just Came Back to 
Haunt Donald Trump,” September 13, 2018, https://secondnexus.com/news/trump-tweeted-hurricane-
sandy-electricity. 
48  Kyle Cheney and Steven Shepard, “Clinton, Trump brace for Hurricane Matthew,” Politico, October 5, 
2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/hurricane-matthew-2016-clinton-trump-path-229200. 
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he should be playing in the post-hurricane drama.49  His public image was solely that of a 
technocrat responding to an emergency—an active problem-solver on the scene.  His 
aides defended him according to the same manner of thinking: “The people in this city 
didn’t elect [him] three times to give him a hug… His focus is helping people restore 
their lives.  That’s what he believes government is there to do.”50   
In contrast to Bloomberg, President Obama and New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie’s public appearances after the storm were praised by the press.  Going beyond 
the technical problems posed by the storm, Obama and Christie were each photographed 
hugging residents, and Obama gifted holiday ornaments to a couple who turned a downed 
tree into a Christmas tree in their yard.  Governor Andrew Cuomo and Senator Charles 
Schumer similarly posed for photos helping unload emergency supplies on the streets 
among other volunteers.  Christie, who had been campaigning for Obama’s opponent in 
the 2012 presidential election, went so far as to heap public praises upon Obama for 
putting partisanship aside and acting as a national leader during the emergency.  In 
 
49 This criticism appeared despite Bloomberg’s attempts to make himself publically visible in the disaster 
zone, visiting damaged areas and speaking with residents a dozen times in the first two weeks after the 
storm.  But in evaluating these visits, the public pundits were puzzled over his behavior.  He did not 
announce these tours to the press, and instead had his own camera crew film some of them for his own 
youtube channel.  Making it worse, the videos were botched.  They clearly were intended to generate 
positive public relations after the storm, as they were edited and stage-managed to make it palpable to a 
viewing audience: the clips show the mayor in street clothes meeting and shaking hands with residents 
and men in military uniform on the ruined streets of New York City; the videos are just a few minutes 
long, edited to keep people’s attention by not showing a single scene more than half a minute; the Mayor 
and his interlocutors are always facing the camera as they talk and shake hands.  Even when the Mayor is 
speaking with several people, they stand in a U-formation to face the camera, as if at a press conference, 
or actors on a set.  Yet the videos are posted with no sound, making for an awkward, if boring viewing 
experience.  Michael M. Grynbaum and David W. Chen, “Bloomberg Puts Soothing Aside as He Rushes 
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response, conservative media mogul Rupert Murdoch and other major campaign donors 
threatened Christie, making it clear to him that such public displays of bipartisanship in 
the rubble were undermining his potential as a future national candidate in the 
Republican Party.51   
Environmentalists also saw an opportunity in the spectacle of Sandy, hoping to 
inject climate change into the political debate surrounding hurricanes.  Perhaps the most 
prominent voices here were those of the environmentalist wing of the local Democratic 
leadership, with New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg as its unofficial spokesman.  They 
centered upon the notion that Hurricane Sandy was a manifestation of climate change, 
and as such, storms like Sandy would become more common in the future.  This was 
consistent with their already existing political platforms.  Since 2008, Bloomberg had 
been gathering expert climate and social scientists on panels to integrate climate change 
into urban planning of NYC, producing reports on climate change’s local impacts, and 
how the city can reduce its CO2 emissions.52  Mayor Bloomberg renewed these earlier 
initiatives to integrate climate change into urban planning after Sandy.  Approximately 
two months after the storm, he established the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and 
Resiliency, a research group tasked with proposing green infrastructure solutions to 
 
51 Michael Barbaro, “After Obama, Christie Wants a G.O.P. Hug,” The New York Times, November 19, 
2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/us/politics/after-embrace-of-obama-chris-christie-woos-a-
wary- gop.html. 
52 ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability USA, “The Process Behind PlaNYC: How the City of New 
York Developed Its Comprehensive Long-Term Sustainability Plan,” ICLEI-Local Governments for 
Sustainability USA, April 2010, http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/ 
iclei_planyc_case_study_201004.pdf. 
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mitigate the impact of future storms and floods.53  Other democratic leaders echoed 
Bloomberg’s framing of Sandy in public statements.  For example, New York City 
Governor Andrew Cuomo, argued “anyone who says there is not a dramatic change in 
weather patterns… is denying reality.”  The state’s Senator Charles Schumer stated 
“We’re going to pay a price for the change in climate,” while Congressional 
Representative of Manhattan Jerrold Nadler stated, “There will be a storm of this 
magnitude again.”54 In contrast, Republican Representative of Long Island Peter King 
denied the existence of climate change, and framed the storm as merely a technocratic 
emergency.  He used his public attention to shame his fellow Republicans who blocked 
and delayed emergency congressional funding for post-Sandy recovery and “real life and 
death” situations.55   
Bloomberg’s attempt to make Sandy about climate change was timed with the 
looming presidential election.  Climate change had been largely absent from the 2012 
campaign, never appearing in any of the presidential debates, and neither candidate had 
 
53 Cynthia Rosenzwieg and William Solecki, “Hurricane Sandy and adaption pathways in New York: 
Lessons from a first-responder city,” Global Environmental Change, 28, (2014): 395-408.  Thus far that 
effort has culminated in a lot of planning, but very little building: as of this writing in May of 2019, they 
have only constructed a ring of large sandbags around lower Manhattan.  On this planning, see Jeff 
Goodell, “Can New York be Saved in the Era of Global Warming?” Rolling Stone, July 5, 2016, 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/can-new-york-be-saved-in-the-era-of-global-
warming-240454/.  On the delays of this construction in Brooklyn, see Brett Yates, “When will Red 
Hook get its Flood Protection?” Star Revue, October 12, 2018.  On the recent building of sand-bags in 
Manhattan, see Patrick McGeehan, “6 Years After Hurricane Sandy, Here’s What They Came Up With: 
Really Big Sandbags,” The New York Times, May 5, 2019. 
54 Raymond Hernandez, “Bloomberg Backs Obama, Citing Fallout from Storm,” The New York Times, 
November 1, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/nyregion/bloomberg-endorses-obama-saying-
hurricane-sandy-affected-decision.html. 
55 Peter King, “Representatives Peter King and Frank Pallone on Hurricane Sandy Relief Funding,” C-
Span, January 2, 2013, https://www.c-span.org/video/?310181-6/representatives-peter-king-frank-
pallone-hurricane-sandy-relief-funding. 
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proposed any detailed legislative or regulatory agenda on the issue.56  Yet after Sandy, 
Mayor Bloomberg, dubbed by The New Yorker as, “the nation’s most prominent high-
information swing voter,” attempted to make Sandy into an event that would generate 
sustained policy reform toward climate change adaptation on a national level.  He had 
been previously critical of both Obama and Romney and refused to back either in the 
election.  But after Sandy he reversed course and gave Obama his public endorsement.57  
Explaining his reasoning, he pointed to Sandy and cited Obama’s record on attempting to 
reduce carbon emissions: “Our climate is changing.  And while the increase in extreme 
weather we have experience in New York City and around the world may or may not be 
the result of it, the risk that it may be—given the devastation it is wreaking—should be 
enough to compel all elected leaders to take immediate action.”58  Obama quickly issued 
a statement thanking Bloomberg for his endorsement, reiterating that, “climate change is 
a threat to our children’s future, and we owe it to them to do something about it… he has 
my continued commitment that this country will stand by New York in its time of need.  
And New Yorkers have my word that we will recover, we will rebuild, and we will come 
back stronger.”59  Like Bush after Katrina, Obama was responding to the public created 
by the disaster, adopting the framings circulated by powerful public figures.  
 
56 Hernandez, “Bloomberg Backs Obama.”  
57 Hendrik Hertzberg, “Into the Storm,” The New Yorker, November 5, 2012, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/11/12/into-the-storm. 
58 Crystal Gammon, “Will Sandy Change the Climate Change Conversation?” CBS News, November 2, 
2012, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-sandy-change-the-climate-change-conversation/. 
59 Obama/Biden Campaign, “Statement from President Obama on Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s 
Endorsement,” November 1, 2012, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2012/11/02/nyregion/02obama-on-Bloomberg-endorse.html. 
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In contrast to Obama’s gains, The New York Times and other major outlets used 
the spectacle to lambast Romney’s calls for using neoliberal reforms to whittle down the 
responsibilities of government even further, applying a “small-government” approach to 
even national emergencies.  They drew attention to statements he made the year prior in 
support of dismantling the federal emergency response system, and handing it over to 
state, or better, private companies.  Journalists pressed Romney to elaborate on that 
position in the media spotlight after Sandy.  Seeing the political costs of standing against 
“big government” in the moment of a national emergency, he refused to comment.60  For 
these reasons, many public commentators and some social scientists have argued that 
Hurricane Sandy helped increase Obama’s popularity immediately before the election; 
though not likely in swing-states where it would have mattered to the election outcome.61  
Bloomberg’s use of Sandy appears to have had a lasting influence on Obama’s 
platform.  Upon re-election, Obama used his second inaugural address to point to Sandy 
and other storms as a sign that climate change is an urgent problem that America must 
take on:  
We, the people, still believe that our obligations as Americans are not just to 
ourselves, but to all posterity.  We will respond to the threat of climate change, 
knowing that the failure to do so would betray our children and future 
generations.  Some may still deny the overwhelming judgment of science, but 
 
60 New York Times Editorial Page, “A Big Storm Requires Big Government,” The New York Times, 
October 29, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/opinion/a-big-storm-requires-big-
government.html?_r=0. 
61 For example, see Yamil Velez and David Martin, “Sandy the Rainmaker: The Electoral Impact of a 
Super Storm, Political Science & Politics, 46, no. 2, (2013): 313-323. 
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none can avoid the devastating impact of raging fires and crippling drought and 
more powerful storms.62   
It is worth noting that in contrast to other, grassroots attempts to make Sandy about 
climate change that I examine below, the Obama platform on the matter was an 
endorsement of technocratic power combined with market relations.63  He made efforts to 
legitimize this move in public speeches, introducing his “Climate Action Plan” in the 
language of emergency.  In one speech, he cited Hurricane Sandy as an example of how 
normal storms are being made more powerful by accelerated climate change, as well as 
Midwest droughts and floods, and wildfires in the western states.  He emphasized that 
these are problems being created by human activity, and are thus in need of a 
“coordinated assault on a changing climate.”  He then went on to emphasize that the 
assault is not against industry, that it will not harm the economic system, but that these 
new regulations are actually “an engine for growth,” citing companies like GM, Nike, 
and Walmart who have voluntarily invested in renewable energy.64  
At the grassroots level, Sandy was also taken as an opportunity for social and 
political change, albeit in a different way.  Some of the same evangelical organizations 
that mobilized after Katrina showed up to Sandy’s disaster zone to provide aid, and in 
some cases, to simultaneously promote Christian piety.  Included in this movement was 
Jerry Davis, the “disaster pastor” who organized one of the larger evangelical volunteer 
 
62 Barack Obama, “Inaugural Address by President Obama,” The White House, January 21, 2013, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-
obama. 
63 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Climate Change,” The White House, June 25, 2013, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change. 
64 Ibid. 
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relief projects during Katrina.  Just as he saw the disaster as an opportunity to reorient 
America to goals beyond safety and the status-quo, so too was Sandy such a blessing.  
Here is how he describes the need for saving souls in light of the disaster: “New York 
City and New Jersey are densely populated areas, with NYC being America’s largest city 
and perhaps the most in need of salvation of all… God’s word tells us in Hosea 5:15, ‘in 
their affliction, they will seek me early.’”  He goes on to describe the proper division of 
labor between “secular” and Christian agencies, on account of what he sees as the 
narrow, “humanitarian” goals of FEMA and the Red Cross:  
FEMA, Red Cross, and other secular organizations are usually capable of 
bringing humanitarian aid.  They are NOT capable of delivering it with true 
compassion.  That takes Christians.  The secular world is also not capable of 
delivering the Gospel.  But God never asked them to.  That is the responsibility of 
the CHURCH at large.   
He goes on to insist that disaster recovery expand its goals beyond achieving safety and a 
return to normal:  
One hundred years from now EVERYONE we help will be dead.  All of the 
buildings we restore will be gone.  The Church of Jesus Christ MUST leverage 
our desire to be humanitarians with our commission to be soul savers… The great 
command from Jesus to ‘Lover your neighbor as yourself’ must go hand in hand 
with the great commission from Christ to ‘Go make disciples.’65  
More than just repair damage for lives and property that will wither eventually, he insists 
that disaster response needs to address bigger matters, delivering God’s message to the 
nation and saving the souls of disaster victims.  
Social justice activists also mobilized to dually provide disaster aid and to use 
the media’s attention to their work as an opportunity to reshape public understandings 
 
65 “Hurricane Harvey – 2017 – Southeast Texas – Aftermath” Jerry Davis – Disaster Pastor Network, 
http://disasterpastor.net/latest-news. 
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of the disaster.  Like the framing of the Democratic leadership after Sandy, a group of 
activists in New York City and New Jersey were intent on channeling the public 
discussion toward climate change, but with an emphasis on the social justice and 
capitalism.  “Occupy Sandy” was an organization created by former participants in the 
then-defunct Occupy Wall Street movement.  When Sandy hit, they tapped their activist 
networks to organize relief and recovery projects in the streets, and were subsequently 
populated by thousands of new individuals who were looking for a venue to help those 
affected by the storm.66  Sandy participants utilized the publicity of their success in 
providing emergency relief, rendering Hurricane Sandy as the sign of a larger crisis.  
According to Occupy Sandy, the hurricane’s destruction was rooted in capitalism.  
Climate change, as well as pre-existing poverty, state neglect, inattentive bureaucracies, 
and the capture of state power by “the 1%” characterized the underlying problem.  Like 
the activists of New Orleans, they insisted that the disaster merely crystalized underlying 
injustices and dangers in American society.  In this rendering, much more radical action 
was necessary than empowering an environmentally enlightened group of technocrats, 
harnessing market forces, and building better infrastructure, as Bloomberg and Obama 
were pursuing.67  Accordingly, the proper response to Sandy required seizing power from 
the state or the 1%, and empowering “the people” or “the 99%.”   
 
66 For a more detailed analysis on the formation and goals of Occupy Sandy, see Tyler Schuenemann, 
“Making and Scheduling Citizens: Political time and the Democratic Potential of Hurricanes,” New 
Political Science, 42, no. 1 (2020): 87-108. 
67 Prior to Sandy, the Obama administration made what environmentalist groups argued was a half-hearted 
attempt at such reform in his 2009 cap-and-trade legislation, which governed climate change by creating 
a market for CO2 emissions to be monitored by experts. This died in the Senate with little White House 
backing.  The Obama administration returned to the issue after his re-election, issuing a series of 
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Occupy Sandy utilized the popular attention to the post-Sandy recovery efforts to 
inject this story of antagonistic struggle against injustice, abandonment, and exploitation.  
In contrast to the nationalist rhetoric of the Democratic leadership, emphasizing the need 
for unity, aid, and mourning in the face of collective suffering, Occupy Sandy 
participants invoked an oppositional, populist category of political identity—one in 
struggle with an opponent.  This rhetoric is captured in an advertisement for a weekend-
long meeting of participants for organizing future goals within the group:  “We [Occupy 
Sandy participants] came together and showed that a Peoples Recovery- by, for and of 
the 99% - is not only possible, it's already happening.  Now it's time to organize that 
Peoples Recovery together.  Will you join us in the effort and help rally your community 
for a better NYC?”68  Note the conflation of the “People” and “the 99%.” These framings 
demonstrate that participants were politicizing recovery, making it a story about the 
exclusion of the “the People” or “the 99%” from political power at the hands of “the 
1%.”69  They described recovery as a problem of inequality, and highlight the competing 
interests hidden within conventional approaches to recovery, wherein the goal is to 
 
executive orders referred to as his “Climate Action Plan.”  He made efforts to popularize this move in 
public speeches, introducing his new policy strategy by making references to Hurricane Sandy, citing it 
as an example of how normal storms are being made more powerful by accelerated climate change, as 
well as Midwest droughts and floods, and wildfires in the western states.  See Obama, “Remarks by the 
President on Climate Change.” 
68 Emphasis in the original.  Mass email from Peoples Recovery Summit Planning Committee; for “top-
down” metaphor, see Damien Crisp, “Hurricane Sandy: Top Down Relief,” accessed February 17, 2013, 
http://summit.peoplesrecovery.org/#section-n1. 
69 For example, in her online journalism, one Occupy Sandy participant describes her experience by 
foregrounding inequality.  She contrasts the media's attention to people reviving their smart phones at 
charging stations in lower Manhattan with her own experience in trying to deliver insulin to elderly and 
disabled people trapped in their apartments in poor and working-class neighborhoods isolated by the 
hurricane.  See Jillian Buckely, Occupy Sandy Provides Relief for More Than Just a Storm,” Yes 
Magazine, December 13, 2012. 
 174   
“bounce-back” to the status-quo.  It is for this reason that journalists and activists from 
New Orleans were given a forum at the meeting to share their accounts of the racist and 
classist character of post-Katrina recovery, and warn of things to come post-Sandy, least 
they organize to stop it.  Occupy Sandy participants drew from the Katrina example, as 
well as Naomi Klein’s popular book about “disaster capitalism,” to legitimize an 
antagonistic reading of disasters:70 
We’re well aware that disasters are often opportunities for the government to take 
valuable land, or rebuild on land that they see as valuable in some way. That 
benefits people with the big bucks, but not the people living on the ground... Part 
of our work is building strong communities and networks with the knowledge that 
there might be a fight coming towards us. We believe in community empowered 
rebuilding efforts – that the community living on the ground should have a say in 
what happens to their communities.71   
Likewise, Occupy Sandy participants began training disaster victims in the tactics of 
holding sit-ins in anticipation of government agencies refusing to allow people to 
continue living in flood zones on the shore.72 
In this subversion of the Democratic leadership’s framing, in which Sandy is an 
embodiment of climate change, disaster recovery is not a story of American citizens 
being struck by calamity and helped back to their feet by an attentive, administrative state 
or public-private partnerships.  Recovery is a struggle over who gets what, and who gets 
 
70 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism. (New York City, NY: Metropolitan 
Books, 2007). 
71 Ed Rampell, “Occupy Sandy: Volunteers for America's 99%: The Cavalry is Us,” Rock Cellar Magazine, 
January 2013. http://www.rockcellarmagazine.com/2013/01/07/occupy-sandy-volunteers-for-americas-
99/. 
72 Sarah Maslin Nir, “Storm Effort Causes Rift in a Shifting Occupy Movement,” The New York Times, 
April 30, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/occupy-movements-changing-focus-
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to define the goals of recovery.  Occupy Sandy’s framing renders recovery a realm where 
a new actor appears, “the people,” as a counter to the authority of the technocrats, e.g. 
FEMA and the Red Cross, and “the 1%,” e.g. slum lords and insurance companies.  This 
meant that the decision-making process for responding to the disaster was not premised 
upon the authority of technocratic knowledge and its conventions for responding to 
emergencies, but upon deliberation among the people being affected by the crisis.  
Occupy Sandy was calling upon powerful recovery organizations to justify their actions 
to a newly attentive public.  Pushing against what some see as the conservative teleology 
of disaster management institutions—that disasters are a break from the normal, and thus 
the proper response is returning to the status-quo—Occupy Sandy insisted that the goals 
of recovery be a matter of democratic decision-making.73  The teleology of the 
“recovery” agenda was rejected as anti-democratic.   
Occupy Sandy participants focused on opening for debate what elements of the 
pre-Sandy status-quo were worth retrieving, and what was in need of change.  Even 
behind closed doors, they practiced this goal in their meetings.  For example, in a group 
discussion at one of their meetings, one person who described their work as “recovery” 
immediately rejected the term’s implications.  He corrected himself for using it: “Occupy 
Sandy is about making things better than they were, not recovering back to the poverty 
that was there pre- [Hurricane] Sandy.” Others in the same discussion echoed these 
sentiments in stating that the hurricane “exposed the wounds of poverty” that were there 
 
73 Kenneth Hewitt, “The idea of Calamity in a Technocratic Age,” in Interpretations of Calamity: From the 
Viewpoint of Human Ecology, Kenneth Hewitt ed., (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1983), 3-32. 
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prior.74  In their eyes, only parts of the previous status-quo were deemed worthy of 
restoration, including housing, schools, and re-opening businesses.  And even these were 
objects to be radically re-thought for the sake of combating climate change and creating 
more “resilient” communities for the next major hurricane.75  Still others argued that the 
hurricane was only one of several disasters that needed to be addressed in a People’s 
Recovery: “there’s the initial disaster, and then there’s the long-term disaster that 
happens after the… volunteers leave, after the cameras leave, that is deeply related to the 
failures and ongoing crisis of capitalism as a system.”76 Other participates spoke of “the 
slow hurricanes of poverty, unemployment, poor education and lack of access to 
healthcare…” that existed long before Sandy, which merely “accentuated the destruction 
wrought by these continuous crises.”77 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how humanitarian efforts after recent hurricanes in the US 
were not divorced from struggles over political power.  Large-scale hurricanes are now 
being treated as unplanned political spectacles in the US, in contrast to those earlier 
disasters considered in Chapter Two of this dissertation.  Constituted by the discursive 
 
74 Author’s field notes at “People’s Recovery Summit,” February 1, 2013. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Michael Premo interviewed by Liam Barrington-Bush, “Occupy Sandy operationalised Occupy Wall 
Street,” More Like People, http://morelikepeople.org/michaelpremointerview/. 
77 This language is from the website of the Worker-Owned Rockaway Cooperatives, an off-shoot of 
Occupy Sandy designed to incubate worker-owned cooperatives in the aftermath of Sandy, which was 
modeled after those organized in Argentina after its financial crisis in 2003. “Occupy Sandy,” 
http://occupysandy.net/?projects=worker-owned-rockaway-cooperatives-w-o-r-cs. 
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framework of national emergency and an expanded vision for state responsibility for its 
citizens, the spectacle is that of a sudden, urgent threat to people’s capacity to enjoy the 
fruits of American citizenship, namely security and welfare in the face of ecological 
threats.  Officials and dissidents compete to use this spectacle for their own interests, 
framing it with larger political meaning for the public to consider.   
The public trial of authorities is perhaps the most prominent form that these 
political spectacles take, wherein officials are judged based on their ability to perform as 
competent technocrats that respond quickly and effectively to the emergency.  Hence, the 
Bush and Obama administrations made speeches and appearances for a national, public 
audience to defend themselves against charges of negligence or ineptitude.  They also 
told a story that rendered the quest for technocratic management as being beside the 
point.  Emphasizing the tragic, overwhelming nature of the problem, they made a show 
out of giving official recognition to the suffering of victims; and they muddled the 
distinctions between official and unofficial aid projects, portraying them as an 
embodiment of a more abstract “nation” facing insurmountable forces, as opposed to 
technocrats managing nature for the sake of civilians.   
But dissidents did more than demand better, perhaps greener technocrats in office 
to help recover the status-quo.  Evangelicals used the spectacle as an opportunity to direct 
public values away from what they saw as fleeting material concerns over safety and 
welfare, in hopes of spreading Christian piety.  Social justice advocates used the 
spectacle to draw attention to those forces beyond the hurricane that also undermine the 
social contract, such as systemic racism, urban neglect, and capitalism.  In doing so, they 
attempted to force the “recovery” agenda to address the issue of pre- and post-disaster 
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inequalities.  Occupy Sandy went so far as to call for democratic control of the recovery 
agenda.  In their vision, the very notion of recovery should be defined through more 
inclusive, democratic mechanisms, as opposed to experts working behind closed doors.   
These contests to anchor the spectacle to a larger political message show that 
recent disaster contention in the US is not built on social facts, but competing social 
imaginaries.  It is not the severity of humanitarian need and the efficiency with which it is 
met by the state or civil society actors that drives the contention.  Indeed, much of the 
political activity surrounding disasters centers on trying to shape what gets taken as fact 
by the public, and what values should be used to judge those facts, whether it is public 
safety, national solidarity, Christian piety, or social justice.  In this way, disasters have 
become another arena in which officials and dissidents wield symbolic power to shape 
how people understand their citizenship.  These contests over public meaning-making 
and the discursive frameworks that shape them are central to understanding the kinds of 
politics that such disasters impel in the US today.
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CHAPTER 5:  
CYCLONE GONU AS AN UNPLANNED POLITICAL SPECTACLE IN OMAN  
 
 
While the contestation that I documented in the case of recent, large-scale 
hurricanes in the US might call into question the inherent, anti-democratic danger of 
disasters, a scholar of social movements in the United States might not be surprised by 
my findings.  One can imagine them stating that, of course, in a divided society with a 
long history of social movement activism, hurricanes are going to generate contention 
like every other major event.  In this rendering, the hurricane might as well be an 
election, a school shooting, a terrorist attack, and any other event that generates public 
attention on matters of politics.  That is, ecological disasters are merely avenues for pre-
existing struggles, or expressions of the “social contract.”1  
But such a quick conclusion misses surprising similarities to other countries.  As I 
will demonstrate in this chapter, there are similar forms of contention pushing to the 
surface in Oman, where such a history of civic activism and partisanship is largely 
absent.  This contention is evident in the responses to cyclone Gonu, a powerful tropical 
 
1 For scholars who take the latter position, see Mark Pelling and Kathleen Dill, “Disaster politics: tipping 
points for change in the adaptation of sociopolitical regimes,” Progress in Human Geography, (May, 
2009): 1-17. 
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cyclone that slammed into Omani coastline in 2007.  In the language of meteorology, it 
was a “Category 5,” or “Super Cyclonic Storm” by virtue of its Gale winds reaching 145 
miles per hour.  Omanis themselves described how, “the entire land [became] sea,”2 as 
Gonu’s storm surge brought the ocean inland, and flash floods washed away highways, 
bridges, orchards, and neighborhoods.  Residents described snakes and feral street 
animals moving into their houses to seek shelter from the rising waters.  As the flood 
waters subsequently receded, human corpses became visible within the strewn debris.  
The storm instigated a marathon of hardship after it knocked out electricity and running 
water throughout much of the capital and its surrounding suburbs for several days, when 
the summer temperatures exceeded 100 degrees Fahrenheit.  The total estimated cost of 
the storm’s damage is four billion US dollars.3 
The public, visible character of this devastation provided Omanis with a shared 
sense that they had just experienced an event of major destruction to their public goods 
and private lives—a national calamity in Oman that was unlike any previous event.  But 
interpretations varied widely regarding what this modern destruction meant.  These 
disagreements provoked a political competition that trespassed the confines of official 
and self-censorship which normally temper public discourse in Oman.   
Dissidents and officials treated Gonu as an unplanned political spectacle.  They 
competed in framing contests to anchor the images of destruction and aid to a narrative 
 
2 Mariam al Faraji, “a05dag001,” Interview by Mazin al Balushi, Gonu Oral History Project, Omani 
Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and Tyler 
Schuenemann.  Unless otherwise noted, Noora al-Balushi led the translation of all materials cited here.  
3 Juma al-Maskari, “How the National Forecasting Centre in Oman Dealt with Tropical Cyclone Gonu,” in 
Indian Ocean Cyclones and Climate Change, Yassine Charabi ed., (New York City, NY: Springer, 
2010), 265. 
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that provided larger lessons about social and political bonds:  Is the destruction simply an 
inevitable hazard of living on the coast?  Or is it a symptom of some kind of moral or 
political failing on behalf of the Omanis?  Perhaps it is evidence of bad urban planning 
and government corruption, requiring a more rational, technocratic government.  Others 
insisted that it is a sign of God’s disapproval, a form of collective punishment for Oman’s 
modernization and abandonment of Islamic principles in daily life and government.  
These and similar considerations emerged in the face of the cyclone’s vast destruction. 
In this chapter, I draw from my ethnographic field work, semi-structured 
interviews, and archival research to document how Gonu was politicized in ways that are 
surprisingly similar to that of Katrina and Sandy in the US.  To be clear, the extent of the 
contention that emerged in the aftermath of Gonu is much more subdued than seen after 
Katrina and Sandy in the US.  But as I show below, in both countries we see that tropical 
cyclones have the capacity to generate similar public grievances regarding the success 
and value of technocratic government, as well as deeper questions about the meaning of 
national membership.  Moreover, like in the US, political entrepreneurs step onto the 
public stage in a contest to mobilize a larger constituency behind their platforms, creating 
framing contests between dissidents and officials.  In these contests, political 
entrepreneurs are using the spectacle of the disaster to shape the values through which the 
public can attempt to hold the state accountable. In response, as in the US, state 
representatives in Oman make interventions into the public sphere as to the “real 
meaning” of the disaster.    
This battle makes visible for analysis a consequential arena of political struggle 
that is largely ignored by contemporary scholarship on Omani politics.  The Omani 
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regime is not merely distributing “rent” to buy the acquiescence of a population that is 
willing to disengage from politics in exchange for material prosperity, as the rentier 
model would have it.4 Under that model, rentier states like Oman are threatened by 
economic crashes, falling oil prices, or political extremism that may undermine their 
ability to satisfy their citizens’ raised expectations for state services and employment that 
sustain a new lifestyle of leisure and political acquiescence.  The response to Cyclone 
Gonu shows a different field of politics.  That is, Gonu makes visible how the Omani 
regime, like the US government, attempts to consolidate “symbolic power” by 
monopolizing the terms and narratives through which citizens make sense of their shared 
fate in the aftermath of tropical cyclones.5  I find that Omani citizens are hungry for ways 
to publicly display their national solidarity, and willingness to contribute to a larger good, 
and to do so in accordance with their religious and civic values.  The Omani state is thus 
deeply invested in more than just providing material security to its citizens in exchange 
for acquiescence. It goes to great efforts to shape how citizens understand the common 
good, how they act upon it in public, and the extent to which everyday citizens look to 
the government in order to achieve it.  As I show below, the public processes of assigning 
meaning to tropical cyclones are becoming sites for such a struggle of state domination. 
 
4 For examples, see Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in the Middle 
Eastern Monarchies, (New York City, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Peterson, 
Oman’s Insurgencies; and Valeri, Oman. For an updated account of this feature of Rentierism in the 
Gulf, see Matthew Gray, “A Theory of Late Rentierism in the Arab States of the Gulf,” Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Center for International and Regional Studies, Occasional 
Paper, no. 7, (2011).  For a recent example of this thinking applied to Oman specifically, see Hunt, “The 
Late Unpleasantness.”  
5 On symbolic power as a tool of Middle Eastern regimes, see Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination; and 
Lisa Wedeen, “Ideology and Humor in Dark Times: Notes on Syria,” Critical Inquiry, 39, no. 4, (2013): 
841-873. 
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Moreover, my analysis illuminates how the tangible embodiments of climate 
change reinforce already existing, often contested notions of authority and responsibility.  
Extending previous scholarship on how “the social contract” shapes disaster response,6  I 
find that such responses are not determined by some singular, abstract, pre-existing 
“social contract” that defines the rights and responsibilities of the state and citizens.  
Rather, the response is the outcome of a struggle between partisans of multiple, and 
sometimes competing understandings of what states are capable of and responsible for, 
and a popular but politically ambivalent desire by civilians to participate in doing good.  
Moreover, these notions of citizenship are not limited to a contractual logic wherein 
Omani citizens expect certain rights and duties.  They also include popular aspirations, 
shared dreams of collective achievement where surprising accomplishments are also 
meaningful ways of defining political membership.   
This chapter is structured as follows.  The first section examines the events of 
Gonu as they emerged in a country where public speech is carefully policed, creating a 
culture in which expressions of dissent are risky, and as a consequence, Omanis are left 
to speculate as to the concerns and opinions of their fellow citizens in regards to most 
political issues.  The second section examines one of two dissident framings of Gonu, 
which emerged in public and semi-public forums.  This framing focused on the notion 
that the state failed to fulfill its obligation to apply expert knowledge to mitigate the 
effects of such storms upon the lives of Omanis.  The third section examines another 
prominent and critical framing.  It tells the story of the purportedly divine origins of the 
 
6 Pelling and Dill, “Disaster Politics,” 3.   
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disaster as a punishment for the standing regime’s reforms over the past decades.  The 
fourth section examines how the state understood such framings as requiring a response, 
wherein state officials and the Sultan himself stepped in to spin the meaning of Gonu into 
a story of national triumph, drawing upon both the values of successful recovery efforts 
and Islamic piety that were championed by the dissident narratives.    
 
Gonu in Context 
 Cyclone Gonu was first recognized by the Indian Meteorology Department on 
June 2, 2007 as the low-pressure system appeared southwest of Mumbai the previous 
day.  This triggered a meeting among Oman’s various ministries, chaired by the Chief 
Inspector of Oman Police, as the body of the Executive Office of the National Committee 
for Civil Defense (NCCD) that same day.  The first public announcement about the storm 
was released the following day, and on June 4th, a state of emergency was declared by the 
Chairman of the NCCD.7  This declaration put all civil and military institutions under the 
control of the NCCD.  20,000 inhabitants of Masirah Island were evacuated on June 5th, 
and ports and coastal oil terminals shut down in anticipation of the storm.  The Omani 
government declared a five-day national holiday beginning June 5th, using state television 
to broadcast satellite images with a map of Oman’s coast with a florescent swirl moving 
toward it.  It also used radio and text messages in Arabic and English to issue warnings to 
the population.8  The Omani state was pre-emptively treating the storm as a national 
 
7 Chapter three, Article three of the Omani Civil Defense Law. 
8 This timeline is from al-Maskari, “How the National Forecasting Centre in Oman Dealt with Tropical 
Cyclone Gonu,” 267-269. 
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emergency of a technocratic nature, requiring quick, effective, top-down solutions to the 
impending humanitarian problems that the natural disaster would bring. 
As the storm hit the newly urbanized coastline, both the Omani media and 
everyday citizens armed with smartphones created a flurry of formal and informal 
journalism.  Images, videos, and accounts were circulated in the official media outlets, as 
well as on social media and copied CD-ROMs.  Through the newspapers, radio, TV, 
blogs, social media, internet forums, and mosque sermons, stores of the event dominated 
for months.  In these accounts, the spectacle of destruction, suffering, and recovery 
efforts created a clear sense of emergency, but also impelled a great deal of public and 
semi-public discourse about the larger meaning of the event.  These various 
interpretations of Gonu as more than just a humanitarian emergency showcase a field of 
symbolic power with significant political stakes. 
Before analyzing this field, a brief analysis of the context is necessary for 
understanding the rules, norms, and institutions that shape the circulation of ideas in 
public and private spaces. In short, these diverging accounts of Gonu were created in a 
context of long-held official and unofficial controls over an emerging public sphere in 
Oman.  Like other countries in the Middle East,9 Oman has seen the emergence of 
spheres of communication wherein everyday citizens, not just the elite, can comment 
upon and try to shape issues of the common good, most notably around political 
 
9 On this phenomenon in Muslim-majority countries, see Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman ed., 
Public Islam and the Common Good, (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2004), xi; and Armando Salvatore and Mark 
LeVine ed., Religion, Social Practice, and Contested Hegemonies: Reconstructing the Public Sphere in 
Muslim Majority Societies, (New York City, NY: Palgrave, 2005). 
 186   
institutions and Islamic values.  But these spheres of communication are highly 
restrictive. 
On paper, Omanis have individual rights for freedom of speech, with some 
notable exceptions: for example, it is illegal to insult the Sultan or religion, and liable 
laws make “naming-names” in one’s dissent especially risky.10  In practice, the 
government gives little credence to these already truncated rights.  For example, several 
Omanis have been imprisoned or threatened with imprisonment for writing posts on 
Facebook which commented on the Omani civil war in the 1970s, neither of which 
commented on the Sultan, religion, or criticized specific individuals.11  
Outside of the weak individual protection of civil rights, the Omani state also 
exercises a great deal of power over the media.  The government maintains direct control 
over key television and newspaper outlets in the country.  Meanwhile, private media 
companies exercise a kind of dance between self-censorship and pushing against red-
lines for what the government will tolerate in print.12 For example, one Omani journalist 
was imprisoned for publishing accounts of individual corruption in the judiciary, 
including heads of the Supreme Court and Ishaq al-Busaidi, vice-chairman of the Higher 
Judicial Council.  When a colleague of the journalist spoke out against the imprisonment, 
 
10 Most forms of government censorship were officially abolished in 1985, but remain in practice today.  
For more details, see Valeri, Oman, 124-127.  
11 The Omani Center for Human Rights, “The Human Rights Situation in Oman: Annual Report 2016.” 
March 28, 2017, https://ochroman.org/eng/2016-2/. 
12 The Ministry of Information can strip individual journalist of their licenses to practice if they publish 
controversial material.  Moreover, papers that continuously push the boundaries of public discourse can 
be shut down, and their contributors imprisoned.  This was the fate of several independent Omani 
publications in 2016, including al Balad, Mowatin, and Azamn.  Interview with Author, March 8, 2016.  
See also The Omani Center for Human Rights, “The Human Rights Situation in Oman.” 
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he too was imprisoned and the Ministry of Information closed the paper.  Two other 
papers were closed down that same year for publishing material that was critical of, or 
embarrassing to the government.13   
A similar movement between self-censorship and pushing the boundaries of 
acceptable public speech occurs among Omani citizens, as they make use of blogs and 
social media to document and comment on current events in Oman.  When an Omani 
publishes controversial material online, they might receive “the phone call” from 
government minders, be brought in for interrogation, or even imprisoned, depending on 
the seriousness of their case.  They can also be harassed and publicly shamed by 
civilians, as well as Omani officials.14  The effect of these restrictions has been to shape 
what Omanis will say in public and how they say it. 
But more importantly, these restrictions fragment Omani citizens into pockets of 
semi-public discussion and news-sharing.  Alternative news and discussion venues have 
proliferated wherein Omanis can discuss important issues of current events, history, 
religion, and circulate rumors.  Internet discussion forums where Omanis can post 
material anonymously have become key venues in which Omanis discuss what the 
established press is unwilling or unable to cover.  Less anonymous, and therefore less 
critical, are blogs along with their comment threads.  Although Twitter, Whatsapp, and 




14 Interview with Author, March 8, 2016.  
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In these venues, the lines between facts and rumors of current events are difficult 
to establish, because there is no authoritative source to appeal to.  Journalists occasionally 
do publish work that is seen as both factual and politically relevant.  But given the rarity 
of such a phenomenon, some Omanis have made it a practice to take screen-shots of any 
online news that appears controversial, and share it on the online forums.  The 
presumption here is that the material will likely be removed from official circulation, and 
so it is up to them to preserve it for circulation in these alternative communication 
channels.  But without journalists capable of regularly vetting the veracity of claims, 
readers are left to their own to speculate, except, or reject other people’s accounts.  It is a 
sphere of punditry, though without publically available facts to comment upon.  The 
effect of this fragmentation is that it makes it very difficult for a watchful Omani citizen 
to know with any certainty what is happening in their country, or what their fellow 
citizens outside of their own social networks are really thinking.15  In the absence of clear 
and prominent alternative accounts of Omani politics and society, this censorship and 
fragmentation allows official stories to dominate public discussion, and shape much of 
foreign journalism, even some academic scholarship on the country.16  It is why the 
image of Oman as an apolitical, “sleepy Sultanate,” has been able to proliferate, despite 
the fact that the country had two civil wars in the last half of the twentieth century.17  
 
15 Interview with Author, February 16, 2017.  
16 A version of orientalism in Western journalism on Oman has proliferated in this environment, which tries 
to explain that apparent tranquility of the country on account of the specific version of Islam, Ibadism, 
found in the country.  The idea is that there is something about the doctrine of Ibadism that leads to 
political moderation and tolerance of other religions.  The Omani Ministry of Religious Affairs is 
partially responsible for articulating and spreading this message through its educational campaigns in the 
country and abroad. 
17 The Jebal Akhdar War occurred from 1954 to 1959, the Dhofar Rebellion from 1963 to 1976. 
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This fragmented and politically risky character of the Omani public and semi-
public spheres shaped how, and in what venues Omanis were able to circulate and 
evaluate competing framings of the Gonu spectacle.  Drawing from interviews and 
archival research of this cultural production, I have found that, although Omanis were 
understandably cautious with how, and in which venues they politicized Gonu, there was 
considerable dissent, and even attempts to make this dissent in public forums.  In the 
analysis that follows, I document simultaneous ways in which public suspicion about the 
meaning of Gonu formed into two different political framings against which the Omani 
state had to respond.  The first construed Gonu as a technical, predictable problem to be 
managed, calling into question who was responsible for such management (some 
combination of administration and private initiatives), and whether they had failed or 
succeeded in this case.  The second construed Gonu as a surprising event for which no 
one could be held responsible.  Here, the question is not of responsibility, but of what the 
destruction revealed about the true character of the nation.  In both cases, the legitimacy 
of the Sultan’s regime was brought under public scrutiny to such an extent that the 
regime actively intervened, joining in the framing contest. 
 
Gonu as a Technical Challenge for Government 
The official and private media coverage of Gonu’s impact, as well as the 
subsequent books and magazines that attempted to provide official histories of the events, 
predominately render the event as a cause for celebration.  In this version, the event was 
construed as a technical problem, involving flooded homes and streets, destroyed bridges, 
and a quick and successful response from both state agencies and Omani volunteers. In 
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this sense, Gonu was being framed as a large-scale accident that was being properly 
addressed by rational organization and technology—signaling the success of Oman’s 
recent decades of development. 
Critics similarly portrayed Gonu as a technical problem, but offered a different 
conclusion.  The images of destruction circulated in the media contained a common 
visual language of Oman’s modern achievements being destroyed.  This included photos 
and videos of people standing amongst shattered costal highways, modern shopping 
centers under water, piles of hundreds of buried and over-turned luxury cars, videos of 
Omanis trapped in their SUVs, stranded in gushing torrents as onlookers helplessly 
watched from the water’s edge.  Perhaps the most famous image of the event is that of the 
flood waters engulfing the well-known McDonalds in the posh neighborhood of Qurum, 
with the water lapping at the feat of the golden arches symbol.18  Conspicuously absent 
were images of destroyed labor camps where migrant south-Asian workers lived, and of 
washed-out rural and agricultural areas outside of the capital.19  This visual pattern both 
represented and circulated a very specific preoccupation in the storm’s destruction, as it 
focused on the markers of Oman’s modern prosperity.  It was as if the fruits of Omani 
development were being washed away. 
Critics concluded from these images that Gonu showed that Oman was being 
governed by an incompetent or corrupt managerial class, unable or uninterested in 
 
18 In my fieldwork in 2014-2016, people regularly mentioned the destruction of this specific McDonalds to 
indicate the extent of the flooding after Gonu. 
19 Images of this destruction on the periphery of Muscat was later used in a journalistic expose of the 
government’s neglect of the coastal town of Qurayyat. 
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ensuring public health and safety for all Omanis.  Some newspapers published accounts 
that fed this image of government failure, despite their practices of self-censorship.20  For 
example, a news was entitled, “The streets of Qurayyat cry out since the climatic event 
(anwa) of June 2007.”21 The article showed that one of the hardest hit coastal towns 
outside of the capital still had not had its infrastructure repaired several months after the 
storm, long after the recovery period was officially declared over.  The language of the 
article was dramatic, showcasing how people outside of the capital had been abandoned.  
It states that the streets and the people of Qurayyat were still “crying out” several months 
after the storm.  The word for “crying” here, tastaghaith, is politically charged in Omani 
discourse, as it is used for describing pleas from the most desperate.  For example, 
Omanis would use the term to describe the “crying” of Palestinians living under Israeli 
occupation, and that of the Syrian people in 2011.22  The article was eventually removed 
from circulation and the paper’s publically available archives.  But one reader took 
screenshots of it and circulated them on a popular Omani discussion forum.23   
This narrative of Gonu as an episode of managerial failure was also documented 
by an oral history project that was conducted by the Omani Research Center at Sultan 
 
20 Interview with Author, May 6, 2016. 
21 The meaning of anwa and how to translate it is contested, as I describe in a subsequent section below. 
22 I am thankful to an anonymous Omani for highlighting the political significance of this word choice.  
Author’s Field notes, July 7, 2016.  For an example of Omanis using “tastaghaith” to describe Syrians in 
2011, see “Oman Youth Campaign for Syria Relief [Levant Cries Out [tastaghaith],” Sabla ‘uman, 2011, 
http://avb.s-oman.net/archive/index.php/t-1566415.html.  
23 Discussion of the article, as well as a screen-shot of it, can be viewed at this Omani discussion forum: 
“shoar’ qurayyat tastaghaith [The Streets of Qurayyat Cry Out],” Sabla ‘man, October 5, 2007, 
http://avb.s-oman.net/showthread.php?t=1145845.   
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Qaboos University.  For this project, Omani university students went to the areas affected 
by the cyclone and collected approximately fifty interviews.  Conducted two months after 
the storm, they provide a window into how Omanis were reflecting upon the storm with 
the hindsight of the aid and recovery efforts.  These transcripts went uncensored by the 
Omani Ministry of Information, likely because they were archived and never published.  
While several of the transcripts show a reluctance on behalf of the interviewee to be 
candid with the researchers, they nevertheless express views that trespass the boundaries 
of public speech.    
The transcripts reveal that Omanis were divided and often ambivalent on the 
performance of the state emergency institutions, as well as of others who participated in 
the early warning, relief, and recovery efforts.  While many Omanis expressed gratitude 
and pride in their descriptions of the government’s response to the disaster, many Omanis 
also resented the police, military, and weathermen for not doing enough, especially in 
regards to warning those living inland.  “Do you know who did not do their job well?  
The police… [they] evacuated some areas and left the others.  The police did not do their 
job.”24  The Omani meteorologists were also blamed by those living inland who lost their 
homes.  While the police drove around to warn people in coastal villages about the 
incoming storm, and the Omani meteorologists did the same on TV, they appear to have 
neglected to tell those who lived in flashflood areas away from the coast: “When [the 
weathermen on TV] told us it [Gonu] is coming, they didn’t tell us that it’s coming from 
 
24 Zakyia al Battshi, “a07dag001,” Interview by Asma al Baluchi, Gonu Oral History Project, Omani 
Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and Tyler 
Schuenemann. 
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this side [inland], they said it’s coming from the sea, from the coast… and the people 
from the coast were actually brought here [inland] to stay with us.”25  Another Omani 
expressed his frustration with the same problem: “…Everyone was warning us about the 
sea.  The police, the municipality, all warning about the sea.  They didn’t warn us about 
the land at all.  Those people living inland were abandoned [labar] completely.26  The 
warning was all about the sea, and those by the sea weren’t hit at all.”27  As the rain 
turned their inland streets into torrents, many of these Omanis lost their homes; others 
were swept to their death.    
What may have been the meteorologists’ failure to take Oman’s geography and 
geology into consideration in the early-warning plans resulted in a misunderstanding of 
the event as merely oceanic in nature.28  It was the rain and the torrents it made that killed 
people in low-laying areas, not the waves.  Despite claims by officials within the Omani 
 
25 Maryum al Wahibi, “a05haj002,” Interview by Mazin al Baluchi, Gonu Oral History Project, Omani 
Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and Tyler 
Schuenemann. 
26 According to my Omani translator, the word choice here denotes a sense of being abandoned, as the word 
used to modify being left, is labar.  This is a word specific to the local dialect within this part of Oman.  
Likely recognizing the term’s obscurity, the Omani who had originally transcribed this interview 
included in their notes the better-known Arabic word, bil mara, from which this local term is derived.   
27 Ali al Wahaibi, “a05mur002,F`” Interview by Mazin al Baluchi, Gonu Oral History Project, Omani 
Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and Tyler 
Schuenemann. 
28 Subsequent studies of flash-flooding in Oman have noted that the country has a kind of rocky terrain that 
is less porous than found in most other countries.  This makes the land more vulnerable to flash flooding 
after rainfall.  For example, see Ghazi Ali Abdullah al-Rawas, “Flash Flood Modelling in Oman Wadis,” 
PhD Diss. University of Calgary, 2009.  Flooded streets are a common sight after a small amount of rain, 
and often become a space for play as Omanis watch the rushing water, or try to ford it with their 4X4s.  
The darker side of this trend is that many people are swept to their deaths when they play in the rushing 
water, or get caught in the very thin and deep canyons that in dry weather are immaculate hiking paths, 
but quickly fill up with rushing water killing entire hiking parties at once.  Hence, in the name of 
promoting public health, state authorities have begun to regularly remind people to avoid wadis after 
rainfall.     
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meteorological authority that they did warn people of flashfloods through the TV and 
radio stations, that the problem was that people did not listen,29 many victims of Gonu 
saw their plight as evidence of failure or neglect of their government.   
The death count of the storm was another subject of criticism.  To this day, 
Omanis do not know how many died from Gonu because the official death count was 
frozen at 49 two weeks after the storm.  No other official numbers have been made 
public, but it is regularly regarded as a fraction of the real toll.30  A cable from the US 
Embassy shows that their own investigations through contacts with the Royal Omani 
Police and the hospital morgues put the number at several hundred.  This number 
includes many south Asian construction workers—a particularly vulnerable group of 
people due to their camp-like housing quarters, and whose plight received minimal 
coverage in both the national media and the oral history project.31  As a consequence of 
this government propaganda, Omani citizens are left to speculate about both the human 
cost of the destruction and the government’s motivation for suppressing it.  In her 
interview with the oral history project, a university student from an area hit hard by the 
cyclone expressed her frustration and confusion over the official death count: 
There was one Indian man who came and told us, he said: “30 people us [sic] 
die.” And we said 30?! What do you mean 30, while they are saying 49 died in 
the entire country?  And in one [construction] company, you’re saying 30 people 
 
29 Interview with the Author, July 25, 2016.  
30 Valeri reports an official count of, “around 80 people… [dead] or missing at the end of 2007,” but notes 
that an Omani official privately reported to him 200 casualties, and that expatriate contractors regularly 
spoke of 500.  See Valeri, Oman, 126. 
31 For the US Embassy’s numbers, see Embassy Muscat, “Oman Three Weeks after Gonu,” Wikileaks 
Cable: 07Muscat654_a, dated June 27, 2007. 
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died?  I don’t know why they are being so secretive about it.  But maybe it’s 
politics, and we don’t want to interfere there.32  
 
Note how she attributes the official, deflated number to “politics,” an arena in which she 
should not interfere.  The act of censoring the death count thus teaches Omani citizens 
that it is not for them to know, or publically discuss, the extent of the damage and death 
incurred by the storm, or the extent to which they might be in danger from future storms.  
This censorship thus prompts critical responses from the citizens when the Omani state 
attempts to construct the disaster as a manageable natural hazard, as it is never made clear 
to what extent the state actually managed Cyclone Gonu successfully. 
The repeated complaints in the oral history interviews demonstrate that 
underneath the optimistic pomp in the uncensored media, there existed alternative, 
critical interpretations of how various authorities responded to the storm.  Other 
individuals interviewed blamed the government for allowing residents to live in flood 
areas in the first place, and for not maintaining public infrastructure.  For example, they 
blamed the Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Municipalities for allowing people to 
build in hazardous areas, and for allowing the dam near their settlement to become 
clogged with debris.33    
Whether in terms of the early warning, the inequality of recovery efforts, poor 
urban planning, and a lack of infrastructure maintenance, Omani civilians took the notion 
that Gonu was a technical problem for which the government was responsible for 
 
32 Zakyia al Battshi, “a07dag001,” Interview by Asma al Baluchi, Gonu Oral History Project, Omani 
Studies Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and Tyler 
Schuenemann. 
33 I am withholding the source and direct quote of this complaint because the interviewee had asked the oral 
historians not to record it.   
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managing, and spun a narrative of failed governance.  In that sense, the destruction of 
Gonu was not just a humanitarian problem, but the sign of a larger crisis of authority.  
And this critique lived on to animate subsequent anti-government indignation.  For 
example, the post-Gonu neglect of Qurayyat would re-emerge in four years as the focus 
of local protests during the nation-wide protests during the so-called Arab Spring.  
Speaking on behalf of the victims of Gonu, protestors called for municipal reform and an 
improvement to health and education facilities.34 The image of the government as 
incompetent or corrupt managers would also be utilized in the aftermath of subsequent 
storms of smaller impact.  For example, during my fieldwork in 2015, flash floods and a 
near-miss with a cyclone generated a great deal of official and social media coverage of 
the storm’s approach and impact.  One image that gained high circulation on Omani 
social media in 2015 during a flash flood was a juxtaposition of two photos of the same 
street, one flooded with bluish water, the other with brown. The caption sarcastically 
remarked upon the progress that the photos demonstrate, “Two pictures of Muscat in 
1997 and 2015.  Thank God for the different color of water.”  A pro-regime account, 
“Callings for Sultan Qaboos,” rebutted: “Calm yourself sir.  Our Oman was all dust, and 




34 Joseph Benny, “Qurayyat Stir Ends on Peaceful Note,” Muscat Daily, March 14, 2011, 
http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Stories-Files/Quriyat-stir-ends-on-a-peaceful-
note/%28language%29/eng-GB. 
35 alfarsi_salim, Callings for Sultan Qaboos, September 6, 2015, Tweet. 
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Gonu as a Warning from God 
In addition to conceiving of Gonu as a predictable feature of nature, which human 
organization and technology could overcome or fumble, another framing of Gonu was 
prominent in Omani discourse.  In this version, Gonu was a surprising, unmanageable 
event.  Like the technocratic framing, official and dissident commentators utilized this 
version of Gonu to protect or attack the status-quo.  
On June 4th, immediately after the Omani government first warned the public of 
the on-coming storm, some Omanis began authoring a political narrative of the storm in 
online forums.  One pattern in these posts was a theological interpretation of the storm, 
and to call for a national movement of Islamic piety.36  On June 4th, one author wrote 
about how a hurricane (‘aSar), like drought, and earthquakes, is God’s punishment for 
nations (al‘umam) that are un-Islamic, indulging in luxury (al tarafu) and lawlessness 
(fawdaa).  The post received an out-pouring of positive responses from others.  Many of 
these responses consisted of stating agreement on the thread, asking God for forgiveness, 
and posting prayers on the forum itself.  Others added their own specific gripes against 
the Omani government and society according to their interpretation of Islam.  One author 
 
36 The quick articulation of such a response might be due to the fact that the topic of Oman’s ecological 
destruction was still fresh in the public debate.  In the preceding month, wide-spread rumors circulated 
that described a Pentecostal man named Raju George who reported to his church community, local 
business owners, and the police that he had a religious vision that warned that the posh Muscat 
neighborhood of Qurum would be flooded on May 7th of 2007.  Although his vision was supposedly 
about a tsunami predicted to hit on that specific day, the story was later re-cast by some as an accurate 
prediction of Cyclone Gonu, a re-interpretation that was mocked by others.  Author’s Field Notes, 
7/25/16.  The rumors are also discussed in online forums and discussion threads.  For example, 
“alkhayimat altawthiqiat li'ahwal altaqs marjie likuli ma yakhusu altaqs wayashmal tawarikh alhalat 
aljawiyat alty marat biha alsaltanat w dual alkhalij,” Sabla ‘man, June 6, 2009, 
http://www.omanya.net/vb/showthread.php?t=45402&page=12.  For the mockery of applying his 
prediction retrospectively to Gonu see, “mo qal alsaahir alhindiu ean junu ......khabir 
eajl!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” Sabla ‘man, June 5, 2007, http://www.s-oman.net/avb/showthread.php?t=42697. 
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cites practices of adultery, sodomy, and usury (riba), the consumption of alcohol, the 
government’s annual festivals, which had previously been boycotted by Islamic activists, 
and the government encouraging tourists to “strip naked on our shores and in our 
markets.”  Others saw Gonu as a warning for the accumulation of sin in Oman, rather 
than strictly a punishment.  But the prescription was the same: restrict international 
influence on local culture.  Meanwhile, one should repent, change their behavior, and 
encourage others, one’s “brothers and sisters,” to do the same.37 
The Omani Grand Mufti himself, Ahmed bin Hamad al Khalili, amplified this 
theme in public and semi-public forums.  Appointed by the Sultan to be the official 
representative of Islamic thought in Oman, al Khalili is normally a religious cheerleader 
for the regime’s policies, advocating a moderate, non-sectarian version of Islam.  
However, eleven days after Gonu, the Mufti appeared on state television where he 
answered questions about how Muslims should respond to the storm.  In his response, he 
delivered an Islamic criticism of the status quo.  He drew an analogy between Gonu and 
stories in the Quran, wherein God destroys the villages of sinners.  His message was that 
the storm was God’s punishment for Oman.38  This was in stark contrast to the normally 
positive, apolitical public discourse in Oman, which emphasizes national unity and 
avoids commentary on the regime. Al Khalili is reported to have also given a remarkable 
sermon that contributors to Omani internet forums entitled, “Alarm Bell,” (jaras 
 
37 For example, see “nasihat eajilat hawl al'iiesar almurtaqab (samam aman ya aihbh),” Sabla ‘man, June 
04, 2007, http://s-oman.net/avb/showthread.php?t=42427. 
38 See “‘aSar Gonu – alshaykh 'ahmad alkhalili - laylat 3 jamadaa al ththania 1428,” Youtube, originally 
aired June 17, 2007, posted online May 14, 2011, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=188&v=TGv-MzT0tNg. 
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al’jindhar). Here, he is reported to have cried while describing with great emotion his 
worry for the country.  The authors on the forum quote him as telling an unusual story: a 
younger Omani confides to him a dream of being abducted by “a grey space ship that was 
being driven by two green men.”  The aliens warned him that the wrath of God is 
approaching due to the sins of the people: fornication, homosexuality, places of alcohol, 
usury, and not listening the parents.  The Mufti interprets the man’s story in retrospect as 
a prophecy of Gonu, insisting that the aliens were really angels, warning Oman about the 
cyclone as an impending punishment for these “mother of all sins,” going on to reference 
AIDS as a similar expression of God’s wrath.39   
The Mufti later published a collection of his essays, written during this time 
period, in which a theological treatise appears, addressing the subject of natural disasters 
and the hubris of modernization.  Not mentioning Gonu specifically, he avoids the 
scandal of direct criticism in this more public venue.  But since he is writing in the 
months after Gonu, it would have been obvious to his Omani audience that he was 
commenting on Gonu.  After providing a long list of quotes from the Quran illustrating 
the role of God in laying waste to villages of sinners, he closes this essay by highlighting 
the folly of humans who try to conquer their fate through their own powers: the building 
of the Titanic, the “unsinkable ship,” was an affront to God, and its sinking was a sermon 
onto the world.40 That Gonu may be a similar sermon would not be lost on his audience. 
 
39 On account of the alien story, Omani commentators on internet forums expressed doubt over the veracity 
of this sermon.  In response, purported excerpts later appeared online, from which I am drawing.  For 
these excerpts, see “samahat alshaykh 'ahmad bin hamd alkhalili fi sharit ‘jrs al'iindhar’ yahdhar min 
rawya,” Sabla ‘man, June 13, 2010,  http://www.s-oman.net/avb/showthread.php?t=787058. 
40 Samaha Sheikh Ahmed bin Hamad al Khalili, al ‘qal, (Muscat, OM: University of Sultan Qaboos, 2008). 
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Other features of the Mufti’s political subtext would also be apparent to an Omani 
audience.  First, in Omani culture, several of the specific “sins” mentioned by the Mufti 
and these online Islamic commentators are clearly associated with the regime.  The 
understanding is that the oil-boom that marked the beginning of the Sultan’s rule caused 
an influx of non-Muslims into the country in search of work, and later, tourism.  This 
transformation created a market for Western resorts that serve alcohol and host 
prostitution.  This purportedly “foreign” sin is then on-hand to tempt Omanis themselves 
away from their pious lives.41  Here, the Mufti is providing a reactionary narrative, 
rendering things like alcohol consumption as foreign, playing upon an undercurrent of 
resentment toward the economic successes of “expats.”42   
Regarding the fear of homosexuality in Oman, it is commonly speculated in 
private, an “open secret” by some accounts, that the Sultan has sexual relationships with 
other men.  Second, as detailed in Chapter Three, the discourse through which the Sultan 
commands loyalty is premised upon the economic development that coincided with his 
regime, and the new sense of prosperity that Omanis enjoy in contrast to their previously 
impoverished subsistence living.  By invoking the story of the hubris behind building the 
Titanic, and its eventual failure, the Mufti is making an analogy: the current prosperity of 
 
41 A noteworthy omission in this conservative account of public vice as both new and foreign is that 
Qaboos’ regime actually oversaw a conservative movement of Omani society towards Islamic piety.  
Among the many local traditions that this movement expunged was the production and consumption of 
date wine.  For a more sustained discussion of contemporary piety in Oman, see Mandana Limbert, In the 
Time of Oil: Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010). 
42 The political charge of this resentment would be made more apparent years later, as it shaped some of the 
activism within the later Arab Spring protests, most notably arson against a large, Indian-owned 
supermarket in Sohar. 
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Oman may be a fleeting triumph before a larger catastrophe, and Gonu is God’s warning 
to turn back.  Unlike the West’s neglect of the sermon of the Titanic, it is not too late for 
Omanis to heed the call.   
In these ways, the Omani commentators and the Grand Mufti himself are 
trafficking in politically charged frames that question the fruits of the regime’s rule, and 
its potential folly as hubris in the face of God.  To be clear, none of them appear to be 
decrying all of the modern trappings associated with the Sultan’s rule.  They are 
concerned with the ways in which the Sultan’s rule has created violations of Islamic 
teachings. The Mufti’s sermon and writings are what American readers might recognize 
as a “dog-whistle,” implicating the Sultan’s renaissance, and the collusion of everyday 
Omanis, as a cause of Gonu without explicitly saying so.  In that way, these 
commentators are rendering Gonu as a crisis of collective morality, one that demands a 
return to Islamic values in the individual, the family, society, and in government policy. 
Compared to the technocratic reading of the storm, this Islamic critique is more 
radical.  The impetus to “recover” to protect life and property is rendered as being beside 
the point, so long as it does not address these collective sins.  That is, while the technical 
rendering of the disaster places value in returning to the status quo, albeit with better 
technocrats in charge, the Islamic criticism renders the pre-Gonu society as being at the 
root of the problem.  In this version, Gonu demands a more radical social and political 
transformation that imbues Omani laws, economic activity, and personal life with Islamic 
practices. 
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Gonu as an Un-planned Spectacle of State Power and National Solidarity 
In contrast to the public skepticism, disenchantment, and criticism of the regime 
after Gonu, various branches of the Omani government responded to the spectacle of 
Gonu’s destruction by asserting their own narrative in public venues, often in response to 
the criticism.  These venues included the state-owned media, internet forums, and 
statements from the Sultan himself.  State-sponsored publications spoke of a “national 
epic” (malhma watania). Like the Islamic critique, the national epic circumvents framing 
the disaster as a technical problem to be overcome.  Instead of discussing the storm as a 
feature of the climatic system to be predicted and mitigated by scientists and state 
agencies, Gonu is a surprising, extraordinary moment in which the entire nation rises to 
action and realizes its true character, hence the title of one official account of the event: 
“Gonu: Extraordinary Anwa’ [roughly, “Climatic Event”]… And Extraordinary 
People.”43 Unlike the Islamic critique, the diagnosis praises the status-quo: Gonu was a 
trial that God brought to the nation for it to prove itself, and learn lessons of hardship, 
hard work, and solidarity.  Rather than divine justice for a sinful nation, Gonu was divine 
pedagogy.  Rather than search for who or what is to blame for the destruction, the 
difficulties are simply to be endured collectively as a lesson.  The Sultan put forward this 
epic framework in his national address three weeks after Gonu.  According to him, the 
event (anwa’),  
…proved, and thanks to God, the strength of this country.  This abnormal time 
proved the power of the nation, and the solidarity and unity of its brothers, and 
their interdependence… Oh loyal citizens, we stand today proud and appreciating 
 
43 My translation of “anwa’,” as “climatic event” is problematic because the term has no set usage or 
meaning in this context.  I address this later in the paper.  The cited title is from Ahmed bin Khames al 
Balushi, Gonu: Anwa’ Istithna’iya… wa Sha’b Istithna’iya, (Muscat, OM: Bank Muscat, Association for 
Vision in Journalism and Publishing, 2007). 
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the loyal efforts serving the proud, brave nation dedicated to helping and 
supporting… May God protect our country, and may God’s grace last for Oman 
and for the rest of the countries in the world…”44 
 
This national epic emphasizes the surprising, uncontrollable, theological character of the 
event.  The solution it calls for is not a turn toward piety and religious leadership, as 
called for by the Mufti and his cohort.  Instead, it requires patriotism, the leadership of 
police and military, popular participation in volunteering projects, and an overall 
appreciation and patience for the will of God in these hard times.   
 The Sultan later elaborated upon this narrative in a subsequent interview in a 
popular Kuwaiti newspaper.  Explaining why he supposedly rejected foreign aid after the 
disaster, he explained, 
We also wanted to test our strength in the face of such a disaster, our 
people were subjected to such a test and I tell you that we succeeded. Such 
a test has [woken the] people and the Omani nation whom… stood united 
as one and capable of discharging their duty. Unfortunately, there are 
some people who [interpreted] this disaster as God's punishment.  Such 
people are [misinterpreting] Sharia... Let us take this issue as a warning 
from God so that people would understand that life is not always without 
hardships, and therefore, they should be prepared for all that is ordained 
on them and this is natural. We should always say, Thanks [to] God for 
what he has ordained and for his kindness. Such natural disasters in other 
countries are common… What happened to us may happen once or twice, 
we consider it [exceptional] if we [are] compared with others who are 
experiencing disasters annually or repeatedly. With a high level of 
national cooperation and sentiments we were able to face this disaster, and 
I was extremely delighted for the Omani people's cooperation with which 
we were able to overcome such a cyclone with believing hearts free from 
any panic, fear or chaos.45 
 
44 I am thankful to Dola alGady Dee for her help with translating this video.  Qaboos bin Said, “Words of 
His Majesty after al-anwa’ al-munākhia 2007,” Youtube, posted October 31, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XsbDOyXGU8Q. 
45 The interview was originally published on a now defunct website of Oman Tribune.  Segments from the 
interview are still available at “India Booms, Inflation Rages,” Muscat Confidential (blog), April 30, 
2008, http://muscatconfidential.blogspot.com/2008/04/.  
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What is striking about this account is not just that he acknowledges his Islamic critics in 
public, but that he pushes against the idea that people can be protected against such 
storms in the first place.  In other words, one might conclude from the triumphant 
language around Omani development that is normally associated with the Sultan’s regime 
that such a storm is one more element of nature to be controlled under his leadership.  But 
the Sultan is rejecting this contextualization of the storm within Oman’s official narrative 
of progress.  According to him, the fruits of Omani development do not mean that the 
state can provide life without hardship.46  In his version, such storms are a natural part of 
earthly existence, and if God has a message for Omanis, it is that life can be difficult at 
times, calling upon “us” to be strong and unified in caring for one another.  In short, 
Gonu is not a crisis that signals a need for some broader transformation.  It is an 
affirmation of the status-quo, and a call to being better citizens within it. 
State-owned and private media, along with everyday citizens, reproduced this 
nationalist sentiment in public.  There was a great deal of spontaneous organization of 
thousands volunteers, in some cases led by state agencies, in others by para-state 
charities.  In areas hardest hit, initially it was just families and neighborhoods helping 
each other.  Many state representatives, journalists, and every-day people framed stories 
and images of these recovery efforts as embodiments of national solidarity and strength—
demonstrations of the true Omani character, of “honor.”  They saw the spontaneous 
 
46 Here, he echoes other liberal thinkers who, in the face of the “intractable regularities” of nature and 
human populations, advocate for using state power not to set the world according to the whims of human 
beings, but to understand the regularities and live in accordance with the nature of things.  See Bruce 
Curtis, “Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery,” 529. The Canadian 
Journal of Sociology, 27, no. 4 (2002): 505-533. 
 205   
aggregation of strangers helping one another as an embodiment of Oman's national 
strength. 
Consider the following exchange between an Omani oral historian and a victim of 
the cyclone.  He describes the arrival of Omani volunteers to his town in terms of 
national brotherhood, overcoming local and tribal identities, noting that help came from 
as far away as the Dhofar region—a ten-hour drive, and notably, the former hub of the 
separatist movement in the 1960s and 70s. 
Ma shallah, in Oman there are some manly men of pride (rijāl ghaira wa 
ḥamoa).47 You wouldn’t say that this man [volunteer] is from Badia and this one 
is from Imra, they all stood together as one hand. 
[Interviewer]: One nation? 
Yes, yes, yes. 
[Interviewer]: How was the help from different people? 
 
The help we received came from Ibra, Badia, Ja’lan, Kamil, and Wafi, so the cars 
were abundant.  Some cars were coming from Salalah [Dhofar].  They performed 
their duties and stood a manly stance, even the old men, they would come in cars 
and stop and say, “Come, take everything, it’s all for you.”  And most people 
would want to drink water.  Thank god, Oman has men, men with honor and 
blood, ma shallah.  We didn’t say this originally, we used to say, “No one loves 
the other,” but now we say that we are one people, (sh’ab wāḥid), one nation, 
(‘uma wāḥida).48 
 
Consider also the various responses to the Sultan’s decision to order the Omani border 
guards to turn away caravans of volunteers and supplies coming in from the UAE and 
 
47 According to my Omani translator, this is the same phrase used to describe those men who perform 
honor killings, as an act of pride. 
48 Juma al-Araimi, “a02sur003,” Interviewed by Ali al-Riymai, Gonu Oral History Project, Omani Studies 
Center, Sultan Qaboos University, August, 2007; translation by Noora al-Balushi and Tyler 
Schuenemann.   
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other countries.49  To some, this decision was a mistake because Gonu was an 
emergency, requiring an immediate response from any who could contribute, including 
foreign countries.  To others, it was an act of national leadership, giving Oman the chance 
to demonstrate that its citizens and its state institutions could work together and recover 
without the help of foreign aid.  For this reason, several Omanis that I spoke with were 
shocked, felt “betrayed,” when I told them of leaked US Embassy cables that discuss the 
Omani government secretly accepting financial aid from other Gulf countries after 
Gonu.50 When I asked why they felt betrayed, they referenced the pomp in the media and 
the Sultan’s speeches regarding Oman’s self-sufficiency in the recovery effort.  Here is 
how one Omani put it to me:  
I feel betrayed to hear that they [the Omani government] took [foreign] money, 
because they made a big show of it [rejecting aid], and there’s all this anti-Emeriti 
sentiment, the [rumors of a] secrete [Emirati intelligence] cell [in Oman].  It 
would be really annoying that they [the Omani government] played on that.51   
 
 
49 This story was told to me by many Omanis I spoke with.  It also appears repeatedly in the transcripts of 
the oral history project.  For example, “His majesty knew that we did not need to except any help from 
outside because he knew that Omanis are honorable.”  See Ibid.  This rejection of foreign aid is 
consistently talked about as evidence of Omani strength and independence from foreign influence.  
50 The Wikileaks cables from the US Embassy describe that the Omani government did initially reject all 
forms of foreign aid, but eventually opened up venues for individual donations in public, and later 
accepted money from other Gulf states in secret.  They also show that the Omani government was 
steadfast in its refusal to accept money from the US and British governments after the storm.  Embassy 
Muscat, “Oman Issues Cyclone Recovery Directives, Quietly Accepts Funds from GCC States,” 
Wikileaks Cable: 07Muscat596_a, June 12, 2007, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07MUSCAT596_a.html. 
51 Interview with Author, June 15, 2016.  The anti-Emirati sentiment is likely in reference to Omani 
suspicions that members of the ruling family in Abu Dhabi wish to absorb Oman into the UAE.  See 
Peter Salisbury, “Insulting the Sultan in Oman,” Foreign Policy Magazine, October 19, 2012, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/19/insulting-the-sultan-in-oman/; and  Joel Schectman and 
Christopher Bing, “UAE Used Cyber Super-Weapon to Spy on Iphones of Foes,” Reuters, January 20, 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spying-karma/. 
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The story of Omanis able to support each other after such great destruction gave them 
pride, and the story of the secret foreign aid left them feeling manipulated.   
Another notable feature of this attempt to narrate Gonu as a national epic was a 
conceptual innovation.  With the help of the Ministry of Information, the Sultan’s post-
Gonu speech introduced a new word into the Omani lexicon.  When the Sultan gave his 
national address after Gonu, he said in Arabic that, “God had it that our fate was to go 
through this al anwa’ al munākhia.”  Then he went on to praise the strength and 
solidarity of the nation in the face of this thing.   
This term, anwa’ al munākhia, was accepted by some as the new, proper way to 
discuss the event, especially in official discourse, but also in some critical media 
coverage.52 Since the speech, anwa’ and anwa’ munākhia’, the latter word modifying 
anwa’ as a “climatic anwa’,” have been used in official Omani sources as synonyms for 
cyclones, especially in media and books about the storms.53 However the Sultan’s new 
term was also met with confusion, criticism, and some mockery by everyday Omanis, and 
these responses tended to fall within the two dissident framings of Gonu discussed above.   
If the national epic was the government’s response to public and semi-public 
dissent after Gonu, then these patterns of response to the term “anwa’” reveal a kind of 
third phase in the framing contest, showing how Omanis critically engaged with the state-
sponsored frames and the narrative of the national epic.  One pattern of response draws 
from the technocratic framing of Gonu.  It renders the Sultan as a bumbling manager who 
 
52 This was the case in the previously discussed news article exposing the “crying out” of a coastal town 
after the “anwa’.” 
53 For example, the aforementioned source that renders Gonu as a “national epic,” is entitled “Gonu: 
Extraordinary Anwa’, Extraordinary People [sha’b].”  See Ahmed bin Khames al Balushi, Gonu. 
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does not know what he is talking about.  In this case, some Omanis claim that the term is 
actually a blooper, where the Sultan mispronounced a similar-sounding meteorological 
term in his speech.  They claim that since he is the Sultan, everyone has to just pretend 
that this is the correct word from here on out, and as a result, it is now part of the lexicon 
of official reporting on cyclones in Oman.54  There is indeed another Arabic word, 
“ajwa’,” which when paired with the same modifier above, “munākhia,” means “climatic 
condition,” and is sometimes used to refer to a weather forecast.  So the Sultan’s sentence 
would have made sense in context by switching out anwa’ for ajwa’.  This was a 
plausible explanation for Omanis unfamiliar with the history of pre-Islamic and Islamic 
astrology in which “anwa’” does appear, which is of course most people.  The context of 
the well-known legal and social sanctions against any criticism of the Sultan, only 
reinforced the plausibility of this interpretation.55 
A more commonly reported explanation is that the term was deliberately 
innovated by the Sultan.  There are various explanations for why he would do so.  One 
version has the Sultan trying to put a positive spin on things.  This explanation seemed 
plausible to some Omanis because it would not be the first time that such top-down 
linguistic engineering occurred.  In Oman, there are both top-down and more diffused 
social pressures to keep public conversation optimistic and polite.  Regarding the top-
down, there are precedents where, for example, the Sultan insisted on not calling people 
without jobs “unemployed,” but instead, “job seekers” in order to make them feel 
 
54 I was told this explanation in person.  Versions of it also appeared in popular online discussion forums 
around the time of the Sultan’s speech. 
55 For example, see Human Rights Watch, “Oman: Prison for Online Critics,” Human Rights Watch, 
February 21, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/21/oman-prison-online-critics. 
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empowered to eventually “have something,” to not be “in stasis” or “dead.”  This 
example was cited by Omanis trying to explain the emergence of anwa’ as another 
instance of the Sultan’s belief in the power of positive thinking.56  
However there are reasons to doubt that this innovation was due to pressures for 
optimistic language.  When I asked Omanis about the meaning of anwa’, many did not 
know the word to begin with.  Those who did, on account of their memories of cyclone 
Gonu, did not see any positive or optimistic connotations with it.  To them, it was a word 
that is alien to their lexicon, something formal or old, being imposed on them from 
above.  Indeed, it was. 
Hence another explanation that Omanis give for the innovation is that the 
government needed to create a new word for a new problem.  The public discourse 
around Gonu repeatedly stated that the storm was the first of its kind to hit Oman, and 
thus, as a new phenomenon it required a new name.  Some Omanis were annoyed with 
this innovation, making comparisons with other, equally strange instances when the 
Sultan tried to manage the public lexicon, like the “job seekers” example above, or his 
proclamation that tribal names now need to be gender specific for the sake of cohering 
with what many Omanis consider to be overly formal grammatical rules in high-Arabic.57  
Some responded with mockery and hostility to this innovation.  Jokes circulated about 
 
56 For example, when answering someone’s question in an online discussion forum as to the meaning of 
anwa’, one Omani stated that it is an official term used to replace “cyclone,” i’ṣār, because “cyclone” can 
stoke panic.  Faris al-Hijaz, “mutāb’a ākhar mustajidāt al-ṭuqs fi baḥr al-‘arab wa al-sulṭana lil mūsum al-
‘awal li’ām,” Sabla ‘man, May 30, 2011, http://avb.s-oman.net/archive/index.php/t-1158584-p-10.html. 
57 The idea is to have last names follow the same grammar as adjectives that describe feminine objects or 
people.  According to this rule, a woman named Fatma of the Baluchi tribe would need to add an “a” to 
the end of her tribal name, making her “Fatma al Baluchia.”   
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anwa’ on social media, while participants on online forums derided the term as 
redundant.  For example, one writer expressed distain for the government’s attempt to use 
a word other than “cyclone” (i’ṣār), “It’s i’ṣār [not anwa’]… i’ṣār.  This is the word [for 
cyclone] whether the government likes it or not.”58   
Other Omanis believed that using the term was part of the Sultan’s overt attempt 
to use his authority to squash the politicized, Islamic rendering of Gonu.  Indeed, as 
quoted earlier, the Sultan used an interview with a Kuwaiti journalist to publically 
denounce such thinkers, but without naming names.  Islamic critics responded with 
theological citations to challenge the Sultan in internet forums.  One participant raised the 
possibility that calling the event “anwa’” makes one an infidel because it is associated 
with paganism in Islamic teaching.  In a condescending tone, he states,  
Of course, some support the use of the word [anwa’] because it is from the 
government.  Supporting and not rejecting it is required… As for those who 
refuse the word, [they do so because of] the fear of God, and the fear of being an 
infidel due to this word, since the messenger of God hated/disliked (krāhu) 
rainmaking (al istamṭār) from anwa’.59  
 
He goes on to quote a Hadith as proof: the Prophet Mohammad wakes in the morning 
after “an impact in the sky.”  The Prophet then says,  
I woke up and there were believers and infidels.  The believers were those who 
attributed our rain to the favor and grace of God, and the infidels attributed it to 
the planet (kaowkab).  As for those who say our rain is from nwa’ [the plural of 
anwa’] they are infidels believing in the planet (kaowkab) [as opposed to God].60   
 
 
58 ‘az al-Arab, “al-anwa’ al-munākhia: kalima t’udy ily al-kafar bil allah fa hdhar.” Sabla ‘man, November 
2, 2007, http://www.s-oman.net/avb/archive/index.php/t-97406.html. 
59 Sheikh Abdul Rahman Asheim, “ẓaharat kalima al-anwa’ wa ‘aṣbaḥat hadha al-kalima ḥadeth al-sā’a,” al 
irshad, Febrary 12, 2010, http://al-ershaad.net/vb4/showthread.php?t=1002.  
60 Ibid. 
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In response to this post, a Sheikh from the government’s Office of Guidance and 
Preaching intervened, posting a response on the forum to give textual credence to the 
Sultan’s use of the term anwa’.  He argued that using the word itself does not make one 
an infidel.  According to him, it is the causal story behind weather events that 
distinguishes a believer from an infidel.  The Prophet denounced the use of “anwa’” 
because Arabs at the time believed that anwa’ and the stars had their own spirit, giving 
anwa’ its own separate power or agency to create rain.  This is paganism and un-Islamic.  
Alternatively, monotheism means that God causes anwa’, and then anwa’ causes rain.  
Thus he concludes that it is not un-Islamic to appeal to anwa’ for the sake of explaining 
weather events, so long as the events are put into the proper causal chain where God is 
rendered the initiator of the event. 
 
Conclusion 
These debates over the source and legitimacy of using the term anwa’, as well as 
the earlier wave of political renderings of the emergency, demonstrate that both 
dissidents and officials are responding to Gonu as an unplanned political spectacle whose 
public meaning has political power.  They are treating the state’s authority as if it rides on 
how the emergency is interpreted: what caused it, who is responsible for responding to it, 
and how much safety and support can Omani citizens expect from their government?  As 
officials and the Sultan himself step into the framing contest, their version of events is not 
accepted as a banal description, like a weather report, but as a partisan shot fired in a 
larger cultural battle.   
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Beyond providing rescue, relief, and recovery, state and civilian organizations 
mobilize to give the event a political meaning.  What emerged in this process of meaning-
making is a framing contest to anchor the event to broader political agendas.  Critics 
advocated clearing out corruption and negligence to make a better-functioning 
technocratic state, or clearing out public and private sin to make a more pious, Islamic 
nation-state. Unlike the previously examined cases in the US, the stakes of the battle were 
not necessarily over who will rule, as there was no viable alternative to the Sultan—no 
competing politician, political party, or social movement to seize power of the state.  
Nevertheless, these political entrepreneurs mobilized to try and change how state power 
would be used, and upon what values it would be evaluated.  And like the US, officials 
responded with their own tale of a national epic.  This consisted of an incoherent story 
about the value of an effective technocratic response, the limits of safety in a world of 
cyclones, and the extra-humanitarian value of national solidarity in the face of human 
suffering.  That is, the expert’s ability to predict and conquer, and the layman’s ability to 
face up to such surprising, uncontainable events were ennobled as markers of the national 
character.  




CHAPTER 6:  
CONCLUSION: REVELATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
 
Despite the fact that disasters are usually talked about as special times—
“emergencies,” “crises,” “calamities,” etc., it has nevertheless become a trope of public 
discourse that these events “reveal” or “teach” us something about our “normal times.”  
For example, activists talked about how Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy revealed the pre-
disaster poverty and government neglect.  While some Omani citizens also spoke of 
government neglect, others insisted that Gonu taught them that “we are one people” 
(sh’ab wāḥid); the Sultan spoke of how, “This abnormal time proved the power of the 
nation…”  More recently following the devastation of Hurricane Maria (2017), an 
editorial in the Miami Herald was typical of how people discussed the event.  Entitled, 
“What Hurricane Maria taught me about the people of Puerto Rico,” the editorial is filled 
with laudatory, totalizing statements about “the people of Puerto Rico.”  According to the 
author, the hurricane showed that they are: generous, desperate, dispossessed, kind, 
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industrious, and characteristically sunny.  The article quotes a resident reflecting on the 
hurricane’s aftermath: “No one separates us, in good times or in bad.”1 
Scholars critical of the status-quo have similarly used disasters as ways into 
seeing beyond the destruction.  For example, Margaret Somers treats Katrina as a mirror 
through which we can better see what has become of American citizenship, what she 
calls the rise of “market fundamentalism.”2  Writer Rebecca Solnit treats disasters as 
moments where more authentic human relations are able to emerge because the disaster 
has removed the social and economic structures that normally represses them, if only 
momentarily.  For that reason, she writes that disasters provide an “extraordinary window 
into social desire and possibility, and what is seen there matters elsewhere, in ordinary 
times, and in other extraordinary times.  The desires and possibilities awakened are so 
powerful they shine even from wreckage, carnage and ashes.”3  Tests, windows, 
mirrors—this trope that disasters show us truth demonstrates a commonly held suspicion 
that there is some important reality about political community that is hidden, ignored, or 
 
1 Emphasis in these quotes added.  Patricia Mazzei, “What Hurricane Maria taught me about the people of 
Puerto Rico,” Miami Herald, September 26, 2017, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/weather/hurricane/article175307901.html.   
2 According to this manner of thinking, those who do not produce economic value have become stateless 
people, undeserving of the equal recognition that previous notions of social welfare –citizenship had 
provided, such as those introduced under the New Deal for white people, and expanded upon for racial 
minorities in the Great Society initiative.  Market fundamentalism stripped the urban, African American 
poor of their moral worth, such that tending to the levees, or carefully planning an evacuation was not a 
priority for government agencies, nor was funding such agencies a priority for the administrations which 
oversaw them.  See Margaret Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship.  For an argument in favor of treating 
disasters as natural experiments for social inquiry, see Charles Fritz, “Disaster,” in Contemporary Social 
Problems, Merton RK and Nisbet RA eds., (New York City, NY: Harcourt, 1961), 651-694; as cited in 
Hans M. Louis-Charles, “State Sovereignty and Natural Hazards: A Study of the Legacy of the United 
Kingdom’s Imperial Practices and Disaster Management Activities of Their Island Possessions,” Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of Delaware, 2016, 53. 
3 Rebecca Solnit, A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster, (New 
York City, NY: Penguin Books, 2010), 6. 
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perhaps just unclear during “normal times.”  It follows that as disasters strike, one has to 
look past the immediate spectacle of destruction to see or hear the larger message, the 
greater insight.    
But disasters do not by themselves “reveal” anything, at least not in the sense that 
they uncover social facts that were there all along, waiting to be discovered and inform a 
political agenda.  This dissertation has argued that many of these claims as to the 
revelations of disaster are actually shots being fired in what are ongoing political battles.  
If we wish to understand the kinds of politics that disasters make possible, then we cannot 
assume that the practical problems of suffering and destruction, and therefore the 
institutions of disaster management that would keep us safe, are people’s central 
concern.4  Instead, I have examined public meaning-making around disasters, finding a 
much broader set of concerns and visions for the common good.   
Like the chicken and egg, there is a kind of co-constitutive relationship between 
people’s historical circumstances and how they understand and work to shape their 
membership within a political community.  This dynamic applies to how Americans and 
Omanis make sense out of disasters.  In the context of the US and Oman, new discursive 
frameworks of citizenship and national emergency helped to make disasters political 
spectacles today.  Actors now compete to use these spectacles in their broader agendas to 
change or reproduce the status quo.  I do not mean to suggest that disaster politics in the 
 
4 Urlich Beck makes such an assumption with his risk society thesis.  Urlich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a 
New Modernity, translated by Mark Ritter, (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 49.  I address this thesis 
later in the chapter.  
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US and Oman are identical, but that in spite of their different regime types, they share 
more in common than current scholarship recognizes.5 
Understanding how political contexts shape disaster politics and vise-versa is 
more than just a scholastic inquiry into political and environmental change.  There is a 
great deal at stake in these dynamics for those who worry about the dilemma between, on 
the one hand, the values and institutions of democracy, and on the other hand, the need to 
protect people from these ecological calamities.  For example, several scholars warn of a 
kind of authoritarian drift toward technocracy as we increasingly rely on experts to 
understand and address the political problems that ecological threats pose.  They worry 
that anxieties over our lack of safety will trump other public values, driving us to abdicate 
to a rule of experts.6  
Environmentalists also have a great deal at stake over how societies respond to 
the disasters.  They hope that climate-related disasters can push societies past the cultural 
barriers to environmental reform.  They point out that “climate change” is an abstract 
concept.  It is something that is happening slowly and above our heads.  We cannot see it 
or touch it.  So it is hard to mobilize a political movement in response to it.  As one writer 
points out, unlike the scientific and political campaign to expose and answer the dangers 
of smoking tobacco, environmentalists have a harder time connecting the dangers of 
 
5 Some scholars attribute the form of disasters politics to regime characteristics.  For examples, see Sorace, 
Shaken Authority, 40-41; and Platt, Disasters and Democracy. 
6 Hewitt, “The idea of Calamity in a Technocratic Age,” 3-32; for an updated version of this argument in 
light of the subsequent rise of neoliberalism, see Alex de Waal, “An Imperfect Storm: Narratives of 
Calamity in a Liberal-Technocratic Age,” Social Science Research Council, June 11, 2006, 
https://items.ssrc.org/understanding-katrina/an-imperfect-storm-narratives-of-calamity-in-a-liberal-
technocratic-age/. 
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climate change to personal experience.  Many of its victims are harder to identify, and its 
effects less direct and immediate.  The slow boil of rising temperatures is less personal 
than losing a loved one to lung cancer.7  But events like hurricanes are not just tangible 
and personal, they are spectacular, drawing the concern of broad constituencies.  Hence, 
environmentalists hope that such events can help people see the world differently.  They 
are trying to render these storms as events that point beyond their own spectacle of 
destruction to a broken system that is carrying us toward oblivion.  Their hope is that 
such events can help focus enough public attention and care that it galvanizes more 
support for massive social, economic, and political changes to arrest climate change.   
In the following section, I provide a summary of the analytic concepts and 
arguments presented in the preceding chapters.  The remainder of the chapter is devoted 
to putting this content in conversation with these aforementioned democratic and 
environmental concerns with the political possibilities and dangers that lie in our 
warming climate.   
 
Summary of the Dissertation  
By comparing the US and Oman, I have revealed a trend that cuts across what 
initially look like very different contexts: public processes of meaning-making after 
tropical cyclones are becoming sites of political struggle between officials and dissidents.  
People are not simply treating ecological calamities as material problems to be solved 
 
7 David Runciman, “How climate skepticism turned into something more dangerous,” The Guardian, July 
7, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/07/climate-change-denial-scepticism-
cynicism-politics. 
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through aid or recovery efforts.  They are also treating them as unplanned political 
spectacles through which the quality of government and the larger values underpinning 
the status-quo can be sized up by a national audience.   
The second and third chapters of this dissertation address why we see this 
similarity across different cases.  They argue that today’s political spectacles of calamity 
were made possible by the emergence of new discourses of citizenship and 
emergency.  These frameworks help constitute the political spectacles that attend 
disasters today.  Hence, it was only after they were on hand that it became plausible for 
political figures to speak of responding to a cyclone’s destruction as some kind of 
window into political or social facts, such as the standing of the government or the 
character of the nation.     
A discourse of citizenship came to political prominence in the US and Oman, 
ennobling a specific set of ideas and practices that make the collective maintenance or 
improvement of people’s quality of life synonymous with being a member of the political 
community.  This new vision of the social contract made one’s government and fellow 
citizens responsible for achieving or upholding certain standards of living.  It has been 
used to ennoble the provision of such support for both the predictable, everyday needs of 
people, such as education, health care, and social security, and the unexpected, 
extraordinary needs of people, such as help in times of financial ruin or aid in times of 
disaster.  This new discourse of citizenship provided a way to understand the relevant 
social and political ties in times of disaster, by articulating a vision of solidarity and 
responsibility in which citizens could count on the national community and government 
to show up for them when calamity struck. 
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This new vision for citizenship became a powerful model for envisioning what it 
meant to be an American and an Omani through different means in each country.  In the 
US, it was a gradual process.  The American constitution included a charge for Congress 
to oversee the “general welfare” of the nation, which was sporadically upheld in federal-
funding of disaster relief.  But it was not until the late nineteenth century when we saw 
the Progressive movement popularize the notion of a significantly expanded federal 
government tasked with reforming or “improving” the lives of individual citizens.  
Politicians like Herbert Hoover and FDR capitalized on this development.  Although they 
had separate visions for how these goals would be achieved, one through a synergy 
between private citizens and federal coordination, the other through centralized 
organization and expert rule, both campaigned on their ability to lead the nation in new 
programs that would improve citizens’ quality of life.  Like government responses to 
disasters today, they did not just mobilize improvement schemes to change people’s 
material conditions.  Hoover and FDR advertised these efforts, making the taming of 
rivers and serving the calamity-stricken symbols of their power and leadership.  It was 
only then that large-scale disasters were regarded as moments for evaluating national 
institutions and figure-heads.  
In Oman, it was in the mid-twentieth century when these new ideas and practices 
of citizenship became common ways for framing what it meant to be an Omani, and what 
the government would do for its people.  Many of these ideas were institutionalized 
through the nation- and state-building process of Sultan Qaboos and his British allies, 
originating at a smaller scale in their counter-insurgency response to the Marxist, anti-
colonial rebellion in the Dhofar region.  The regime branded its rule as a new era, the 
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Omani Renaissance (nahda), characterizing it as a modernization effort that broke from 
the repressive, anti-modern rule of the previous Sultan.  A big part of that modernization 
was implementing institutions and public values associated with a new social contract.  
Schools, hospitals, paved roads, and government-funded jobs would lift up Omani lives.  
Key to my investigation is how this brand of rule included changing how Omanis made a 
living, and through that, their relationship with the environment.  No longer subject to the 
hardships of nature—a drought or a bad fishing season—the new Omani citizen made a 
living working in state-funded positions in the new rentier economy.   In 1977, Sultan 
Qaboos expanded on the ecological implications of Omani citizenship when he ennobled 
the Omani military’s post-cyclone recovery effort on Masirah Island as a symbol of 
national power in the new, Qaboos-led Oman.  Thus, it was through the branding of the 
Omani Renaissance that this new discourse of citizenship became central in Omani 
political culture.  And like the US, this had ecological implications: part of what it meant 
to be a citizen was to receive support against the hazards of nature in both normal and 
extraordinary times.   
As this new discourse of citizenship made it possible for disasters to appear as 
problems for political responsibility at the national level, the framework of “national 
emergency” made it possible to view these problems with urgency, and thus, a need for 
immediate, sometimes extemporaneous mobilization.  For example, prior to Hurricane 
Katrina, the poverty, failing schools, and derelict public infrastructure of New Orleans 
was easily construed by activists as a miscarriage of justice under the new social contract.  
But such problems were also synonymous with the status-quo inequalities of the United 
States, receiving little national attention.  Compare that to the spectacle of hungry, 
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displaced people surrounded by rising water in the Superdome of New Orleans after 
Hurricane Katrina.  It was the latter problem that the mainstream national media and 
national political figures construed as a national emergency, demanding both immediate 
solutions by the government, and accountability as to why the Bush administration 
appeared unwilling or unable to do its job.  While the discourses of citizenship ennobled 
by the earlier progressive and New Deal movements provided language through which 
the denizens of New Orleans could articulate their political grievances, it was only after 
their circumstances appeared as a national emergency by virtue of the hurricane that their 
suffering sparked a national mobilization.   
History shows that this constitutive framework of contemporary disaster politics 
is relatively new.  On account of their quick, sudden destruction to human life and the 
surrounding environment, a sense of urgency is characteristic of how people have 
responded to natural disasters.  But it was only after the invention of new communication 
technologies that this urgency could be framed as a national emergency.  With the 
telegraph, radio, newspapers, and television, these new mediums helped to create a 
constituency that included people who never feel the wind, rain, or seismic shakes in their 
own body, because they live far away, but nevertheless understand themselves as part of 
the event.  National audiences can now learn about these problems in “real-time,” 
contemplating the urgency themselves and how they as an audience might intervene as 
volunteers, or how their government might intervene as the official guardians of the 
social contract.  It is now possible for local “emergencies” to become “national” ones, 
wherein the actions of larger networks of civilian and official actors are implicated in the 
disaster response effort.  In a context where solving such problems is seen as a key duty 
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of government, these emergencies are easily made into unplanned political spectacles 
wherein the capacity of the government to fulfill the expectations of citizens is thrown 
into question, creating an opportunity for dissidents and officials to compete over the 
meaning of the disaster.  It is the historical convergence of these discursive frameworks 
of citizenship and national emergency that has made it possible for disasters to appear as 
the political spectacles that they are today. 
This historical account of the US and Oman helps to correct an important part of 
how scholars understand the relationship between ecological calamities and contentious 
politics.  Maslowians regard disaster contention as arising from a mismatch between 
universal psychological needs and government performance in emergencies.  According 
to their model, insofar as the state fails in its primordial duties to provide for people’s 
basic needs after a disaster, it faces a political crisis in which its popularity or even its 
power is threatened by a disaffected public.  One could derive a dire forecast from such a 
model, wherein the growing power of disasters in a warming globe will inevitably outrun 
the capacity of governments, leading to unrest and government repression.8   
But I have shown that mass suffering and destruction caused by disasters has only 
recently implicated the state.  There is nothing universal or “natural” about how people 
politicize disasters.  In the cases of the US and Oman, such activity is historically made 
through changing discursive frameworks that offer political meaning to disasters.  In a 
sense, these findings corroborate Pell’s insight that societal responses to disasters are 
 
8 For an account of climate change causing such disorder, see Christian Parenti, Tropics of Chaos: Climate 
Change and the New Geography of Violence, (New York City, NY: Nation Books, 2011). 
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shaped by the pre-existing “social contract” of that place, a contract which is specific to 
historical context.9  However, insofar as “the social contract” describes a singular, clear 
set of expectations for state responses to disaster, it does not correspond to the multiple, 
culturally contested meanings that constitute post-disaster framing contests today.   
The fourth and fifth chapters of this dissertation examined these contests after 
large tropical cyclones in the US and Oman.  They show how officials and dissidents 
have treated tropical cyclones as unplanned political spectacles over which they compete 
to give meaning in pursuit of their own political goals.  One prominent form that these 
political spectacles take is that of a public trial, wherein national officials are judged 
according to their ability to respond quickly and effectively to the 
emergency.  Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012) demonstrate how American 
dissidents and officials competed to support accusations and provide evidence in these 
public trials.  For elite dissidents, such as the congressional Democrats during Katrina, 
these attacks took the form of publicly shaming the actions or platform of the Republican 
Party for failing to apprehend the seriousness and urgency that these disasters represent 
as national emergencies.  Grassroots activists made similar points, publicizing the 
inequalities or absences of affective government recovery efforts, especially for the urban 
poor and African American communities who were being treated as “refugees” in their 
own country.  Such trials were not unique to Katrina.  Conservative and Republican 
leaders tried to frame Hurricane Sandy as “Obama’s Katrina,” while grassroots activists 
 
9 Pelling and Dill, “Disaster politics,” 1-17. 
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attempted to highlight the gaps in the federal government’s response to the disaster in 
spite of the generally positive media coverage of its efforts.   
Both the Bush and Obama administrations made their own case to the national 
jury, and the story they told was actually two.  The first conformed to the values of 
technocratic government.  They emphasized their administrative competence and care in 
the face of the logistical feats of the emergency.  But they also told a story that rendered 
the quest for guilt or innocence as beside the point.  Their public statements emphasized 
the overwhelming, uncontainable forces of nature, and the heroism of both first-
responders and the civilian-laymen who, in spite of the enormity of destruction, 
nevertheless mobilized to serve their neighbors in need.  Rather than technical problems 
for experts carrying out their duties, in this version of the disaster such events were tests 
of “the nation’s” character.  As such, the need of civilian-led volunteer efforts were not 
evidence of a negligent government, but a testament to the nation’s virtue.     
The aftermath of Cyclone Gonu (2007) shows a similar public trial over the 
performance of the Omani state.  Despite the official and unofficial restrictions on speech 
critical of the government, Omanis after Gonu shared stories and images in public and 
semi-public forums that depicted the destruction of Oman’s newly urbanized coastline, 
purported administrative errors in the state’s early warning system, and state neglect in 
the recovery process.  They also shared stories of mass casualties, casting skepticism on 
the official death count and speculating on the political motivation behind the low 
number.  When Sultan Qaboos went on television to provide the official narrative of the 
storm, the novel word he used to describe the event, “anwa’,” was regarded by some as a 
mispronunciation of a meteorological term, underscoring the perception of government 
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officials as bumbling and fumbling in their response to the disaster.  This image of the 
Omani government failing in its capacity to protect civilians from disaster persisted into 
the years-long recovery effort.  Four years on, Gonu was still a symbol of government 
neglect to some activists.  When the Arab Spring protests in the region were inspiring 
Omanis to launch their own sit-ins, residents of a coastal town heavily damaged by Gonu 
used the occasion to take to the streets.  On behalf of Gonu victims, they demanded 
political reforms at the local level, and better education and health facilities.  
In some cases pre-empting and in others defending against these accusations in 
the public trial, the Omani government mounted a political campaign in the language of 
technical proficiency in the aftermath of Gonu.  Officials upheld the suspiciously low 
death count.  State-controlled media flooded Omani televisions with images of Omani 
helicopter rescues and aid convoys, while reporting that the government was turning 
away relief caravans from the neighboring United Arab Emirates because, they claimed, 
Omanis were capable of national self-sufficiency.  Conspicuously absent from the 
coverage were things that might damage this image of disaster expertise, such as stories 
of the destitute Omanis living outside of the capital and drowned migrant workers in 
washed-out labor camps.    
Like Presidents Bush and Obama, the Omani officials also told a parallel story of 
national heroism that circumvented the discourse of the public trial.  They emphasized 
the surprising-but-natural character of the suffering and destruction.  Rather than a 
government that can offer or fail to provide safety to its population, in this narrative the 
state’s role is to participate in the larger effort among civilians to weather the storm with 
dignity and solidarity.  Hence, they framed civilian and military relief efforts as 
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embodiments of the nation’s strength, unity, and piety across Oman’s diverse tribal, 
regional, or religious lines.  As such, the government was not there to provide a service, 
but to join and give public recognition to the heroism they attributed to the spectacle.   
Dissidents in both countries also offered accounts of the disaster that went beyond 
concerns with technocratic effectiveness, questioning the larger values and social 
arrangements that define the status quo.  After Katrina, activists contested the 
appropriateness of relief efforts that did nothing to address the pre-hurricane poverty and 
racial discrimination, or the ongoing neoliberal efforts to reduce government support for 
public spending during “normal” times.  Dissidents used the spectacle of the disaster to 
draw national attention to the systemic neglect of New Orleans’ African American 
community whose suffering, by virtue of the disaster, was only now viewed as deserving 
of urgent redress from national actors.  The aftermath of Hurricane Sandy shows a similar 
story.  Activists who mobilized relief projects used their media spotlight to challenge 
disaster recovery conventions: they echoed the message of post-Katrina activists that 
emergency mobilizations must address pre-existing racial and class inequalities.  They 
also attempted to frame the disaster as a symptom of the status-quo, rather than an 
aberration from it.  In their account, the destruction of Sandy is the outcome of capitalism 
and climate change.  As such, any attempt at recovery would be a farce if it does not 
address these systemic threats.   
Members of Oman’s religious-right also used the disaster to question the 
fundamental values and institutions of the Omani status-quo.  From anonymous 
contributors to popular online discussion forms, to the Grand Mufti himself, they 
advocated for an Islamic reform of Omani society, implicating the Sultan’s brand of rule 
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in its sins.  In their eyes, any celebrations of civilian or government feats in 
“overcoming” the cyclone was blasphemy, hubris in the face of God.  The cyclonic 
destruction was God’s work, and one does not overcome God.  One submits to him.  For 
these critics, submission consisted of rejecting the public sins on hand due to Oman’s 
recent economic transformation under Sultan Qaboos.  Like the social justice activists in 
the US, albeit in a reactionary framework, these critics offered a radical critique of the 
status-quo.  They used the popular concern brought by the disaster to circulate the 
message that merely rebuilding houses and infrastructure misses the root problems facing 
the nation. 
I make no claims as to the generalizability of these findings.  It would be a 
mistake to infer from these case studies that disasters will become unplanned political 
spectacles in all societies wherein similar discursive frameworks of citizenship and 
national emergencies are available.  It may be true that virtually all contemporary 
societies have significant access to the communication technologies that make it possible 
to think in terms of national emergencies.  It may also be true that all “modern states” 
engage in some versions of statecraft that appear to pursue the goals of welfare provision, 
social regulation, and social insurance—albeit to varying degrees.10  But one cannot 
conclude from these trends that disasters will be made into unplanned political spectacles 
everywhere, because the availability of a framework does not dictate that it will be used, 
 
10 David Garland, “The Rise of Risk,” in Risk and Morality, Richard V. Ericson and Aaron Doyle, eds., 
(Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 61-62; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990); François Ewald, “Insurance and Risk,” in The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 1-52. 
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and what it will be used for.  Recall that the American constitution made Congress 
responsible for overseeing the nation’s welfare, and congressmen in the nineteenth 
century occasionally cited this passage to justify providing aid to disaster victims.  But 
there were plenty of disaster victims who were refused aid, and this did not generate a 
political scandal, as if the social contract was being violated.  The discursive frameworks 
of citizenship and national emergency are constitutive to the unplanned political 
spectacles studied here, but they did not causally determine them.  Anyone wishing to 
understand the kinds of politics that disasters make possible in other places will have to 
look at the processes of public meaning-making.  The available frameworks provide 
discursive resources to people in this process, but they do not script it.     
My analysis of these contemporary attempts to politicize tropical cyclones in the 
US and Oman helps to correct other features of disaster contention scholarship.  Would-
be activists are not simply reacting to social facts, like how well the state fulfills its duties 
in meeting basic needs.  They are trying to shape the meaning of an unplanned political 
spectacle.  Much of the political activity surrounding disasters actually centers on what 
gets taken as fact and what those facts mean to the public.  Moreover, activists and 
officials are using the spectacle to do more than address the immediate needs of disaster 
victims.  Recognizing this helps us see an arena of competition over meaning-making that 
takes place across regime-types.  Just as these governments use the symbolism of 
providing for disaster victims as a propaganda tool, so too are dissidents using the 
purported absence of such provision as a sign that something is rotten with the status-quo.  
Today’s officials are attempting to shape how their civilian audiences understand the 
calamity in order to shape how they understand their government.  Likewise, dissidents 
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are seizing upon disasters as opportunities to spread to a national audience their own 
message against the government or the status-quo, in some cases rendering “recovery” 
itself a farce insofar as it neglects what they regard as root problems such as capitalism or 
public sin.   Thus, contests over public meaning-making and the discursive frameworks 
that shape them are central to understanding the kinds of politics that such disasters impel 
today in the US and Oman.   
 
Emergencies and Opportunities 
While I make no claims as to the generalizability of these findings, they 
nevertheless speak to concerns beyond the cases examined here.  Many influential 
scholars of natural disasters have warned of the authoritarian nature of ecological 
emergencies.11  One strand in this literature focuses on what Urlich Beck describes as the 
emerging “risk society.” Writing in 1986, Urlich Beck popularized this warning not in 
reference to global warming, but to a conglomeration of ecological side-effects that 
follow industrialization.  This included chemical spills, air and water pollution, the 
depletion of the ozone layer, the unknown effects of GMOs, and the dangers of nuclear 
radiation.  He warned that we are entering a new phase of modernity, wherein societies 
are forced to encounter the byproducts of the industrial revolution.  According to this 
literature, we are increasingly encountering complex hazards that threaten our survival.  
Unlike the disasters of old, these hazards are global in scope, so complex and largely 
 
11 However, some appear to embrace it, openly advocating for international, top-down social engineering 
with a heavy hand to eliminate fossil fuels from the global economy.  For example, see Ted Nordhaus, 
“The Empty Radicalism of the Climate Apocalypse,” Issues in Science and Technology, (Summer 2019): 
69-78. 
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invisible to our everyday life that we may need to move toward technocracy for the sake 
of survival.12  Beck argued that such a society shifts the aspirations of citizens, as well as 
their understandings of justice: “The dream of the [pre-risk] class society is that everyone 
wants and ought to have a share of the pie.  The utopia of the risk society is that everyone 
should be spared from poisoning.”13 Under such circumstances, the role of scientific and 
managerial authority expands to such an extent that ideals of democratic accountability 
and participation are thrown into crisis.   
While several scholars see disasters as nudging societies along this path to 
technocracy, Beck speculated that there might be an opportunity in these events.  He 
pinned his measured hopes for democracy on the ability of everyday people to have direct 
experience with the hazards that threaten them, so that they may judge for themselves and 
not rely on experts.14  The citizen-as-layman needs opportunities to experience the 
threats, as in a disaster, in order to participate in governing risk.   
My findings show that while ecological emergencies might prompt some to look 
to experts to make urgent political decisions on their behalf, such a move presumes two 
things that are not actually given.  First, it presumes that people have experts on hand 
whom they trust.  But that assumption does not seem to hold in many cases of national 
emergencies that I have examined here.  In fact, the cases often show that the opposite 
can happen.  Who counts as an expert worthy of such authority was contested, and those 
 
12 Urlich Beck, Risk Society, 21. 
13 Ibid., 49. 
14 Urlich Beck, Ecological Problems in the Age of Risk, 183-184. 
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officials charged with emergency response were subjected to intense public scrutiny.  
They often faced charges that they were inadequate to the immediate task at hand, or 
irrelevant to it because the root of the problem was beyond their reach.  Second, 
abdicating power to technocrats also presumes that safety, the public good that 
technocrats provide, trumps all others.  Yet my cases show a much broader universe of 
public concerns.  Just as the threats posed by global warming instigate discussions around 
how to find safety in the face of complex threats, ennobling the values of technocracy, 
they also provide a powerful platform for radicals to call for changes to the status-quo, 
often doing so by appealing to public values beyond safety.  Examples from the cases I 
have examined include piety, national solidarity, and addressing pre-disaster racial and 
class inequality.  Thus, the emergencies brought by climate change are more politically 
promiscuous than is recognized in the warnings about the rule of experts.  
This promiscuity means that we should view natural disasters as potential 
opportunities and dangers, insofar as they are treated as unplanned political spectacles.  
They are not merely pathways to any single political future.  Indeed, history tells us not 
just how things have changed, in this case, how we got to a place where such different 
countries share similar disaster politics today.  It also tells us that our future is open to 
new possibilities.15  As ecological calamities are slated to become more frequent and 
severe due to climate change, it is not a forgone conclusion that they will merely generate 
efforts to meet basic needs and return things to “normal,” safe times, as a kind of 
 
15 Here, I am indebted to Foucault’s work on genealogy.  For his comments on the “liberatory” elements of 
genealogy, see Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 164; and Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” 
82-84.  For helpful assessments of Foucault’s approach and its liberatory goals, see Mark Bevir, “What is 
Genealogy?” Journal of the Philosophy of History, 2, 2008: 272; and Davidson, The Emergence of 
Sexuality, 188-189. 
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humanitarian conservativism.  Nor is disaster contention determined by a singular, pre-set 
“social contract” or authoritarian “emergency” thinking.  Disaster responses have become 
political spectacles in which today’s partisans compete for popularity and cultural 
influence to shape the public conversation about what kind of world we want to build in 
the wreckage.  Indeed, many activists are using these spectacles as occasions for bringing 
the status-quo under public scrutiny—both the authorities and the values through which 
we evaluate them.   
Against the purported ties between disasters and humanitarian conservatism, 
between emergency and authoritarianism, my findings suggest a more contingent, 
messier, contested field of public meaning after disaster.  “Disaster capitalism,” a phrase 
coined by Naomi Klein in her influential 2007 work, The Shock Doctrine, refers to a 
political strategy in which neoliberal reformers take advantage of exogenous shocks, 
including natural disasters, to implement privatization policies that otherwise would not 
have been possible under normal circumstances. Yet Klein closes that book with 
descriptions of counter-forces to disaster capitalism, including “direct action 
reconstruction” efforts after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katina in 
2005.16 In chapter four, I have similarly showed how Hurricane Sandy was also 
occasioned with organizing against disaster capitalism, among other targets.17  What her 
 
16 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York, NY: Metropolitan 
Books, 2007), 464-466.  Her later journalism and advocacy continues to highlight this dynamic between 
disaster capitalism and the politicization of civilian-run relief efforts.  For example, see Naomi Klein, 
“Puerto Ricans and Ultrarich ‘Puertopians’ are Locked in a Pitched Struggle Over how to Remake the 
Island,” The Intercept, March 20, 2018, https://theintercept.com/2018/03/20/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-
recovery/.  
17 I provide a more thorough account of Occupy Sandy’s organizing elsewhere.  See Schuenemann, 
“Making and Scheduling Citizens,” 87-108. 
 233   
work does so well is it shows that disasters are being seen by political actors as 
opportunities for political change.  But while she characterizes these efforts as being 
primarily driven by elite, neoliberal reformers, against which grassroots activists must 
then react—playing defense—this dissertation has shown a broader cast of players and 
initiatives.    
The meaning of disasters and the values through which people evaluate the 
response are sites of public contestation and therefore opportunities for change.  In that 
sense, we should read post-disaster contention as a series of experiments and struggles to 
popularize new ways of thinking about who we are, who or what we can look to in the 
face of calamity, and the kind of world we want to build on top of the debris.  The 
resonant depictions of national vulnerability in the media and in the streets, along with 
the attempts to address it collectively, instigate battles wherein political entrepreneurs 
find opportunities to frame the emergency toward a larger political agenda, putting 
pressure on the state to intervene in this framing contest.  Rather than just holding states 
accountable to a pre-existing social contract, like the duty to provide for basic needs in 
the face of calamity, these mobilizations are spaces for political and social innovation.  
As global warming makes disasters more frequent and destructive, and we are confronted 
with scene-after-scene of human suffering and ecological devastation, the political 
spectacle of disaster is an opening for experimentation and mobilization behind new 
visions.   
The variety of mutual aid and activist networks that emerged in Puerto Rico in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Maria (2017) are a testament to this potential.  There, a negligent 
relief effort by the Federal and local governments prompted citizens to organize relief 
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efforts for themselves.  Some of these organizations politicized their work, drawing 
attention to the larger problems of an inattentive government, economic injustice, and 
climate change, calling them “social emergencies.”18 The effect of hailing the public this 
way may have been fleeting.  But popularizing such a political reading of the disaster 
provided a framework that activists could pick up later, when evidence of government 
neglect returned.  The leaked emails of Puerto Rico’s governing elite provided the 
occasion.  They including denigrating remarks about those killed by the hurricane, 
sparking public outrage and mass protests that ousted Puerto Rico’s then-governor, 
Ricardo A. Rosselló.19   
This contested meaning of disasters in public discourse should also inform 
environmentalists who seek to use such events to clarify the dangers of global warming to 
the public in hopes of mobilizing them as environmentalists.  The sheer diversity of 
answers to the question, “just what is it that disasters reveal?” complicates the notion that 
they have the capacity to function as a spotlight, a test, or a corrective lens to make the 
abstract dangers of climate change visible.20  In other words, disasters do not clarify or 
make tangible global warming.  Environmentalists must to do that.  And in doing so, they 
 
18 JunteGente, “Manifesto of Emergency and Hope,” June 2, 2018, http://juntegente.org/en/manifiesto/.   
19 Karen Pinchin, “How Hurricane Maria Fueled Puerto Rico’s Resistance,” PBS Frontline, August 2, 
2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-hurricane-maria-fueled-puerto-ricos-resistance/; 
Patrician Mazzei and Alejandra Rosa, “Hurricane Maria, 2 Years Later: ‘We Want Another Puerto 
Rico,’” The New York Times, September 9, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/us/puerto-rico-
hurricane-maria.html. 
20 This argument also applies to the disaster studies scholarship that examines the conditions under which 
disasters can act as focusing events that allow state institutions to learn the right lessons about disaster 
mitigation.  For example, see Birkland, Lessons of Disaster.  
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must contend with the frameworks on hand that shape people’s understandings of 
disaster.   
While national citizenship is being used as a discursive resource for articulating 
dissent in the face of emergencies, it may be a trap for environmentalists to the extent that 
this framework dominates public discourse after disasters.  In the US and Oman, new 
visions of citizenship have made scenes of mass destruction and suffering, as well as the 
efforts to redress them, into potent symbols of shared national fate and interdependence.  
But what of the global nature of these threats, both their causes and who else they 
harm?21  In the national framing, perhaps those harmed outside our boarders are worthy 
of “charity,” or capable of giving “us” aid when calamity strikes.  But it restricts the 
language of shared fate and political responsibility to a particular territory in a way that 
does not correspond to what climate scientists tell us are the transnational 
interconnections that shape global climate change.  There is a danger that this focus on 
the national community occludes other understandings of harm, interdependence, and 
responsibility that are also worth mobilizing behind. 
Discourses of citizenship also contain the danger of scapegoating that 
environmentalists need to avoid.  Born out of the promethean vision of modernizers who 
saw human organization and technology as capable of mastering humanity’s fate, the 
visions of citizenship ennobled by progressives, New Dealers, liberal imperialists, and the 
Qaboos regime can hold such a grand vision of human agency that it lends itself to 
 
21 For this reason, Urlich Beck believes that cosmopolitan understandings of citizenship are necessary for 
addressing global risks.  See Beck, “Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk.” 
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mistaking structural problems for problems of leadership.  It makes good sense to hold 
George W. Bush accountable to his decision to hand FEMA over to someone with no 
relevant experience.  But, to give just one example, a great deal of Katrina’s initial 
destruction and suffering can be traced back to generations of human settlement in 
hazard-prone areas, itself driven by systemic forces that have been beyond the control of 
any politician.22  Just as discourses of citizenship have the danger of depoliticizing our 
connections to those living across the border, it poses the same risk for intergenerational 
connections.  Ensuring that future heads of FEMA are the best of experts will not fix the 
world we inherited.  It will not prevent massive hurricanes from flooding New Orleans 
again.  Iris Marion Young was correct when she warned against a vision of political 
responsibility that was ill-suited for addressing the historic and systemic forces behind 
such disasters.23  The time frame through which we read these threats must be much 
longer, the chains of collective responsibility wider.  If environmentalists wish to use the 
political spectacles of disasters to their own ends, then they must find ways to make the 
destruction represent a much broader slice of history, and therefore a wider collection of 
actors and institutions that are responsible.  Somewhat paradoxically, they need to make 
the emergency appear as part of the so-called “normal times” both before the disaster and 
after the recovery.  
  
 
22 Susan Cutter, “The Geography of Social Vulnerability: Race, Class, and Catastrophe,” Social Science 
Research Council, June 11, 2006, https://items.ssrc.org/understanding-katrina/the-geography-of-social-
vulnerability-race-class-and-catastrophe/. 
23 Iris Young, “Katrina: Too Much Blame, Not Enough Responsibility,” Dissent, 53, no.1 (2006): 41-46. 
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